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When Columbus lost his head 
In June 2020, demonstrators marched in the UK in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter 
demonstrations ongoing in the US. A group of demonstrators in Bristol brought down 
and dumped in the river the statue of Edward Colston who was involved in the slave 
trade in the 17th century.  
In the German language, a distinction is drawn between Denkmal – which is a monument 
and Mahnmal – which is a structure memorialising a painful chapter in history which 
serves as a reminder that such history must not be repeated.  
The uproar surrounding events in Bristol saw much discussion around the life and legacy 
of Colston. But long after the controversy has blown over, the question that will remain 
with us is this: What does heritage stand for and why it matters so much to us? Those 
who oppose the toppling of the statue condemn such actions as erasure of history and 
those that support its removal decry it as an affront to those at the receiving end of 
historical injustice and marginalisation. Both parties agree that the statue – in both 
standing there for 125 years and in no longer – serves the purpose of educating future 
generations. Referring to similar takedowns of statues in cities across the United States, 
one commentator viewed the events as “protest against the current neoliberal policies 
that simultaneously expel the lower classes from urban centers, and transform them into 
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frozen vestiges. The symbols of old slavery and colonialism are combined with the 
dazzling visage of real estate capitalism — and these are the protestors’ targets”1. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos describes these events as statues leaping from the past into 
our present. He perceives the attacks against them as an expression of discontent 
against “unjust power (which) favors the rise of racism, the negation of other stories, 
violence against women, and homophobia”2. The answer, for Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos, lies in a creative liberation pedagogy, based on a recognition that the oppressor 
too now seeks liberation.  
The artist Banksy came forward to propose a compromise: Reinstate the Colston statue 
to its plinth at an angle with the addition of tugging protestors on the ground having 
halfway uprooted it.  
Some debating the issue have taken a different angle: should the removal of the statue 
have proceeded in a more orderly manner rather than what can now be considered 
unlawful destruction of public property? The charged polemics of the episode directly 
confront politics – domestic and international – with this question: Should order always 
be privileged over justice? 
 
**** 
                                                          
1 Traverso E (2020), Bringing Down Statues Doesn’t Erase History, It Makes Us See It More Clearly, THEWIRE.IN 
https://thewire.in/world/statues-racism-history-protests 
Accessed June 27, 2020 
2 De Sousa Santos B (2020), The Statues of our Discontent, Critical Legal Thinking website 
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2020/06/20/the-statues-of-our-discontent/ 
Accessed June 23, 2020 
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US withdrawal from UNESCO  
Recognising the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, which was active 
in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s, as the precursor to UNESCO, Lynn Meskell 
characterises the latter as “embedded within modernist principles of progress and 
development and similarly subscribes to the liberal principles of diplomacy, tolerance, 
and development”3. The role of international organisations is a key consideration in this 
study and UNESCO is heavily focused on in this regard, due to its mission in the field of 
heritage.  
In 2017, the United States of America withdrew completely from UNESCO, having 
discontinued funding to the organisation since 2011. Israel also withdrew from UNESCO 
along with the US in an instance of what the realists would term bandwagoning. A major 
concern for both countries is reported to have been the recognition of Palestine as a full 
member state and designation of certain sites as Palestinian heritage.  
In 2018, the United States withdrew from the United Nations Human Rights Council and 
in 2020 from the World Health Organisation. 
**** 
Post-COVID world order and international cooperation 
Ten questions worth asking: 
1. Who will be the winners and losers in international society? 
2. Will a world order centred around one hegemonic power cease to exist? 
                                                          
3 Meskell L (2013), UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention at 40 Challenging the Economic and Political Order of 




3. Will another hegemon emerge and engage in revisionism and what toll will such a 
transition exact? 
4. Which aspects of history will be contested and resuscitated for forging of 
identities and articulation of political agendas? 
5. How will powerful groups respond to challenges to their privilege? 
6. How will the global economy adapt and will neoliberalism decline? 
7. Will international organisations reform themselves or recede irredeemably?  
8. Will conventional geostrategic rivalries be heightened or supressed by the impact 
of climate change? 
9. What is the nature of preparedness required to cope with the psychosocial fallout 
of conflict and uncertain technological change? 
10. Can we keep teaching globalisation and other foundational concepts in social 
science, law and international politics the way we have been? Have disciplinary 
silos been rendered completely irrelevant, even counterproductive?  
**** 
Memory in Law 
The concept of memory in law has mainly been interpreted as a psychosocial concept in 
the courtroom setting. Legal scholars, other than criminologists, have seldom found it 
necessary to unpack the phenomenon of memory. In the literature surveyed for this 
study, I was able to find one study which links memory and law towards analysing the 
impact of the latter on preventing mass atrocities. The authors Joachim J Savelsberg and 
Ryan D King propose two hypotheses in this context: first, “once established through 
trials and other mechanisms, collective memory may counteract violence directly, by 
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delegitimising grave human rights violations, or indirectly, by evoking new control 
responses” and second, “the narrative history produced by trials is unique in that it 
reflects the institutional logic of the legal sphere”4. This study rescues memory from 
cooption into this institutional logic of the legal sphere in two ways: first, through an 
exploration of the way in which memory is embodied and enacted in heritage we have a 
way to understand it anew; second, by observing how memory itself can fuel the conflict 
which law seeks to redress, particularly when it manifests itself as intergenerational 
trauma.   
**** 
The Marble that saved the Mausoleum 
The story of an attempted sale of the Taj Mahal by Governor General Lord Bentinck in the 
early 1830s has survived the inherited lore from British India. The demolition of several 
structures in Agra to repurpose their materials for construction of buildings of the 
imperial administration is well established. As to whether the Taj Mahal itself was under 
any serious threat of meeting a similar fate remains a matter of dispute5. Contemporary 
writings suggest that the demolition did not go through as the marble in which the Taj 
Mahal is constructed, failed to fetch an attractive price.  
Today, the Taj is a World Heritage Site attracting millions of visitors each year and is also 
visited by controversy stemming from communalisation and politicisation of heritage 
                                                          
4 Savelsberg JJ and King RD (2011), American Memories: Atrocities and the Law, Russell Sage Foundation, pp 8-
9 
5 In Spear P. (1949), Bentinck and the Taj, The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 
No. 2, pp. 180-187 evidence in support of both sides of the debate is examined. 
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from time to time. However, this saga contains key lessons. Firstly, it is difficult to define 
heritage because what is a masterpiece to someone is a mere hunk of marble to another.  
Secondly, heritage is both unifying as a link to the past and polarising for its economic 
and identity-related aspects. And thirdly, studying heritage is an exercise in mindfulness 
and reflexivity because what we regard as cultural patrimony and how we approach it is 
a reflection of our history and how much power we are accustomed to wielding.  
**** 
Other ways of knowing as heritage 
In “Internationalising the University: A Spiritual Approach”, I arrive at a conception of 
“other ways of knowing” by observing through time, the dance between religion, 
spirituality, science and knowledge creation. The separation of state and church was 
accompanied by secularisation of science and education which I argue led to a “double 
reductionism”6: 
On the one hand, scientific modernity reduced the aim of salvation of the soul to constructs 
such as human rights and liberal democracy. On the other, for the religious domain too, a 
reductionist response was evoked, faced with a challenge to its universal applicability. 
The concept of heritage is central to this study. As detailed later, the concept of heritage 
opens the door for a conversation with other ways of knowing besides positivist, Euro-
centric, hegemonic science, chiefly by reminding us that “while it may be possible to 
explain the living human state entirely in scientific (biological) terms, it is our cultural 
                                                          
6 Unkule K (2019), Internationalising the University: A Spiritual Approach, Palgrave Macmillan, p 101 
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inheritance that enables us to find meaning in our existence and not merely exist, but 
thrive”7.  
As a scholar situated in the global south, I consider other ways of knowing as part of my 
heritage. This perspective has helped me to be, as a person, in sync with my scholarship. 
With its growing influence on my teaching philosophy, this perspective has also enabled 
me to better connect with students and begin to reimagine my role in legal education as 
an outsider, a social scientist.  
**** 
This doctoral study brings the disciplines of International Relations and International Law 
together. While referring to the disciplines I have used capital I-R and I-L, while referring 
to the real world phenomena, I have used small i-r and i-l. The main aim of this study is to 
discover how the two disciplines, in conjunction, extend each other’s boundaries and 
open the way for a shift of focus from order to justice in international society. The case 
study I have used to delve into my research questions is that of protection of cultural 
heritage. Heritage is treated here as a site for interdisciplinary study and the central 
theme that draws in all the influences and strands of my research project. Accordingly, it 
is a site for meeting of interests and identities, of theory and practice, of International 
Law and International Relations, of empirical findings, conceptual redevelopment and 
theoretical innovation. Importantly for my situation and situatedness as a scholar in the 
global south Heritage is also a site that allows the clash between hegemonic/Eurocentric 
positivist science and other ways of knowing to play out. In the literature I have reviewed 
and cited in this study, I have not exclusively relied on the work of scholars from the 
                                                          
7 Unkule p 102 
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global south or scholars pledging allegiance to non-western or post-colonial discourses. 
As reflected in my previous work, my attempt is not to replace one hegemony with 
another but to achieve harmony. The findings of this study are more relevant to tangible 
cultural heritage. However, a promising area of further research would be applying the 
analytical possibilities created by the study to investigate questions surrounding the 
protection of intangible cultural heritage.  
The next chapter deals with the research methodology of the study somewhat 
unconventionally by thoroughly reviewing the epistemological traditions in International 
Relations and International Law and outlining what scholars on both sides have so far 
been able to achieve joining forces. Chapters three, four and five deal respectively with 
the game theory, human security and constructivist frameworks from International 
Relations, as applied to the case of heritage protection. The role that international law 
has played in heritage protection is critically assessed within each theoretical edifice. 
Chapter six turns to responses in international law and groups them as legalisation, 
criminalisation and regulation, again concentrating on wartime destruction of and illegal 
trade in cultural property. Together with the analysis presented in the foregoing 
chapters, findings on responses from international law lead us to conclude that 
approaches from International Relations and International Law working together 
present international cooperation in a particular domain in different light, as a step 
towards reconceptualising the role of law in international politics. Major conclusions of 
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Seeking: Research Methodology 
Chapter Highlights 
 The disciplines of International Law and International Relations differ greatly in 
their methodological starting points 
 The adversarial nature of legal practice exerts a marked influence on the 
traditions of legal research 
 Method in International Relations has been shaped by the discipline’s aspirations 
to be at once policy relevant and taken seriously as a science; for its conceptual 
building blocks, it has borrowed heavily from other social sciences; the discipline 
continues to be western-centric 
 A common research agenda for both disciplines has been spoken of in recent 
decades but never engaging with their methodological orientations as this 
chapter attempts 
 Heritage as a case study has rich potential for interdisciplinary collaboration 
between International Relations and International Law, especially if interpreted as 
a “site” for meeting of various influences, understandings and approaches 
 Reflexivity and self-awareness need to be an explicit part of thinking about 








Method in Legal Research and International Law 
In legal science, according to Jaap Hage, “The adoption of a method is a choice for what 
counts as relevant ... (and) the kind of data that must be collected in order to argue for 
or against a potential piece of knowledge”8. This adversarial and interpretive approach 
marks off legal research from the understanding of method in the social sciences. 
Mathias Siems is critical of this traditional approach finding that it makes much of legal 
scholarship insular, self-referential and advocacy in disguise9.  
Lee Epstein and Gary King concede that “perfectionism in methods at the expense of 
other goals is both inappropriate and unnecessary”10. However, they do also lament the 
absence in legal scholarship of “the methods of statistics, interviewing, ethnographies, 
modelling, participant observation, experiments, network analysis, archival work, 
historical studies, and many other diverse approaches”, as found in “political 
methodology, econometrics, psychometrics, or sociological methodology”11. Richard 
Revesz has argued, au contraire, that legal scholarship has become ever more 
interdisciplinary over the years and “social scientists would benefit from paying close 
                                                          
8 Hage J. (2011), The Method of a truly normative legal science in Van Hoecke M. (ed.), Methodologies of Legal 
Research: Which Kind of Method for what kind of discipline?, Hart Publishing, p 22 
9 Siems, MM. (2011), A world without Law Professors in Van Hoecke M. (ed.), Methodologies of Legal 
Research: Which Kind of Method for what kind of discipline?, Hart Publishing, p 81 
10 In their reply to discussant submissions to their paper Epstein L and King G (2002), The Rules of Inference, 
University of Chicago Law Review 69 (1), p 207 
11 p 209 
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attention to the methodological innovations performed by legal scholars”12. Paul Roberts 
opts for a more pragmatic position in stating that “smart methodology means selecting 
‘horses for courses’, the opposite of unthinking conformity to methodological dogma or 
transient intellectual fashions”13.  
According to Manderson and Mohr, “legal research means finding the law” and so far 
what is conventionally understood as legal research has “little to do with how things get 
to be called law, or how they are experienced as such, and with what effects”14. 
Manderson and Mohr further attribute these shortcomings of legal research to “a 
profoundly short-term and limited understanding of the actual nature and principles of 
‘law’”15. This study is undertaken based on the observation that these pieces are even 
more conspicuously missing in case of international law and adopts an interdisciplinary 
approach to address the gaps.  
Paul Roberts attempts to outline the crux of legal research in these words16: 
Legal research ‘takes law seriously’ in terms of its methodological presuppositions and 
engagement with primary institutional sources ... (which) include treaties, constitutions, 
legislation and precedent cases, but also procedural codes, ‘hard-working soft law’ norms 
and the informal operational routines that mediate between law in the books and law in 
action.  
                                                          
12 Revesz RL. (2002), A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, University of Chicago Law Review 69 (1), p 169 
13 Roberts P., Interdisciplinarity in Legal research, in McConville M and Chui WH (eds.) (2017), Research 
Methods for Law, Edinburg University Press, p 100 
14 Manderson D and Mohr R. (2002), From Oxymoron to intersection: an epidemiology of legal research, Law 
Text Culture Vol 6, p160 
15 P 161 
16 Roberts P., Interdisciplinarity in Legal research, in McConville M and Chui WH (eds.) (2017), Research 




Below, I have reviewed some of the nudges towards interdisciplinary research that have 
emerged from within the discipline of law.  
Geoffrey Samuel attributes instances of isolation of law from social reality to the 
overwhelming emphasis on structure and coherence within the discipline and its 
aspiration to be regarded as a science. As a way out of this self-referential cycle, he 
reminds us that legal rules and institutions are meant to express a vision of justice, 
adding17: 
...if justice is a phenomenon that exists independently of law one will need to turn to other 
social science disciplines...in order to give substance and definition to the phenomenon.  
Manderson and Mohr similarly derive the possibility of scholarship in law with reference 
to considerations exogenous to law itself, stating that “law as a process of debating 
between outcomes offers thereby a language for articulating issues of morality and 
justice”18. More generally, they argue for the need to account for multiple reference 
groups as unifying law as technique, law as scholarship and legal ethics.  
Ultimately, in answer to the question as to whether law is a social science, Samuel 
concludes that it has the ability to be so when it steps outside of the authority paradigm. 
The authority paradigm in law stems from the theological origins of law. Later in this 
chapter, I discuss how a conversation between positivist science on the one hand and 
theology and other ways of knowing on the other, opens the door for closer 
collaboration between international relations and international law.  
                                                          
17 Samuel G. (2008), Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative Law, Cambridge Law Journal 
67(2),p 295 
18 18 Manderson D and Mohr R. (2002), From Oxymoron to intersection: an epidemiology of legal research, Law 
Text Culture Vol 6, p160 
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Commenting on the preponderance of doctrinal research in the discipline of law, Ian 
Dobinson and Francis Johns summarise the prevailing view as follows19: 
The main arguments are that law is an authoritative, rules-based discipline where doctrinal 
observations are merely self-referential and do not reveal anything about the outside world. 
However such arguments also acknowledge that where law engages with society in a way 
revealed by legal realists or where a researcher reaches beyond jurisdictional authority to 
consider comparative law issues, then that doctrinal research may take on some of the 
elements of social science research. 
Manderson and Mohr contend that it is due to the tradition of doctrinal scholarship 
compared to social sciences, law has more in common with theology “in terms of its 
exegetical cast, its faith in authority and its devotion to untangling the intricacies of 
canonical texts”20. The question of interest to them is not the intersection of law with 
other disciplines but the intersection of law with the idea of research itself. 
Dobinson and Johns further document how the internal professional pull of legal reform 
and the external academic push of needing to align research methods with other 
disciplines, has brought research in law ever closer to social science research21. However, 
these authors do also add the caveat that “the social science model cannot be wholly 
applied to legal research because the source documents are derived in a different way”, 
i.e. a more inductive and hierarchical approach than is practicable in the social sciences. 
Instead, they emphasize that what legal research can truly hope to gain from the social 
                                                          
19 Dobinson I and Johns F, Legal Research as Qualitative Research, in McConville M and Chui WH (eds.) (2017), 
Research Methods for Law, Edinburg University Press, p 21 
20 p 163 
21 Dobinson and Johns’ main contention is that “law is not simply self referential but can teach us about the 
world”. (p 35) 
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scientific approach is “the discipline of a thorough, unbiased and reproducible 
methodology”22.  
Paul Roberts alerts us to the inevitable friction that can result from the conjoint 
operation of two or more disciplines in a research study adding that “incompatible 
standpoints and perspectives can sometimes be more productive, energising or revealing 
that seamless coherence, harmony and integration”23. Indeed, such has been the case 
with the interactions between International Relations and International Law as we will 
see below.   
The growing importance of socio-legal research has been proposed in the context of 
possibilities for interdisciplinary research in law. A growing body of scholars today accord 
great significance to context in legal research pointing out that “A precondition for legal 
research in any form has become that the researcher should not only have knowledge 
about the traditional elements of the law, but also about the quickly changing societal, 
political, economic and technological contexts and, possibly, other aspects of 
relevance”24. 
This study falls at the intersection of international relations theory and international law.  
Although influenced by exploratory, explanatory, historical and comparative studies, it 
primarily engages in critical, analytical research. For instance, in forthcoming chapters, 
the comparative merits and limitations of the rational choice, human security and 
constructivist frameworks are discussed in relation to protection of cultural heritage but 
                                                          
22 p 35 
23 P 92 
24 Philip Langbroek, Kees van den Bos, Marc Simon Thomas, Michael Milo, Wibo van Rossum (2017), 
Methodology of Legal Research: Challenges and Opportunities, Utrecht Law Review, Vol 13 (3), p1 
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going further, in each case, an analytical takeaway is arrived at which extends our 
conceptual understanding of the frameworks themselves. From a quality control 
standpoint, this study has found the following advice particularly instructive25: 
The quality of legal research is gauged by the quality of the conceptual analysis, the quality 
of the reasoning and the rhetoric, and last, but not least, the quality of the references in the 
text. 
Method in International Relations 
Stanley Hoffman distils the philosophical preoccupations of the international relations 
scholar in these words26: 
... they wrote about the difference between a domestic order stable enough to afford a 
search for the ideal state, and an international contest in which order has to be established 
first, and which often clashes with any aspiration to justice. 
The first noteworthy point in these lines is that in International Relations analysis, 
international politics is not a mere extension of domestic politics just as the international 
system is not simply, a domestic polity writ large. Yet, certain assumptions about human 
behaviour, social control and the nature of power have been adopted from domestic 
politics. The second noteworthy point is that for generations of International Relations 
scholars the conception of order in the international system has not always been 
underpinned by an insistence on prioritising justice. Does this latter observation mean 
that International Relations has nothing to offer International Law in terms of 
                                                          
25 Supra note 16, p 2 
26 Hoffman S. (1977), An American Social Science: International Relations, Daedalus, Vol. 106, No. 3, 
Discoveries and Interpretations: Studies in Contemporary Scholarship, Volume I (Summer), pp. 41-60 
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articulating a conception of justice, as many believe to be the promise of interdisciplinary 
engagement? It has been established in existing literature that theoretical perspectives 
developed by International Relations Scholars provide a variety of frameworks to 
articulate our vision of international society. Based on each vision, a different and well-
specified approach to the relevance and form of international law emerges. In 
forthcoming chapters, conceptual lenses from International Relations – rational choice, 
human security and constructivism – are evaluated in relation to the concern of 
protecting cultural heritage. We find that: 
1. Normative positions are written into the theoretical perspectives themselves 
2. International Relations draws significantly from conceptual building blocks 
developed in other social sciences which originated from the quest for a just 
social order 
3. When the operation in the real world of policies based on these paradigms is 
observed, it becomes evident who gains and does not from them 
4. The role of epistemic and linguistic dominance in obstructing a genuine debate on 
“justice” is uncovered 
Therefore, concludes the study, that although in their purest form International Relations 
theories may not serve as useful guides to outline a vision of international justice, their 
application in real world scenarios is highly instructive.  
Drawing attention to the emphasis on empiricism in international relations, Hoffman 
further asks27: Without a study of political relations, how could one understand the 
                                                          
27 p 42 
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fumblings and failures of international law, or the tormented debates on the foundation of 
obligation among sovereigns unconstrained by common values or superior power? It is 
interesting that Hoffman, among others in the discipline of International Relations, 
consider Hans Morgenthau, a teacher of international law, to be one of the founders of 
International Relations as a discipline. Morgenthau’s approach of blending empiricism 
with normativism appears to have left a lasting legacy for International Relations. The 
wide scope and sweep of his work also laid the foundations for an analytical orientation 
focused on the system. Through an examination of the evolution of the realist school in 
international relations, Hoffman relates how the link which exists between scientific 
disciplines and State institutions and interests, usually uncomfortably, happens to be 
more robust in the case of International Relations. He lists an articulation of the concept 
of “system” as a web of interaction between states, the “rules of the game” that 
emerge from deterrence literature, and a specification of the role played by economic 
interdependence in interstate relations, as the three major contributions of disciplinary 
International Relations. Since the Cold War context in which the first two of these 
contributions were made no longer applies and the assumptions of a thriving liberal 
economic order on which the third contribution rests have been seriously undercut in the 
twenty first century, the continuing relevance of the discipline, lacking further innovation 
and advances, may be called into question. This study therefore advocates a two-way 
interdisciplinary dialogue in which the work of international legal scholars provides 
inspiration and impetus to the evolution of International Relations.  
Reviewing the contribution of structural realist Kenneth Waltz to International Relations, 
Charlotte Epstein identifies two key dimensions: firstly, a move away from empiricism 
and an inductive approach to analysis and second, “the establishment of the 
21 
 
international as a discrete, constitutive, space; not simply as that indeterminate space 
beyond, in between or ‘among nations’’28.  From the perspective of international legal 
scholars, however, Waltz’s strong emphasis on theorising underestimates how much 
international agreements factor into the decision-making calculus of policy-makers. The 
Liberal School of International Relations, by contrast, renders the international system as 
a reflection of the relationships that exist between state and civil society (strictly 
speaking interest groups) at the domestic level. They view foreign policy in the same way 
as they do the domestic variant – interests organising to achieve their goals through the 
system of governance. It is thus that they derive the Democratic Peace Thesis whereby 
liberal democracies shun war for being antithetical to the interests of the governed. With 
respect to international law, proponents of the liberal view would therefore contend 
“that liberal democracies are more likely than are other regime types to revere law, 
promote compromise, and respect processes of adjudication”29. Another hypothesis 
derived from the liberal view of the international system is that economic 
interdependence drives up the cost of conflict by linking the interests of domestic 
constituencies in various states, and is therefore desirable for systemic stability. While 
studying regime characteristics as a determinant of external policy, including compliance 
with international law, scholars have also investigated differences between federal and 
unitary states, parliamentary and presidential systems and common and civil law 
systems. Broadly speaking, while the realists are preoccupied with the system as a unit of 
                                                          
28 Epstein C. (2013), Constructivism or the eternal return of universals in International Relations. Why returning 
to language is vital to prolonging the owl’s flight, European Journal of International Relations, Vol 19, p 503 
29 Simmons BA (1998), Compliance with International Agreements, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 1998. 1:75–93 
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analysis, the liberal international relations scholar’s gaze is focused on the regime 
characteristics of the state.  
Describing International Relations as a “not so international discipline”, Ole Waever 
points out its major characteristics as follows30: 
 The discipline’s evolution has closely modelled the existence of American 
hegemony in the real world 
 The discipline has borrowed heavily from other social sciences but simultaneously 
asserted its separate identity, in particular by embracing rational choice as the 
predominant analytical framework 
 International Relations scholarship in the United States is oriented towards 
rational choice as the metatheoretical framework whereas European scholarship 
demonstrates a greater influence of constructivism and postmodernism 
Even as International Relations has developed largely in the US and is heavily influenced 
by historical and institutional variables obtaining there, the contributions of scholars in 
other regions do help address important questions of our time31. Christer Jonsson 
describes International Relations scholarship emerging from Scandinavia as “prone to 
focus on subnational actors, ... more embedded in political science, ... generalist rather 
than specialist... (and) in a better position to escape from the entrapment of an 
ahistorical current-events approach”32. Jonsson points out that unlike their American 
                                                          
30 Waever O. (2005), The Sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European Developments 
in International Relations, International Organisation Vol 52(4), pp 687-727 
31 In a footnote of a work cited in this chapter, Onuma Yasuyaki has linked a decline in academic interest in 
International law in Japan with progressive Americanisation of international studies since the 1970s 
32 Jonsson C. (1993), International Politics: Scandinavian Identity amidst American Hegemony?, Scandinavian 
Political Studies Vol 16(2), pp 149-165 
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counterparts, Scandinavian specialists of International Relations have maintained the 
research stance of an observer and not an advisor and as a result have had much success 
in explaining the nature of international cooperation. Jonsson concurs with the 
assessment above that the emphasis on grand theorising in International Relations, 
which has been a byproduct of the Cold War context, weakens its claims to continued 
relevance. Instead he argues33: 
...the periphery – including Scandinavia – has been more involved in testing and refining 
middle-range theories [...] such as decision-making, conflict management, bargaining, and 
integration (which) have not been called into question by recent world events.  
Jonsson further notes that while in the United States, International Relations has staked 
its claims as an independent discipline, in Scandinavia it has, au contraire, developed as a 
subfield of political science and in close connection with comparative politics. This has 
enabled Scandinavian International Relations scholarship to pay more attention to those 
questions which “involve a complex of domestic and international political processes”34. 
Asking whether “realism and liberalism (are) genuinely universal”35, Amitav Acharya 
surveys the proposed influences that might shape a non-Western theory of International 
Relations. Some of the attempts that have so far been made in this direction take the 
approach of studying emerging powers or countries from the global south as outliers. 
However, it is increasingly clear that the assumptions undergirding realist stability or the 
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ethos of linear progression central to liberalism are today seriously challenged in the 
western world too.  
Looking back on their approach to theory, International Relations scholars have found 
their historical aspiration to be policy relevant36 to have had decisive implications for the 
evolution of the discipline in two ways: 1. The resemblance of theoretical frameworks to 
ground reality during important periods in history 2. The emphasis on producing middle-
range theories which seek to establish the relationship between input and output 
variables in law-like fashion.  Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon help us uncover 
the ideational assumptions underlying this general disciplinary approach as making “a 
number of commitments concerning the law-like character of good knowledge, the 
representational nature of empirical claims, and the ‘Humean’ account of causality. In 
other words, such middle-range theorizing generally depends on a neopositivist 
worldview, and on a wager that neopositivism — as distinct from other, equally 
‘scientific’ methodological perspectives — provides a definitively superior grasp of the 
world”37. 
Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wright present a more comprehensive account of the 
various theoretical denominations in the discipline38: 1. Explanatory theory which 
prioritises utility and predictive capacity; 2. Critical theory which aims to bring about 
normative change; 3. Constitutive theory which investigates the influence of ideas on 
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observable facts. As a result, argues Arlene Tickner, this places International Relations in 
the same category of the rest of Western science which erects synthetic walls between 
modern/premodern, human/non-human, fact/value, nature/culture, and on which its 
hegemonic standing is premised. The core-periphery dynamic which characterises real 
world relations under pyramid globalisation, has very much been the operative scheme 
of the global spread of the International Relations discipline. Thus, the obsession with 
policy-relevance of metropolitan International Relations is mirrored in peripheral regions. 
Tickner observes, “research agendas in IR throughout the global South seem to parallel 
those of the foreign policy agendas of states, reinforcing the idea that theory should 
operate as a toolbox that derives from the realities that states must address in their 
international dealings”39, making International Relations an extreme case of 
asymmetrical knowledge. Worse, since the of philosophical and ideational lineage of 
western theories is alien to other parts of the world, use of theory there is not 
methodologically rigorous, further hurting the prospects of localised development of 
theory.  
 Dovetails and Departures: the conversation between International Law and International 
Relations so far 
In the mind of the International Relations scholar, the malleability of diplomacy lends 
itself much better to international life than the straitjacket of law. The conception of 
international law in the mind of the international legal scholar closely approximates an 
ingrained understanding of domestic law. As noted earlier, theorising in International 
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Relations is concerned primarily with order and justice has been a secondary concern if at 
all. Due to the influence of the parent discipline of Law, International Legal scholarship is 
much more interested in contending with the question of a just order. Expressing this 
dilemma, Onuma Yasuaki writes40: 
If we understand the ‘essence’ of law as the realisation of justice, we may think that a major 
function of international law is to provide a tool for achieving international justice. If, on the 
other hand, we see the role of law as that of camouflaging the dominance and exploitation 
by the establishment of a society, then a major function of international law can be seen as 
that of justifying global dominance and exploitation by the powerful developed countries. 
Yasuaki considers distinguishing law from the politics and ethics of international society 
as key to specifying its nature and promise. His analysis uncovers an important impetus 
for interdisciplinary work in International Law. He contends that the discipline has 
neglected investigating the drivers of status quo in the international system. In a similar 
vein, the common understanding of positive law has not been critically examined and 
further extended beyond “the category of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute41, especially 
explicit provisions in existing treaties and norms of customary international law as 
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exemplified by leading Western international lawyers”42. For scholarship in International 
Relations, the status quo or “systemic stability” has indeed been a key concern. Realists 
have elevated it as a prime variable for disciplinary investigation, liberals have closely 
observed interactions with and among its moving parts and constructivists have sought 
to discover its relationship with an extrinsic realm of ideas. Although positivist 
international lawyers do not consciously engage with these theoretical foundations, they 
nevertheless “invite international politics into their home through the back door”, argues 
Yasuaki. This opens up the possibilities for scholarship in international law which 
knowingly engages with conceptions of international society reciprocally has the 
potential to influence disciplinary International Relations. Another noteworthy feature of 
International Legal analysis is that although exponents differ on whether international 
law is best viewed as an authoritative decision-making process or a framework 
facilitating cooperation, there is across the board a tendency to view soft law as 
“something minus legal commitment”43. This study highlights the rich spectrum of forms 
of international cooperation and their drivers that the discipline of International 
Relations has been able to observe and articulate. In the process, it should provide 
International Lawyers with a stronger case for seeing soft law in more promising light.  
Exemplifying a common tendency among international lawyers, Philip Allott ascribes a 
social function to international law, claiming that all law “1. […] carries the structure and 
systems of society through time. 2. […] inserts the common interests of society into the 
behaviour of society-members. 3. […] establishes possible futures for society, in 
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accordance with society’s theories, values and purposes”44. International Relations 
scholars, operating differently, are careful in distinguishing between a domestic polity 
and an international system. The centralising and unifying authority of law is not 
recognised in the International Relations scholar’s imagination of the anarchic 
international system.  The argument between the two disciplines comes down to 
specifying how law and power interact with each other. In this thesis I attempt to expand 
this understanding of law by teasing out the non-judicial functions of international law 
and exploring ways in which a dialogue between International Law and International 
Relations enables us to envision different possibilities for international law.  
Elaborating further on the concept of International Law, Allott offers the following 
description that is amenable to the International Relations scholar’s more expansive view 
of what makes international politicking45: 
The legal self-constituting of society (the legal constitution) co-exists with other means of 
social self-constituting: self-constituting in the form of ideas (the ideal constitution) and 
self-constituting through the everyday willing and acting of society-members (the real 
constitution). 
This description also corresponds to a broader understanding of sources of international 
law which includes customary law in addition to treaty law. When Allott further portrays 
law as conditioned by the ideal and real self-constituting, yet possessing its own 
distinctive social form, we see a striking parallel with the key theme in constructivist 
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International Relations that actors, rules and institutions are conditioned by socially 
constituted meanings.  
To Manderson and Mohr46: 
The socio-legal scholar operates in a distinct genre, committed to the sphere of human 
goods and contingent particulars, not eternal verities and universals. 
International Legal scholars also suggest that the nature of research in international law 
is different from that in domestic law. Stephen Hall writes that the “decentralised, 
consensual and relatively primitive character47” of international law challenges us to seek 
new approaches to research rather than relying on off-the-shelf tools from largely 
domestically oriented legal research.  
Describing the conception of the actorhood of states in International Law, Hall explains 
that “States are simultaneously the main subjects of international law and the entities 
whose choices and conduct generate positive international law”48. He adds that where 
the State is legal person, governing institutions which exercise power on behalf of the 
State are akin to the corresponding natural persons.  
Anne Marie Slaughter advocates cross fertilisation between insights from International 
Relations and International Law through the cultivation of a “dual agenda”49. She 
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surveys the responses which International Relations scholars have offered to the realist 
contention that international law is at best an instrument of dominant states and finds: 
 McDougal and Lasswell’s formulation of law as derived from competitive political 
interaction and therefore a subset of the decision-making process in the 
international system 
 Falk’s vision of law as derived from a systemic logic that transcends national 
interest narrowly defined in pursuit of systemic stability 
 Chayes, Henkin and others’ concern with showing in what ways (rather than to 
what extent), international law proves to be a constraint on state behaviour and 
influences the course of international affairs 
 Hoffman and Kaplan’s understanding of “international law of a particular era as 
both a reflection of the reining political system and a repository of normative 
efforts to regulate and shape it”50.  
A wider menu of formats for inter-state cooperation is acknowledged within 
International Relations. Other than treaty law, this list includes unilateral/bilateral 
cooperation, formation of multilateral fora and soft law. Broadly speaking, the view in 
the International Relations community is that States align their behavior with 
international laws when they reflect the interests and values of states and when they are 
formulated through processes or by organisations that are perceived as legitimate.  
However, it is only through a conversation with International legal scholars that 
International Relations theorists have had to rigorously examine regimes of interaction 
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and cooperation. In “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations”, 
Abbott and Snidal argue51: 
Possible types of arrangement for inter-state cooperation are – 
 Decentralized cooperation 
 Informal consultation 
 Treaty Rules 
Despite the existence of such alternatives, states frequently resort to creation of 
International organizations to institutionalize cooperation. The two markers of IOs 
which, according to Snidal and Abbott, explain this preference of states are: 
 
 Centralization  
 Independence 
 
Centralization refers to “a concrete and stable organizational structure and an 
administrative apparatus managing collective activities52”. When the costs of 
decentralized action or unilateral intervention outweigh the costs of centralized 
organization, the creation of an IO becomes attractive to states.  
IOs contribute the following through centralization: 
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 Neutral, depoliticized and specialized fora for dialogue 
 Balance between states with different levels of power and varying interests 
through representation and voting rules 
 Expertise in the form of background research and structured agendas 
 Flows of information, institutional memory and documentation of state of play on 
a certain issue area 
Thus pooling of resources, competencies and risks is what centralization is all about and 
wherefrom IOs have an edge over decentralized or bilateral cooperation or unilateral 
action.  
Independence refers to “the authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with 
neutrality, in defined spheres”. An independent International Organization has the 
potential to: 
 Influence the terms of state interaction 
 Elaborate norms 
 Mediate or resolve member states’ disputes 
 Affect legitimacy of member states’ actions 
To sum up, actions taken on a state-to-state level, appear more legitimate when routed 
through an IO instead – a process that Snidal and Abbott term “laundering”. Another 
advantage of IO independence lies in the fact that leaders are able to shield themselves 
from often overbearing assertion of interests from domestic constituencies. Lastly, even 
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if “IO autonomy remains bounded by state interests and power”, strong states do also 
have a stake in not allowing their actions to completely undermine IO independence.  
Snidal and Abbott also conceptualize IOs as Community Representatives. Here, the 
characterization of IOs departs from the rationalist discourse and crosses over into 
constructivist terrain. In particular, IOs perform two important functions: 
 Creating a language based on norms and ensuring adherence to norms through 
“mobilization of shame” or reputational concerns among states 
 Enforcement of commitments by making the threat of retaliation meaningful in 
cases of non-compliance 
 
For the research agenda at the intersection of international relations and international 
law, Snidal and Abbott prescribe the study of International Organizations as a bridge 
between rationalism and constructivism.  
By discussing compliance behavior in broader terms, international relations scholars have 
maintained its distinction from a strict technical understanding such as treaty 
implementation. A useful approach to unpacking the reasons behind States’ compliance 
of international law is the one proposed by Robert Keohane. Keohane distinguishes 
between the instrumentalist optic where rules matter only if they affect calculations of 
interest and the normative optic where compliance is driven by reputational concerns53. 
Beth Simmons argues that real world compliance defies simplistic explanations since 
                                                          




“agreements among asymmetrically endowed actors are rarely perfectly voluntary, and 
the decision to “conform to prescribed behavior” might rest on an amalgam of 
obligation and felt coercion”54.  
Cali refers to the instrumental view on international law as the “cynic’s view”, describing 
it thus:  
For the cynic, all international law does, is offer some intricate language which politicians 
use to get their own way55. 
She counters this cynicism by suggesting that “the survival of the idea and practice of 
international law after hundreds of years of manipulation shows us that there is 
something more to it than mere rhetoric”. 
In establishing the divergences and overlaps between the disciplines of International 
Relations and International Law, Cali holds: 
There are two central independent variables that determine the nature of the 
relationship between International Relations and International Law.  
1. Reasons motivating the asking of a question.  
2. Reasons motivating the selection of procedures in order to answer a question.  
The former indicates differences in terms of approaches. The latter indicates differences 
in methodology56.  
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She goes on to explain that “the legal element has a more significant weight in 
International Law, while in International Relations it is the political element that takes 
center stage. International lawyers ask when we have international law. International 
relations scholars ask how international actors behave”57. 
“What are the rules and principles that govern international relations and how do we 
identify such rules?” and “what makes states support a particular norm in international 
relations and how do we know when support for that norm erodes or increases?58” are 
identified by Cali as key questions at the heart of International Law and International 
Relations respectively.  
In Cooperation under Anarchy, Axelrod and Keohane state, “not only can actors in world 
politics pursue different strategies within an established context of interaction, they may 
also seek to alter that context through building institutions embodying particular 
principles, norms, rules, or procedures for the conduct of international relations”59. 
Applying the prisoner’s dilemma game to interstate cooperation, these authors focus on 
three dimensions in particular: 
 Mutuality of interest 
 The shadow of the future 
 The number of players 
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An attempt is made in a forthcoming chapter to apply principles of game theory to the 
cause of heritage protection.  
Philip Allott discusses the social function of the law as signaling “presence of the social 
past, the organizing of the social present, and the conditioning of the social future”60.  
Allott likens an international public realm devoid of International Law with the Hobbesian 
state of nature, with “urbane diplomacy and mass murder” as the bases for survival. He 
characterizes the minimization of the role of law in mainstream International Relations 
Scholarship thus: 
So-called international relations seemed to be the more or less random aggregating of the 
aggregate output of the systems of those societies, so that the absence of potential moral 
responsibility was even more evidently the case between the States than within those 
States. It seemed also to follow that international law, even more than national law, was 
morally immune, since it was itself seen as a secondary surplus social effect of the morally 
immune relations between States, the content of those relations—so-called foreign 
policy—being itself the morally immune systematic product of the internal national 
systems61. 
He explains this by problematizing morality at any aggregate social level. Since the 
outcome at any aggregate social level, or as Allott describes it, “the surplus social 
effect”, is always greater than the sum of its parts, no single individual may be held 
accountable for it. This results in a situation where, since no human individual is 
responsible for the macro-product of social systems, there can be no moral responsibility 
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for that product, including the macro-product known as law. Apparently, the social 
actual, and hence the legal actual, is necessarily right”. Thus, to Allott, the problem of 
specifying the role of international law in international society is a more generic 
conundrum of attribution of moral responsibility at all macro levels.  
In an attempt to theorize non-instrumental law in general and international law in 
particular, Terry Nardin writes62: 
General international law is largely customary law, which obligates states as members of 
international society without their explicit consent. States can terminate their agreements 
but they cannot escape the jurisdiction of general international law, which, because it both 
constitutes and regulates the relationship of states as legal subjects, is the ultimate basis of 
their association. The rule of law demands that international law must not contravene 
certain basic rules of general international law. Agreement cannot legalise actions, like 
waging aggressive war, that are contrary to the non-instrumental rules of general 
international law. That law limits the policies that states can pursue collectively as well as 
unilaterally. The instrumental rules they adopt must conform to the non-instrumental rules 
of general international law and, at a deeper level, the principles of legality underlying those 
rules. The international rule of law exists to the extent that states conduct their relations on 
the basis of laws that limit and not simply enable policy.  
This passage illustrates the contribution that international legal scholarship has made 
towards explaining the determinants of state behaviour in the international realm.  
                                                          




As discussed above, there are two distinct conceptions of the payoff of interdisciplinary 
exposure for legal research. Dobinson and Johns anticipate gains in the form of a 
reproducible methodology. Roberts, on the other hand, emphasises greater analytical 
complexity and nuance as the main advantage. How do the conversations between 
International Law and International Relations fare in terms of meeting these 
expectations? 
In this study I apply lenses from International Relations and International Law to 
demonstrate their contributions on such questions as: 
What is heritage? 
What contextual factors influence the definition of heritage? 
Who owns it? 
What is the proper way of protecting it and can it be applied universally? 
What does studying transnational efforts to protect heritage tell us about the nature of 
international cooperation? 
How does studying the case of heritage protection, in depth, contribute to our 
understanding of the potential for interdisciplinary dialogue between the fields of 
International Relations and International Law? 
How might such an interdisciplinary dialogue transform our understanding of the nature, 
role and potential of international law? 
It is relevant to clarify the way in which heritage is meant as a case study here. In general, 
a case study represents intensive analysis in contrast with a survey which represents 
39 
 
extensive analysis of a phenomenon. Thus, the approaches selected for critical analysis, 
both from International Relations and International Law, are not exhaustive. Instead, 
their choice is informed by the possibilities they afford to illuminate various facets of the 
case study. An attempt has been made to draw in some of the marginal and under-
emphasized approaches in order to truly test and challenge the current state of the 
debate on the interplay between international relations and international law. The 
following lines of Peter Swanborn are resonant in this respect63: 
As in all research, in doing a case study we focus on the problem we want to solve. 
Whatever research project one has in mind, the research question is the point of departure. 
 
Heritage as site 
With reference to themes such as “cities” or “drugs”, Manderson and Mohr propose the 
following approach that may assist us in evading the downsides of disciplinary silos and 
over-specialisation64: 
One approach might be to examine a particular site or sites of interest without a particular 
disciplinary strategy in mind. It is the site as observed and not the intellectual tradition of 
the observer which determines the approach. 
Mandersohn and Mohr add that this framework taps into the relevant aspects of 
disciplines without allowing their role in research to become overbearing and 
hegemonic, thus making legal research “disciplinary-critical, site-specific, engaged and 
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constitutive”65. The concept of heritage richly lends itself to such an understanding of 
site.  
Heritage as a site for meeting of past, present and future 
Discovering heritage as the space where the past, present and future converge is 
presenting it in dynamic light, rather than as a culturally-specific relic stuck in time. It is 
also to acknowledge, that the past matters because it tangibly impinges on 
circumstances in the present and prospects for the future. Based on her study of the 
evolving meanings of Heritage in eastern Europe, Laura Demeter posits that “the use and 
abuse of heritage has reached a level of impact, intensity and differing complexities that 
has little in common with the realities of heritage in the Anglo-Saxon context”66. 
Heritage is subject to interpretive evolution. Illustrating this point with the example of 
the Palace of Versailles, Denise Maior-Barron writes that “the postmodern era witnesses 
a gradual transition in the interpretation of heritage from Tradition to Translation”67. 
Thus the same sites and objects contain different mnemonic associations for different 
groups and across time periods. Maior-Baron goes on to explain that political elite 
reinterpret history through heritage in service of their own legitimation and therefore 
often, the “version of history labelled ‘inevitable progress’ is preferred by victors rather 
than victims”68. In the age of nationalism, such reinterpretation to suit political interests 
has contributed to problematizing heritage conservation in source countries and 
complicated the debate over ownership and optimum methods of conservation in the 
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international realm. Maior-Baron further notes that the rise in commemorative politics 
around the world in the recent past aims to “ritualise a society without rituals and to 
introduce fleeting moments of sacredness into a world otherwise bereft of a sacred 
dimension”69. Thus, as a by-product of fulfilling a psycho-social need for familiarity, 
distinctiveness and continuity, heritage contributes as a “freezing factor of the natural 
course of historical evolution”70, in her estimate. This is an on-going process as seen 
through the instant memorialisation of sites of tragedy such as bombings in a bid to link 
present grief with future sanctity.  
Having established the role of heritage in reinterpreting history and legitimising power 
rooted in construction of hegemonic identity, one must also give due regard to the 
positive implications of such potential. In her report to the UN Human Rights Council, the 
Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights observes71: 
By engaging people and encouraging their interaction through artistic and cultural 
expression, actions in the field of culture can open a space in which individuals and groups 
can reflect upon their society, confront and modify their perception of one another, express 
their fears and grievances in a non-violent manner, develop resilience after violent or 
traumatic experiences, including human rights violations, and imagine the future they want 
for themselves and how to better realize human rights in the society they live in. 
Thus, the shape-shifting associations with heritage should be viewed against the ever 
evolving backdrop of a broader cultural landscape. In case of conflicts which coalesce 
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around faultlines of identity, in particular, this potential for creative reconstitution could 
well translate into the power to assist social reconstruction. As the Special Rapporteur 
on Cultural Rights reminds us: “Humanity dignifies, restores and reimagines itself 
through creating, performing, preserving and revising its cultural and artistic life”. In 
settings of violent ethnic conflict cultural activities involving celebration of common 
heritage have been vital for expressing common humanity or rehumanising the other, 
thereby contributing to trust building and reconstruction.  
Heritage as a site for meeting of identities and interests 
Interest and identity have both been polemical and polarising terms in discussions about 
international society, particularly under the influence of globalisation. Studying heritage 
protection in the context of both terms demonstrates what we lose when we attempt to 
parse phenomena in light of one, at the exclusion of the other. Heritage, as a site, 
enables us to liberate the two terms from narrow definitional strictures and create new 
possibilities for the study of International Relations and International Law at large.  
Tracing back the ancient nexus between art, identity and heritage, Margaret Miles recalls 
that “much, if not all of what was highly valued in antiquity, and typically looted in wars, 
was originally created, dedicated or used within a religious context […] although art 
even in a religious context could also convey political values, including symbolic value as 
a trophy”72. Sara McDowell conceived the very essence of heritage in terms of its 
malleability and instrumental value defining it as “as an aggregation of myths, values and 
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inheritances determined and defined by the needs of societies in the present.73” Denise 
Maior-Baron posits a symbiotic relationship between heritage and power and illustrates 
it through the associations of successive rulers and governments in France with the 
Palais de Versailles despite its complicated past. Delving into this history she finds that 
heritage can be evocative of legitimate power and authority “within either the artificial 
remembering and commemorative process of nations, or the educational purposes of 
contemporary, globalised tourism”74. The fact that heritage can serve both purposes as 
outlined here by Maior-Baron contributes to the contested terrain that is the idea of 
“universal heritage”. On the one hand, the nationalist view demands a set of context-
dependent practices that tie heritage to origin stories and national identity while on the 
other, the cosmopolitan view is centred on logics of tourism, cultural consumption of 
market countries and the considerable commercial interest at stake. It is in the pre-
meditated destruction of heritage during the course of war that we see its relationship 
with identity thrown in sharp relief, especially as the emerging complexities of warfare 
blur the battle lines between identities and interests. In recent memory we see such 
convergence of destructive factors of wartime collateral damage through shelling and 
occupation, deliberate erasure as a language of terrorism, genocide and civil war and 
varying scales of looting for financial gain in the damage that has been sustained to 
heritage in Syria.  
Heritage as a site for meeting of International Relations and International Law 
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The study of cultural heritage has thus far been undertaken within disciplinary silos as is 
the case with many multi-faceted concepts and phenomena. A consequent limitation at 
the epistemic level resulting from this is that “these disciplines bound conversations may 
talk about very similar issues in completely different languages, diminishing the 
opportunity to learn from, and communicate with, one another”75.  
Watfa Shadi and Mustafa Bashar poignantly capture the impact of heritage destruction 
and the illegal trade in cultural objects on the countries of origin and the world at large76: 
We feel a tragic loss when our valuable cultural artifacts disappear. They become fuel for 
the black market, perpetuating the economic foundation of the plunder. Then they are lost 
to all, having value neither for their beauty nor for scientific research where much could be 
learned from them. Instead, they become hidden away in a collector’s vault, reduced to a 
state of having no value for anyone, save for their illicit procurer. 
The above articulation of the state of world heritage captures the possibility of 
convergence of the Game Theory, Human Security and Constructivist approaches to 
exploring possibilities of international cooperation, developed in forthcoming chapters. 
It opens the way for unapologetically recognising the dysfunctions and asymmetries of 
power in the international system which International Law either glosses over of helps 
sustain and strengthen.  
Heritage as a site for meeting of empirical findings and conceptual re-development and 
theoretical innovation 
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The field of heritage studies has been characterised by a practice-driven orientation. 
Much of the existing literature is in the form of advocacy for competing approaches to 
conservation. An extremely promising ramification of such an emphasis has been the 
vast information base mapping where tangible and intangible heritage exists, detailing 
the causes of destruction or illicit transfer in the form of case studies and specifying the 
positions of relevant stakeholders. As noted above, the evidence of interdisciplinary 
dialogue in heritage literature is limited. Where the applicable body of international law is 
studied, the discussion focuses more on textual application of conventions and does not 
properly contextualise the emergence and operation of legal instruments in broader 
insights about operation of the international system.    
However, according to Paul Roberts “simply highlighting significant gaps in the existing 
knowledge base might be sufficient to puncture the complacency of prevailing 
assumptions...”77.  
In the case of destruction and illegal trade of cultural heritage, much work of great value 
has documented the channels, operative methods, role of actors and extent of the 
phenomenon. It appears however, that this body of work does not point to a clear 
direction for legal reform and instead becomes clearly polarised along the lines of 
opposing causes or interested parties. It is thus, for instance, that the binaries of the 
nationalist and internationalist view or the source countries and market countries, have 
dominated much of the discourse directly influencing legal imagination on the question.  
According to Denis Byrne, the sub-discipline of heritage management within archaeology 
has evolved based on Western experience and has since attempted to transplant its 
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approaches to diverse contexts. Byrne also suggests that “imbued with the ideological 
colour of their own societies”, archaeologists have reordered history to situate Europe at 
the pinnacle of the “hierarchy of progress” by ascribing to it such attributes as 
“technological pre-eminence” and “uni-linear cultural evolution”78. The fact that 
“heritage management seems simply to appear with the passing of the first protective 
legislation which itself occurs because an obvious ‘need’ is recognised”, strikes Byrne as 
symptomatic of this one-size-fits-all approach. Further, he also recognises the continued 
imprint left by imperial legislation on the imagination of heritage management in the 
post-colonial world. “The legacy was not rejected; in fact there has been a widespread 
tendency for the new states to use and conserve precolonial and even colonial 
archaeological heritage in the name of national identity”, writes Byrne. As we have 
established with the evolution of the discipline of International Relations, in the lines that 
follow, Byrne relates the influential position of western archaeology with strategies of 
dominance of powerful states79: 
Their influence stemmed from the opportunities they had to work in other countries – 
archaeology following the flag either directly or through the favourable climate created by 
economic aid and military alliance – and from sponsoring the education of archaeologists 
from non-Western countries at ‘home’ universities, their ability to publish and disseminate 
research over large areas and from the intellectual thrall with which leading exponents at 
great universities could hold their less advantaged colleagues over large parts of the world.  
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Byrne’s analysis also shows us that lacking the social consensus or indeed the material 
resources to implement a western model of conservation, third world countries are often 
portrayed as uncaring of their heritage and their cultures as missing a sense of history. 
Sandra Bowdler has explained the same phenomenon in terms of an almost Pavlovian 
response of the “heritocracy” to any deviation from the hegemonic western discourse of 
archaeological research and heritage management80.  
Heritage as the site for clash of hegemonic/west-centric science and other ways of 
knowing 
Supriya Chaudhuri recalls81: 
The World Fairs and exhibitions of the nineteenth century were sites of display where 
colonial power offered itself for public admiration, and objects of material culture, denuded 
of social context and use-value, were accessible for consumption as spectacles. 
Chaudhri paints a vivid picture of the growing fascination with displays of traditional 
Indian crafts (such crafts not to be confused with the more evolved European fine arts) 
in Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries even as the policies of 
the imperial government82 impoverished the artisan community in India and slowly 
eradicated this form of “industry”. The fate of indigenous crafts was not simply linked to 
the economic processes unfolding in the hegemonic core but also to the apparatus of 
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knowledge creation which supported these developments. Capturing the epistemic 
dynamics, Chaudhuri writes83: 
In important respects such collections of economic products and ‘art-ware’ bear witness to 
the taxonomic mode of colonial knowledge production. Listing by material, classifying by 
region, attempting to bring order into a botanic wilderness, they demonstrate the 
movement from the collection to the list, to the exhibition catalogue, to the guidebook or 
dictionary, and finally to the museum. 
 
Empire in the twenty-first century is characterised by the very same vision of 
consumption of other cultures through its obsession with the encyclopaedic or universal 
museum.  
The hallmark of a critical researcher is that they are conscious both, of their own 
embeddedness of in a socio-historical milieu as well as the bases on which conventional 
ideas about scholarship rest. Margaret Davies views this as an enquiry into “what are the 
norms of ‘good’ scholarship, where do these derive from in cultural or political terms, on 
what basis can they be defended, and how should they be challenged or reformed?84” 
Being a researcher situated in the global south informs the vantage point from which I 
pose these questions. Being a researcher situated in a country which is rich in tangible 
and intangible cultural heritage has empowered me to grasp the complexities of issues 
but also challenged me to be more aware of my subjectivities.  
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Davies further elaborates that “Western knowledge has conventionally attributed 
‘objectivity’ only to Western observers, who are typically also male – to highlight these 
associations and to ask whether there are knowledge practices other than those put 
forward by traditional ‘objective’ scholarship which might be more cognisant of the non-
Western non-male other, poses a challenge to the myth that subject and object are 
separate”85.  
In the chapters that follow, the preponderance of Eurocentric episteme on the definition 
of heritage and formulation of strategies for its conservation is examined. William St. 
Clair has studied in depth the damage sustained by the Elgin Marbles86 through the 
restorations efforts of the British museum in 1937 and 1938 – efforts which were inspired 
by “the aesthetic of white marble purity that is the idée fixe of neoclassicism”87. Similar 
case studies by scholars in museology, archaeology and law have documented the 
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Protecting Cultural Heritage: Game Theory 
Chapter Highlights 
 Rational choice via game theory has been widely employed in International 
Relations research and has influenced both realists and liberal institutionalists 
 Game theory is useful in understanding the illicit global trade in antiquities and 
explain the premises of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property 1970 
 The possibilities of regulation on the demand side (market countries) and supply 
side (source countries) can both be critically examined using rational choice  
 Recognising the limits of the rational choice approach helps set the context for 
human security and constructivism (forthcoming chapters) 
 A critique of rational choice analysis in International Relations helps ask how 
considerations of justice – rather than exclusively those of order – might have a 










Protecting cultural heritage: Game Theory Approach in International Relations 
At the outset, let us heed a note of caution sounded by Margaret Davies88: 
Like the conventional view of method, theory is abstraction, an exercise of scholarly power 
over its objects -- objects which are tamed in the process of becoming understood.  
This chapter delves into the global market for art and antiquities and applies the rational 
choice lens favoured by realists to sketch the possibilities for international cooperation. 
Such cooperation is already envisaged in international law, particularly by way of means 
to restrict illegal cross-border flows.  
Article 2 of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970 
1. The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit import, export and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property is one of the main causes of the 
impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such 
property and that international co-operation constitutes one of the most efficient 
means of protecting each country's cultural property against all the dangers 
resulting there from. 
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2. To this end, the States Parties undertake to oppose such practices with the 
means at their disposal, and particularly by removing their causes, putting a stop 
to current practices, and by helping to make the necessary reparations. 
The next section reviews the insights that have emerged from the application of game 
theory in International Relations.  
Game Theory in International Relations 
Game theory, otherwise known as interactive decision theory, suggests that an actor’s 
decisions are influenced by the decisions that other actors in the situation could possibly 
make. This catchy premise speaks to the quest of International Relations scholars for 
rigorous frameworks within which to make sense of the actions of states. In the words of 
Duncan Snidal,  “conception of nation-states as interdependent, goal-seeking actors lies 
at the heart of strategic game analysis, it is applicable across different issue areas”89. In 
the prisoner’s dilemma game, the greatest gain is made by an actor if they defect while 
the other actor cooperates. Thus game theory presupposes lack of harmony of interests 
and encapsulates the tendency of actors not to cooperate, aligning itself closely with the 
key assumptions of the realist International Relations view. In the structural realist 
paradigm developed by Kenneth Waltz, “a true systemic explanation […] assumes that 
structural elements dictate channels of actor interaction and ultimately determine the 
outcomes of that interaction. The components of that structure, in turn, are threefold: an 
ordering principle, the differentiation and functional specification of the units, and the 
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distribution of capabilities across units”90. In this chapter, the global system through 
which cultural objects are transacted will be analysed within this framework. The forces 
which have historically permitted and continue to assist their transfer from where they 
were originally found to where they came to be located will be reviewed. We will find 
that international law on cultural property – its ownership and protection – has been 
greatly concerned with the legitimacy of channels through which these objects move in 
the global system.  
Like the realist school, the game theory approach has concentrated its attention on 
states as the important actor in the international system. And yet, Game Theory 
transcends the conflict-centred realist paradigm to explore the nature and causes of 
cooperation under anarchy. Snidal resolves this seeming contradiction thus: “No state 
can choose its best strategy or attain its best outcome independent of choices made by 
others. The related substantive implication is that national policy makers need to pursue 
opportunities for cooperative interactions even as they seek to protect against 
conflictual interactions”91. On the degrees of separation between Game Theory and 
Realism, Snidal concludes that “by assuming that power maximizing states are the 
principal actors, Game Theory subsumes the Realist position. But the game theoretic 
approach is not coincident with Realism”92. Game theory exponents agree with realists 
that structural factors constrain states but depart from them by making way for 
voluntary decision-making.  
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Benjamin Klasche and Peeter Selg identify key critiques of rational decision-making 
forwarded by other paradigms in social science and applied to international relations. 
According to them, approaches which privilege psychological analysis of international 
relations “assume imperfect rationality based on the fluidity of identities, past beliefs and 
groupthink”93. They also cite constructivists who view decision making as a product of 
modes of subjectivity and beliefs and expectations about other actors. In recognising the 
validity of these critiques as borne out by real world events, Klasche and Selg remind us 
that game theory does not work well when the rules of the game change or certain 
actors refuse to play by the rules and thereby they also embrace the sociological insight 
that rationality is context-dependent and bounded.  
Axelrod and Keohane provide a useful framework for evaluating behaviour of relevant 
actors, including states, in an anarchic system. They focus on three variables – mutuality 
of interests, the shadow of the future and the number of players – as framing the 
context for cooperation or defection, in a classic prisoners’ dilemma game94. Rational 
choice theorists have thus identified the compliance pull whereby, States concerned with 
their reputation in international society might see it in their interest to uphold 
international law rather than exercise hard power in contravention of it. According to 
Harlan Grant Cohen, “Building reputation into game-theoretic models of how states 
behave […] allows for the formulation of a comprehensive theory of international law 
that includes treaties, soft law, customary international law, and norms. Perhaps most 
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intriguingly, it helps explain opinio juris, the long-mysterious "psychological" element of 
customary international law”95. 
Staying true to the Rational Choice lineage of Game theory, the Demand and Supply sides 
of the trade in Antiquities will be sketched below. The section will be concluded by a set 
of questions and considerations, key to developing an approach to Heritage Protection 
grounded in Game Theory.  
Antiquities Trade: The Demand Side 
In this section I review the prevailing situation in those parts of the world where cultural 
goods are acquired, primarily by collectors and highly influential museums. 
Describing trafficking in cultural goods as a “demand-driven crime”, Leila Aminedolleh 
argues that “there is a well-documented link between the demand for looted items and 
museums”96. Further explaining the role of museums she adds that “purchasing illicit 
objects, museums fuel the market, thus motivating robbers to steal and destroy art 
objects”. 
The willingness of collectors and museums to expend significant sums of money on the 
acquisition of prized artefacts sets up the incentive structure for downstream 
participants in the trade. In his paper “The Fifth Column within the Archaeological Realm: 
The Great Divide”, Oscar Muscarella places museums and collectors at the uppermost 
echelons of what he terms The Plunder Culture. Elaborating on the intervening systemic 
factors he says that “for museum curators, some are archaeologists, others art 
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historians, the “acquisition” of antiquities is a major component of their job description, 
for which raises and promotions reward them”97. Acquisition of artworks and antiquities 
by museums from dealers and galleries of questionable repute is well-documented in the 
literature. Asif Efrat sums up this phenomenon as follows98: 
Since the antiquities market has traditionally not required revealing a record of ownership 
history or original findspot of an object; and, furthermore, given the principle of vendor 
anonymity, looted antiquities may obtain a veneer of legitimacy when they are sold by 
dealers and auction houses. Illegally excavated and exported, antiquities often change 
hands several times before being purchased by institutional or private collectors, and any 
details of their illegal origin are erased or lost in the process. Once published in a sales 
catalogue, an exhibition catalogue, or an academic paper, the antiquities acquire a new and 
respectable pedigree and are effectively laundered. 
Jessica Dietzler draws attention to two further important features of the antiquities 
trade: first, demand stems from a very limited, wealthy section of the population 
compared to other illicit trades such as drugs and weapons and second, the goods 
undergo a massive increase in value while making the transition from source to demand 
countries, estimated at as much as 100 fold by UNESCO99. On a related note, Erik Nemeth 
observes that “As a market dynamic, looting of cultural artefacts also inspires collecting 
of a disappearing commodity, which increases the profitability of trafficking in 
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antiquities”100. The licit trade in cultural objects itself being clandestine in nature, allows 
for illegally acquired objects to be made to seem legally traded down the chain of 
transactions. In an abstract sense, trade in cultural objects converts them from heritage 
that is “given value” to commodities that “have value”.  
According to the non-profit Saving Antiquities for Everyone (SAFE), the United States is a 
major market for Chinese antiquities with the number of museums with collections 
numbering 47. Describing the toll taken by illegal excavations and the soaring 
international demand for finds, SAFE reports that “during most of the 20th century there 
was a real sense of duty to report finds to the authorities. The lucrative gains from 
supplying the demand of the international illicit antiquities trade in the last 20 years have 
eroded this sense of national responsibility. The forgery industry prospers as a result of 
the high demand for Chinese antiquities101.”  
Regulation on the demand side 
Setting the context for the regulation of the antiquities trade in market countries, Simon 
Mackenzie writes102: 
“Apart from a small and relatively localised cohort of archaeologists, the issue of looted 
antiquities has not fired the public imagination in the demand nations and accordingly 
there is little political value there in allocating resources to strategies of criminalisation. 
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Public apathy in this case creates power in the trade by rendering it less visible on the 
political regulatory landscape.” 
It is therefore unsurprising that instances where regulation has taken place have been 
fraught with resistance and clash of interests. Mackenzie describes the pushback against 
regulation as a process of “mobilisation of the various other forms of capital mentioned 
(financial, social, legal, political) which bring the power to make influential 
representations in the regulatory debate to fend off or dilute any proposed intrusion 
when the light of law enforcement sweeps across transactions, revealing shady corners”, 
once it is found that the sanctity attributed to the cultural sector has eroded amid 
revelations of wrongdoing.   
“As institutions that receive tax benefits for their non-profit status, museums must be 
held to a heightened standard of due diligence”, writes Aminedolleh, adding that failure 
to do so amounts indirectly to public funding of “illicit and terrorism-linked activities”103.  
The State of New York’s 1973 Act to prohibit and prevent illicit import, export and/or 
transfer of ownership of cultural property within New York State finds that “interchange 
of cultural property among states and nations for scientific, cultural and educational 
purposes increases the knowledge of the civilization, enriches the cultural life of all 
peoples, and inspires mutual respect and appreciation among states and nations”104. The 
Act also recognizes the responsibility of all states to protect their own cultural heritage 
and respect that of all other states and nations.  
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During Congressional hearings before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on 
Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session, on H.R. 
5643, representatives presented the following recommendations on the bill on behalf of 
the State Department: 
 
 The restriction of entering solely into bilateral agreements with other states for 
addressing illicit trade in cultural property be relaxed  
 Instead of a statutory committee to advise the President on related matters, ad 
hoc committees be established as appropriate to the field of art and 
archaeological expertise in question 
 Measures be taken to ensure that the provision to allow entry of an object in the 
US if it has been away from the source country for more than 10 years are not 
exploited, including notice to the country of origin in such cases to allow it to 
pursue legal remedies 
 Once an object has been on display in a US museum for 10 years, such object be 
immune from seizure or forfeiture thereafter 
These deliberations give a glimpse into the mind set which informs regulation in a market 
country where the goal is to balance the interests of domestic constituencies with the 
demands of international cooperation. The Museum community in the US has routinely 
voiced three main concerns in response to any attempts to regulate the illicit trade in 
antiquities by law: 
65 
 
 That the cultural and educational interests of the American public will suffer if 
acquisitions by museums are made more cumbersome  
 That the US will be affected disproportionately if other market countries do not 
opt for similar regulatory practices 
 That the burden of heritage protection should be equitably shared by source 
countries as well.  
Miles suggests that “the record among American museums is mixed but improving: some 
such as the University of Pennsylvania Museum, stopped buying antiquities without 
extensive documentation in 1970, in accordance with the UNESCO agreement of that 
year; the Getty Museum declared its respect for the agreement in 2006.105” She finds that 
the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art has not amended its practices in this regard 
and the view that “the encyclopedic museums’ needs should override the claims of 
nations to retain their heritage” continues to find regular expression from quarters 
within the community.   
Self-imposed import restrictions are an important mechanism for market countries to 
help stem illegal flows. By way of example, Fincham describes the process following 
which source countries might seek cooperation from designated agencies in the United 
States. The Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC)106 advises the President on 
requests for bilateral agreements made by any State Party to the UNESCO 1970 
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Convention107. If the CPAC finds that cultural property located in the source country is at 
risk of looting; the source country has taken adequate measures to protect its own 
cultural property; if applied, the import restrictions will have a significant effect; and no 
other remedies are available to achieve the same effect, then, import restrictions may be 
enacted.  
Section 303 3 D of the Act states that108 
…the application of the import restrictions set forth in section 307 in the particular 
circumstances is consistent with the general interest of the international community in the 
interchange of cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural, and educational 
purposes 
The Act also recognises imposition of similar restrictions by other importing countries as 
an important factor which is indicative of a quintessential prisoner’s dilemma mindset 
where, decisions of other actors in the game matter.  
Some have argued whether regulations on the supply side amount to taking on the 
responsibility of protecting their own heritage from source countries. In a way, this poses 
a dilemma similar to what plagues international negotiations on emissions reductions 
intended to mitigate climate change. The question in either case remains: Does more 
power and affluence entail greater responsibility?   
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The notorious case of the collector and curator Marion True who worked at the J. Paul 
Getty Museum in the United States from 1986 until 2005 is worthy of mention here. As 
curator, True had a chequered record of acquiring unprovenanced material, identifying 
and refusing to acquire such material as well as demonstrating some readiness for 
repatriation in certain cases. In addition, she was reported to be involved in questionable 
personal financial dealings with antiquities collectors. Eventually, True was charged and 
prosecuted both in Italy and Greece as follows: 
 In 2005 “True was charged in Italy with receiving stolen antiquities and conspiring 
with dealers Robert Hecht and Giacomo Medici to receive stolen antiquities, and 
she was ordered to stand trial in Rome  […]. The trial commenced on 16 
November 2005, and was abandoned without verdict on 13 October 2010 as the 
limitation period on True’s alleged offences expired”109.  
 In 2006 “Greek prosecutors charged True in connection with the fourth-century 
BC gold funerary wreath acquired in 1993, which was by then believed to have 
been taken out of Greece illegally […]. In November 2007, her trial was ended 
without resolution after the expiry of the statute of limitations”110.  
Commenting on the real motivation behind the True trial, former Italian prosecutor Paolo 
Ferri is reported to have remarked: “To show an example of what Italy could do”111. 
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Antiquities Looting: The Supply Side 
In this section, illegal excavation and trade of antiquities is discussed in the context of 
war as well as in a peace-time scenario.  
Below, a step-by-step account into how the trade begins in ISIS controlled regions and 
continues beyond is paraphrased:   
Metal detectors are used to locate antiquities buried underground. Satellite imagery has 
allowed mapping of the extent of excavations. The Wall Street Journal estimates that the 
looting generates USD 88million in revenues annually for ISIS112. In addition, antiquities 
are used as bribes for facilitating cross border movement of individuals and as barter in 
exchange for weapons. The Antiquities division of ISIS has been issuing permits to locals 
to carry out excavations. Locals trying to earn a living dig up antiquities under ISIS 
supervision. Once obtained, ISIS engages a network of experts to verify authenticity of 
items and determine their value. They charge traders a 20 per cent tax on all items sold. 
At the next stage, the antiquities are sold to middle-men in countries like Turkey and 
Lebanon. These middle-men have the expertise to both channel the antiquities onto 
international markets as well as launder them through the system, until they arrive at 
their final destinations in Western Europe and the United States. Social media sites have 
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been a useful tool for dealers to make the availability of antiquities known to prospective 
buyers. 
Neil Brodie writes that neither the 1974 domestic law prohibiting export of 
archaeological material not the 1990 United nations Security Council Resolution 661, 
prevented large scale looting and export of cultural goods in Iraq during wars in the 
1990s and 2000s113. Brodie’s investigative and statistical work provides insight into certain 
key features of the supply side of the market: 
 Auction houses such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s have profited immensely from the 
sale of antiquities. With reference to objects smuggled or legally exported from 
Iraq, we find their sales trends responsive to price fluctuations. Brodie writes that 
“the profits being made by Christie’s from cylinder seal sales started increasing in 
the late 1980s, and stayed at a high level until 2002, when they declined sharply”, 
somewhat contemporaneously with the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1483.  
 While this decline in profits meant that objects from Iraq receded from the 
catalogue pages of the auction houses, the trade gradually moved online, leading 
to the emergence of a new supply-side entity. The internet market is 
characterised by fly-by-night operators unobstructed by reputational concerns, 
lower levels of scrutiny by experts compared to known auction houses and recent 
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attempts to engage the academic community to combat the proliferation of 
fakes.  
 Another important supply side actor is the academic expert whose authentication 
and endorsement “support a credible pricing regime by establishing the quality, 
interest and rarity of pieces on offer, and maintain customer confidence by 
keeping the market free of fakes”114.  
Dietzler applies Marcus Felson’s Routine Activity Theory to the illicit antiquities trade, 
whereby, the framing is in terms of a series of actions encompassing “the criminal 
elements and organizational structure and sequence of antiquities trafficking”115, yielding 
“a broad chartable view of the entire process”. This framework draws attention to “the 
settings on which actors converge, as opposed to focusing on the actors themselves”, 
making it a useful way of conceptualising the supply side. Dietzler further argues that 
such framing allows us to discuss the illicit trade in cultural goods, as a form of 
trafficking, as both organised and criminal.  
Part of the reason threats faced by heritage sites have intensified is the public policies of 
source countries themselves, most notably the pressure to expand physical 
infrastructure. For instance, Monalisa Maharjan has documented how lack of fulfilment 
of legitimate development needs of people in Nepal have led to perception of world 
heritage sites as a liability116. In his review of the Environmental (Protection) Act of India, 
1986, Rana PB Singh recognises the tussle between a historically oriented approach – 
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espoused by the Archaeological Survey of India – and the broad, forward looking stance 
of the Town and Country Planning Organisation, exemplifying the complexity of goals 
and considerations characterising heritage conservation in urban and rapidly urbanising 
contexts117. In addition to the location of heritage sites in urban areas, Singh lists 
infrastructure development to support tourism and a lack of awareness about 
conservation needs as outstanding challenges.  
In 2006 the New York Times reported Ma Weidu, founder of Guanfu private museum, as 
suggesting that the exclusive emphasis on developmental priorities had recently shifted 
to make room for measures to minimize harm caused to ancient sites118. The 
constructivist framework discussed in chapter five allows us to return to the question of 
a model of heritage conservation based on a tourism economy.  
Regulation of the supply side 
Source countries have been criticized by opponents of regulation of open market access 
to cultural items for: 
 Failing to take adequate measures within their borders to safeguard cultural 
property and expecting market countries to shoulder the responsibility. 
 Diverting cultural heritage towards pursuit of nationalistic agendas rather than 
allowing it to serve the cause of intercultural understanding as the common 
heritage of humanity.  
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One of the forms that looting prevention measures have taken in source countries is the 
creation of special security units such as the Italian Carabinieri. However, even with such 
commitment of resources, it has been found that the presence of archaeological sites 
being widespread, defies one hundred per cent security coverage. This is why supply side 
regulation has had to take the form of strict patrimony laws providing for post-looting 
sanctions and possibilities of restitution. And this also explains why Italy’s “unique 
property laws entitle the government to assert ownership rights to any item dug up from 
a citizen’s land” which “severely limit the permanent export of antiquities”119. Nicole Klug 
discusses the approach taken by Japan as less restrictive. The legal framework there is a 
combination of a limited register of objects under state protection, accompanied by 
“unregistered works of comparable age and quality” which may be exported or 
exchanged120.  
In recent years, source countries – Italy being a leading example – have stepped up 
demands for repatriation of objects holding great cultural and historical significance. 
Thanks to these efforts, their “position has won broad moral support and increasingly 
become the norm among academic archaeologists, who see ancient objects as historic 
artefacts inseparable from their place of discovery”121. While a shift in normative 
paradigm is not accounted for in the game theory/realist approach, the impact of such a 
change is felt on the demand side by putting museums and collectors under greater 
pressure to revisit their acquisition practices.  
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Patrick Howlett-Martin expresses the core sentiment behind the calls for return and 
repatriation of stolen and illegally removed cultural objects in these words122: 
The acquaintance with a culture, the achievement of a kind of relationship with a past 
civilization is obviously easier in situ. There is something inauthentic about a Westerner 
looking at an African sculpture or an Egyptian artwork in a Western museum that feels 
often compelled to build a fake scenery to display the pieces such as the Pergamonmuseum 
in Berlin with architectural structures from Greek and Roman Antiquity reconstructed. 




The game theory approach, which is founded in microeconomic fundamentals of firm 
and market behaviour, is useful towards grasping the trade in antiquities. Much of the 
flow of cultural goods globally, has been understood to take place between source 
countries who are richly endowed with these objects and market countries where 
wealthy collectors and the museums which eventually house the traded goods are 
situated. Treatment of the problem through a market-driven approach, however, is not 
independent of normative considerations. Au contraire, the case of cultural goods in 
particular, forces us to pay attention to the hierarchies and asymmetries that sustain the 
global trading system at large. According to Simon Mackenzie, “The moral argument laid 
out by archaeological commentators has become the object of much legal writing, and 
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drafting, and the policy landscape at both the national level – in source and market 
countries – and the international level, is now characterised by many legal controls 
including notable international conventions (UNESCO 1970; UNIDROIT 1995), national 
generic criminal laws that have been applied to illicit dealing in antiquities (such as the 
National Stolen Property Act in the US) and criminal laws specific to dealing in looted 
antiquities such as the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 in the UK.123” And 
yet, concentrating exclusively on the illegal antiquities trade between source and market 
countries, from a supply and demand standpoint, yields a framework with limited 
applicability and certain inherent limitations.  
It is increasingly clear that the line between source and destination regions cannot be 
clearly delineated in present times. Due to the transnational nature of the trade in 
question, the network of suppliers, intermediaries and consumers is diffuse and cross-
cutting. For instance, entities such as museums and auction houses, although based in 
market countries, operate, respectively, on the demand and supply sides of the market. 
Similarly, museums within universities are demand-side entities while academics working 
within those same institutions contribute to the supply side. Thus, the microeconomic 
analysis ingrained in game theory shows that there is no perfect overlap between the 
legal category of market country with the demand side and the legal category of source 
country with the supply side. Similarly, it is incorrect to say that source countries are 
necessarily “conflict-ridden”, “war-torn” or “unstable” – the sort of language frequently 
used in internationalist arguments. Based on a survey of studies, Jessica Dietzler 
establishes that the “problem of looted or stolen antiquities is most damaging in 
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politically conflicted and economically depressed regions but is not isolated to conflict 
regions alone; in fact, there are a number of politically and economically (relatively) 
stable countries that also experience theft of archaeological materials for profit; notably 
England, France, Italy, Germany, and Poland.124” 
In practice, this delinking of categories gives rise to a sanctioning problem as defectors 
are not easily identifiable and it is difficult to ensure that sanctions are targeted. Similarly, 
the so-called “shadow of the future” is long since the effects of loss of cultural property 
only become evident over a longer time horizon. Alessandro Chechi points out a further 
important feature of the market whereby “objects of licit or illicit provenance pass 
through the same intermediaries – such as auction houses, antiques dealers and galleries 
– and that in the art market licit and illicit antiquities are mixed” and argues that such 
mixing results in an “opportunity to launder the proceeds of crimes and hence the cover 
for wrongdoers to evade criminal responsibility”125.  
For an effective conservation regime to be built around this approach, two key 
considerations matter: 
 Current bifurcation in applicable body of laws and academic discourse between 
source countries and destination countries would have to be replaced by an 
alternative paradigm that more closely approximates the evolving landscape. 
 The shadow of the future would need to be shortened by ensuring that the 
effects of loss of heritage are felt in the short-run. This is best achieved by tying 
                                                          
124 Dietzler J. (2013), On ‘Organized Crime’ in the illicit antiquities trade: moving beyond the definitional 
debate, Trends in Organised Crime, 16: 329–342 
125 Chechi A., When Private International Law meets Cultural Heritage Law: Problems and Prospects, Yearbook 
of Private International Law, Volume 19 (2017/2018), pp. 269-293 
76 
 
heritage protection more rigorously with post-conflict reconstruction, which is 
where it becomes useful to apply the human security paradigm to this discussion.  
International relations scholars like Kenneth Abbott, Duncan Snidal and Robert Keohane 
have drawn on game theory to define what purpose international organisations, viewed 
as “regimes”, play in the international system. While structural realists like Kenneth 
Waltz write off international organisations as instruments of powerful states, the regime 
theorists set themselves the task of identifying how international organisations 
constitute inter-state interactions in specific ways. Observing that rational functionalism 
shares the emphasis on interests with realism, Beth Simmons underlines the absence of 
realist cynicism in the former’s worldview126. Instead, rational functionalism posits that 
international law often stems from states rationally calculating the undesirable outcomes 
that might result from the absence of its constraints. In Slaughter Burley’s assessment, 
regime theorists modify structural realism in contending that “institutions that provide 
valuable information must […] be factored into systemic explanations of state behaviour 
independently of structure”127. Regime theories exemplify the potential of 
interdisciplinary dialogue between International Relations and International Law. 
Slaughter Burley also notes that by recasting international law within the rational choice 
framework, regime theorists not only bridged the realist-idealist ends of the spectrum 
but also made an argument in favour of adoption of international law in domestic legal 
systems on grounds of efficiency and transparency.  
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Amitav Acharya has identified three prominent characteristics of the system in the 
realists’ systemic thinking: 
 Pre-Westphalian international systems are largely ignored 
 The dominant template is the classical Mediterranean of Greek and Roman times 
 The history of war and conquest is well documented while “Interactions 
anchored on trade, ideas (including political ideas) and culture, where 
empire, hegemony  or  explicit  and  continuous  power  balancing  is  
absent,  have  been  ignored”128 
Analysing the movement of cultural goods and the consumption and exchange of 
heritage through the international system helps partly address these imbalances. As a 
case, it is possible to examine heritage destruction both in conflict and in peace, as I do in 
this study.  
In forthcoming chapters, analysis from the lenses of human security and constructivism 
reveals the far reaching effects of the dominance of military affairs and Eurocentric 
thinking in the evolution of international law.  
As explained in chapter two, realism greatly emphasizes the distribution of power in the 
system and this is why, moments of power redistribution or the emergence and decline 
of powers are of great import. According to a McKinsey report, “the Art Basel and UBS 
global Art Market Report 2018 found that in 2017, China accounted for 21 percent of the 
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$63 billion global art market, second only to the United States”129. Recent participation of 
China and emerging markets in general in the international heritage trade could give us a 
glimpse into how ascendency to great power and hegemonic status influences actor 
behaviour. 
Derek Fincham suggests that the merits of nationalist and internationalist views on 
ownership, location and protection of cultural property should be debated from the 
standpoint of distributive justice. He writes130: 
In applying ideas of distributive justice to cultural heritage, we can arrive at a mutually 
beneficial set of principles and ideas which can, ideally, balance the concerns of cultural 
internationalists, who value the idea of universal museums and the dissemination of works 
of art, with the enforcement of legitimate legal restrictions on the theft of heritage, the 
looting of archaeological sites, and the destruction of knowledge. Even groups wanting the 
return of their heritage only want to achieve justice.  
Travelling exhibitions and international loan agreements have been suggested as ways to 
balance the interests of countries of origin and a global audience. Elsewhere, I have 
argued in favour of a travelling exhibition as a satisfactory resolution to recurring public 
debate in India about the repatriation of the Kohinoor diamond131. Such a step, I find, will: 
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Keep alive the memory of empire and its ravages to serve as learning for future 
generations 
Address the challenge of resource allocation for the upkeep of the diamond in India, 
amid competing priorities 
Sidestep what some would argue to be the controversial claim of a nation-state to an 
object which has changed hands a number of times before the State came into existence. 
Serve the interest of the global community in enjoying access to a precious stone and a 
contested fragment of history 
Derek Fincham writes that even in the absence of laws addressing illegal trade in source 
countries, “native cultures have successfully used ethical claims, using social justice to 
successfully repatriate objects wrongfully removed from their context”. Native cultures 
often in conflict with domestic laws anyway and this phenomenon observed by Fincham 
allows us to: 
Study international cooperation in the absence of law but with reference to a claim for 
justice 
Usefully problematize the realist claims that States are the only important actors in the 
international system and as an actor, the State is a monolith without any contradictory 
internal pulls 
Begin to imagine how considerations of justice – rather than exclusively those of order – 
might have a place in systemic thinking 
As noted above, reputational concerns contribute towards making compliance with 
international law a rational choice for States. However, in the case of the global market 
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of cultural goods, until recently, there was a lot of reputational gain to be made by 
disregarding the law and become a major market country. As we saw above in case of 
the True trial, the recourse to prosecution was a step taken by a source nation (Italy) for 
the demonstrative effect it would have on targeted adversaries in market countries. Also, 
the game theory model does not account for the disparities in the capacity of States to 
comply with international law. Therefore, the rational choice framework and lessons 
drawn when it is applied to the international system, alone are insufficient to illuminate 
the many threats to cultural heritage and the range of efforts directed at its 
conservation. The forthcoming chapters attempt to present a more complete picture by 
drawing on the paradigms of human security and constructivism from International 
Relations132.  
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Protecting Cultural Heritage: The Human Security Paradigm 
Chapter Highlights 
 The human security paradigm rose to prominence in the post-Cold War period as 
interstate warfare receded and concerns over non-conventional threats to 
security grew 
 Whether human security is useful and actionable in it thick or thin conception has 
been a matter of debate 
 Broadly it has been discussed with reference to aspirations of freedom from fear 
and freedom from want 
 Applying the human security framework to understand the toll taken by 
destruction of heritage reveals that future prospects are an important element of 
our sense of security 
 It is observed that those military interventions which have deployed the rhetoric 
of human security in the past couple of decades have neglected and failed to 
protect heritage sites 
 It is argued based on the analysis that freedom from trauma is an important facet 
which should be added to the definition of human security so as to more fully 






“There is no small irony in hearing that American museums became havens of spiritual 
nourishment following the attacks of September 11th 2001. By way of contrast, one of 
the most immediate consequences of the invasion of Iraq was the transformation of its 
national museum from peaceful oasis into desecrated battleground as American forces 
sought to spread the “ideals of democracy””133, writes Tom Flynn, plainly setting out the 
complex and variegated repercussions that war, insecurity and conflict have for heritage 
and cultural practice. According to Chinkin and Kaldor the element of use of force 
inherent in guaranteeing human security was an outgrowth of European wars of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and is inapplicable to the New Wars of today. 
However, the influence of said European wars over international law endures. 
Substantiating this influence, Craig Forrest goes as far as to argue that “the need for a 
balance between the considerations of humanity and the military actions necessary to 
win a war is regarded as defining the very nature of international humanitarian law”134. 
The notion of human security itself is premised on the immediate post-Cold War 
optimism about the universality of liberal democratic ideals which has proven to be 
misplaced135. Chinkin and Kaldor argue that International law was aimed at mitigating 
suffering in war but in doing so, has legitimized war. They call for a reconceptualization 
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of human security that brings prohibition of war back in focus. This also means extending 
the concept of crimes against humanity to include attacks on States even if they are 
conducted by other States. These authors also recap the on-going debate on the relative 
merits of broad and narrow conceptions of human security, with the former 
encompassing material security while the latter is limited to physical security. Summed 
up in their words, the main critique levelled against the two approaches is as follows136: 
Those who favour the broad version have argued that the narrow version is too 
concentrated on military intervention, while those who favour the narrow version have 
argued that the broad version is indistinguishable from development and covers too much 
ground to be analytically useful.  
A typical conceptualisation of a broad understanding of human security is seen first in the 
1994 Human Development Report which added the paradigm of security into its study of 
development. The report reads: “The concept of security has for too long been 
interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection 
of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear 
holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. The superpowers 
were locked in an ideological struggle-fighting a cold war all over the world. “137 The 
UNDP defined human security as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease 
and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily life,” thus broadening the conceptualisation of security.  Defining human security as 
“safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection 
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from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life,” the UNDP broadened 
the conceptualisation of security. 138 
 
The justification of a broad definition is best provided for in the foreword in “Human 
Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace” written by 
former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Anan - “During the cold war, security tended to 
be defined almost entirely in terms of military might and the balance of terror. Today, we 
know that ‘security’ means far more than the absence of conflict. We also have a greater 
appreciation for nonmilitary sources of conflict. We know that lasting peace requires a 
broader vision encompassing areas such as education and health, democracy and human 
rights, protection against environmental degradation, and the proliferation of deadly 
weapons. We know that we cannot be secure amidst starvation, that we cannot build 
peace without alleviating poverty, and that we cannot build freedom on foundations of 
injustice. These pillars of what we now understand as the people-centered concept of 
‘human security’ are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.” 
Tatah Mentan offers the following definition of human security which represents it as a 
peace-time project designed to mitigate the very causes of conflict139: 
…human security advocates for inclusive policies that strengthen social cohesion and 
rejects exclusionary policies and practices that result in an unequal allocation of economic, 
political, and cultural rights among identity groups and that also, if left unattended, can 
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lead to social exclusion, proliferation of networks of discontent, and possibly higher 
incidence of conflict. 
Addressing the lack of consensus on a definition of human security, David Roberts 
proposes specifying what constitutes human insecurity, “to represent avoidable civilian 
deaths, global in reach, that are caused by changeable human-built social, political, 
economic, cultural or belief structures, created, inhabited and operated by other civilians 
whose work or conduct, indirectly and/or directly, unintentionally, unnecessarily and 
avoidably causes needless mortality around the world”140. 
To sum up, human security paradigm is centered on the individual, is cosmopolitan to the 
extent that it critiques the insecurity fostered by forces of globalization and is built 
around the pillars of freedom from fear and freedom from want.  
Evolution 
Human security came into being as a concept only after the close of the cold war.141 With 
the end of the cold war came a general acknowledgement that the traditional modes of 
understanding security through a “realist, state centric paradigm”142 were inadequate. 
Mary Kaldor traces the origins of the idea to Conference on Security Cooperation in 
Europe’s 1975 Helsinki Agreement. According to her, “by emphasising the security of 
individuals rather than states, human security implies a commitment to human rights but 
it does not deny the importance of the more traditional state centre”143.  
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The concept of human security came into focus once again with the Human 
Development Report of 1994. The Human Development Report of 2001 furthered this 
concept which called for the formation of the Commission for human Security (CHS).144 
The formation of the commission was chiefly on the lines of UN Secretary-General’s call 
at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of fear”. 
The purpose of the said commission was to  
(i) mobilize support and promote greater understanding of human security, 
(ii) develop further the concept as an operational tool, and 
(iii) outline a concrete action plan for its implementation.145 
When the 2004 Barcelona report, we see a new way of looking at human security given 
that it suggests that in the modern world, individuals from across the world face 
significant threat of violence. Much of this violence, however, is not resultant of state or 
military action. A prime threat in the modern world are terrorist organizations which are 
not representative of state or military interests. Moreover, military action cannot 
conveniently suppress such acts of violence for  
(1) Military cannot be expediently deployed to insecure areas.146 
(2) Military action is meant for usage in battlefields and not over areas inhabited by 
civilians. Military action used to suppress such local security issues can in turn cause 
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further insecurity (as in the case of Syria where American bombs targeting enemies 
affect civilian populations)  
On 10 September, 2012, the United Nations General Assembly adopted General Assembly 
Resolution 66/290 entitled “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome” in which Member States agreed on a common understanding 
on human security147.The UN Human Security Unit’s 2014-17 Strategic Plan identifies as its 
basis, two key building blocks of the concept148: 
1. The application of human security derives much of its strength from a dual policy 
framework based on the mutually reinforcing pillars of protection and 
empowerment. Application of this framework offers a comprehensive approach that 
combines top-down norms, processes and institutions with a bottom-up focus in 
which participatory processes support the important role of people as actors in 
defining and implementing their essential freedoms. 
2. Human security is best safeguarded through proactive and preventive actions to 
current and emerging threats. By examining how the particular constellations of 
threats to individuals and communities can translate into broader insecurities, 
human security promotes the development of early warning mechanisms that help 
to mitigate the impact of current threats and, where possible, prevent the 
occurrence of future threats. 
Scholarship emerging from a non-western lens has tended to mobilise the human 
security framework to draw attention to the linkages between neoliberal globalization 
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and non-conventional security challenges, particularly in resource-rich parts of the world. 
According to Mentan, “Global demand for particular commodities, such as timber, 
diamonds and drugs, has provided the funds that have allowed warring factions to 
sustain fighting over many years. The cases of Angola, Sierra Leone, etc. are eloquent 
examples.149” Mary Kaldor has similarly drawn parallels between the erosion of decision 
making at the national level caused by the market fundamentalist structural adjustment 
paradigm and heightened global levels of insecurity150. Such insecurity is at times 
reminiscent of Cold War dynamics while also defying simplistic rendering in conventional 
geostrategic rivalries.  
Debates and criticisms 
The key debate that emerged post the Human Development Report of 1994, was 
regarding whether Security was to be viewed narrowly (in terms of solely physical 
security) or whether the definition of the same should be broadened (to other elements 
of human development). 
King and Murray have described the birth of the concept of human security as a “unifying 
event” – it works as an “organizing concept” that enables the development of broad 
coalitions around specific ‘security’ issues without the traditional strains of narrowed, 
state-centric definitions of security that have previously hindered multi-party 
cooperation.151 In a similar vein, both Jolly and Ray 152(2006: 13-14) and Tadjbakhsh and 
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Chenoy 153(2007: 10) advocate a holistic approach to human security definition, arguing 
that the post-Cold War world presents such a plethora of security problems, where the 
sources of threat vary widely both within and across states, that a flexible, broad 
definition of human security is the only viable option. “Not only does a holistic approach 
draw different specialisms together in the quest to understand better the 
interconnections between diverse aspects of human insecurity,” writes Ewan, “it may 
also bolster co-operation between international agencies in the fields of security, 
development and human rights.”154   
One of the key criticisms levelled against the concept of human security is its lack of 
clear, universal definition.155 Roland Paris argues that the concept of human security can 
be closely likened to the concept of sustainable development. Similarly, Edward Newman 
calls it “normatively attractive but analytically weak.”156  
Consequently, the proponents of a narrow definition argue that a broad definition would 
take away from the focus of physical security. For instance, according to Khong, by 
broadening the concept of security to encompass anything from environmental 
degradation and pollution to homelessness and unemployment, we would be prioritizing 
everything.157 
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A different line of criticism comes from those who contend that states have been able to 
co-opt the human security narrative to further their own ends, augmenting hegemonic 
interests and narratives rather than challenging or transforming them.158 Instead of 
having genuine commitment to the emancipation of the most vulnerable and 
impoverished, Suhrke has argued that non-military “middle powers” such as Norway, 
Japan, and Canada have used the promulgation of the human security agenda to cement 
their own places in the international state system.159 Taking a critical perspective on the 
development of the concept, Booth argues that human security has taken the image of 
“the velvet glove on the iron hand of power,” criticising how “the cold monster of the 
sovereign state has appropriated human security in order to help entrench its own.”160 It 
doesn’t give a voice to the previously ‘marginalized’, as scholars such as Conteh-Morgan 
have suggested.161 Instead, Western powers have privatised aid and development 
agencies and a particularly troubling issue has arisen where the security and 
development of “those over there” is seen as only a means towards the security of “us 
over here”.162 
Tara McCormack argues that: 
“[The human security discourse]… potentially allows powerful states or international 
institutions greater freedom to intervene in and regulate weaker states in a number of 
different ways. This serves to disempower the citizens of weak or impoverished states. 
Whilst their own state is held up to greater scrutiny and regulation by the international 
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community – purportedly on their behalf – the citizens of those states do not have the 
means by which to control or hold to account major international institutions or powerful 
states.”163 
Thus human security can also be seen as a tool in the hands of the developed states to 
influence the sovereign functions of the weaker states. Moreover, with the new 
paradigm of human security, often, weaker states are presented as existential threats to 
the most powerful states.164 
McCormack suggests that the concept of human security evolved during the post-Cold 
War period of disengagement from developing countries by great powers and this is why 
it delinks development from security165.  Recounting some prominent critiques of human 
security, she further notes: 
“For Duffield and other authors, human security can be understood as a regulatory 
power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and 
economic processes that constitute a human population. […] In this reading the West 
seeks to assert control over the developing world in order to protect itself from disorder 
emanating from the South.166” 
Human Security and Cultural Heritage 
Applying the concept of human security to cultural property conservation in conflict 
zones, one is operating in a context of people-to-people war and isolating as its enduring 
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feature, the targeting of civilians. Referring to heritage as “the ultimate expression and 
footprint of a society”, Watfa Shadi and Mustafa Bashar argue that “to inflict damage to 
the heritage of a country is to damage the soul and identity of the people themselves”167.  
Bearing in mind that “an individual’s current security is a function of her or his future 
prospects”168, allows us to fully capture the psychological impact that the social 
dislocation caused by destruction of heritage can have. This is also to say that heritage 
and cultural practices are not only significant in terms of preserving the past but also 
must be valued as contributing factors to future well-being. For its success, the human 
security approach relies on coordinated action of state and non-state entities at the local, 
national and international level, enabling an interplay of the varied associations with the 
idea of heritage. This approach also takes due cognizance of the fact that more often 
than not, actors trained in combat and other conventional dimensions of security are ill-
equipped to shoulder the responsibility of protecting heritage.  
At present, most discussion on “protection of civilians” is based on a narrow definition of 
civilian and a thin conception of protection.  The definition of civilian can be seen as 
narrow for the following reason: It is hard to distinguish between 
combatants/aggressors, many of whom may be in and out of civilian life over the span of 
conflict and the civilian population, which is purportedly at risk from them. Destruction of 
heritage sites in Syria shows that it is far from easy to separate parties to the conflict into 
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watertight categories of those who are attacking and those who are protecting heritage. 
Reporting on the situation in Syria, Michael D. Danti writes169: 
Combat damage and looting are widespread in Syria, and all major combatants (state, 
quasi-state, and non-state) are responsible for acts of theft and destruction to varying 
degrees. Intentional destructions of heritage places by ISIL and other Jihadi-Salafi 
organizations (Meijer 2013: 24–29; Steinburg 2013) – mainly tombs, cemeteries, mosques, 
churches, temples, and shrines sacred to Shia, Christians, Sufis, Jews, Druse, Alawi, Yezidis, 
and Mandaeans – across northern Iraq and Syria are perhaps the highest impact cultural 
property crimes given their explicit purposes of eradicating cultural diversity, inspiring 
terror, fuelling sectarian tensions, and fomenting further violence. 
The conception of protection can be adjudged as thin concerned almost exclusively with 
keeping people alive. This may be viewed in contrast to a thick conception of protection 
in the sense of minimizing the impact of the conflict on civilian life. The more broad-
based conception of protection has a short-term and a long term advantage. In the short-
run it reduces the incentives for individuals to take up combat as an occupation or to 
perform other services for conflict entrepreneurs. In the long-run it makes for a 
smoother road to peace-building and transition to stability. The widening of social 
cleavages due to cultural crimes would be avoided, making post-conflict restoration of 
social trust less fraught. Disruption and internal displacement would be minimized and 
individuals and communities would be optimistic of having a real chance of rebuilding 
where they are rather than be forced to flee. This would minimize regional contagion of 
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instability and other knock-on effects of refugee outflows from conflict zones that are 
being experienced globally.  
Kaldor describes the operative implications of a human security based national and 
transnational governance paradigm in these words170: 
We are used to thinking of internal security as the domain of law and policing and external 
security as war and diplomacy. A human security approach implies that something like what 
we take for granted internally has to apply externally as well.  
Resituated within this framework, the concern with destruction of cultural heritage 
becomes a problem not of specifying what protections are to be extended to heritage in 
war-time but of finding mechanisms to resolve conflict without recourse to war.  
A human security approach to conflict resolution needs also take into account those 
global private economic interests which profit from weakening of state capacity or state 
failure in resource rich parts of the world. Insights into the dynamics of the market for 
cultural goods yielded by the game theory approach are thus placed within a broader 
context of the systemic inequality and insecurity.  
As we have seen, the human security approach lends itself well to understanding the 
intricacies of destruction of heritage in conflict zones. Such an applied approach also 
reveals an inherent contradiction in the conceptual framework of human security. 
Freedom from fear and freedom from want have been recognized as key pillars of human 
security. In conflict zones, however, these two motivations may be at cross purposes 
with each other. Confronted by economic disruption and extreme deprivation, host 
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communities turn to looting and pillaging of heritage in order to earn a living. “Given the 
sometimes life-or-death situation for themselves and their families, the financial gains 
achieved by stealing and smuggling their own cultural heritage creates an overwhelming 
option”171, write Watfa and Mustafa, lucidly portraying the grim reality of conflict zones. 
Fear of long term social consequences is a small consideration for them but is nothing 
short of terrorizing to a worldwide cosmopolitan sensibility, in large part inspiring the 
high profile, well publicized strikes on museums and ancient sites in Afghanistan and Iraq 
in the first decade of the twenty first century. In this way, the human security framework 
vests more responsibility in the international community to take a long term view on 
heritage protection and interpret the conservation capacities of countries of origin in a 
dynamic sense, rather than as a given. Despite being normative in nature, the human 
security approach hinges on the economic value of cultural objects but in a different way 
than the game theoretical approach. Where the analyses of both approaches converge is 
in ascribing to international law the responsibility of pursuing equitable global 
development rather that sustain the widening of inequalities in a bid to uphold the 
edifice of neoliberal globalization at all costs. Powerful states have also deployed the 
rhetoric of human security to conduct military operations in other parts of the world, 
particularly emphasizing freedom from fear. Such military operations have in recent 
history dealt significant damage to heritage sites and cultural objects.  
At the epistemic level, Amitav Acharya traces the origins of “human-centric” approaches 
to the Global South, making them a significant step forward in the direction of non-
western International Relations scholarship. He is however critical of their appropriation 
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by “western governments such as Canada and Norway” and expresses disappointment 
with their inability to “challenge the centrality of the state”172.  
Freedom from Trauma: Towards redefining human security 
A conception of protecting cultural heritage based on human security is likely to suffer 
from two of Philip Allott’s five main challenges to the future evolution of international 
law173.  
1. The Hegemony of the Economic 
2. The Tyranny of the Actual 
While explaining what he means by the “hegemony of the economic”, Allott questions 
the assumed positive correlation between economic development and social 
development and is critical of the association of public interest with capitalist, private-
interest driven economic activity. The human security paradigm seems to have coopted 
Freedom from Want without addressing the basic underlying limitation that capitalism 
and globalization exacerbate inequalities.  
Allott also argues that “to rationalize or naturalise the human actual is to empty it of its 
moral content, to neutarlise it”174. We see this done to a great degree when the human 
security paradigm evaluates the harm caused to heritage against a static background of 
conflict or in the contingency of war and its immediate aftermath. Here the opportunity 
to think about conflict and reconstruction as long term processes is missed with the end 
result that heritage is the loser since by definition it accrues more value over the longer 
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horizon of time. Keeping these limitations in mind, I propose a revised understanding or 
human security below which would elevate the potential of the framework to safeguard 
cultural heritage.  
In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scurry writes, referring to the phenomenon of torture175: 
But this reluctance, and the deep sense of tact in which it originates, increase our 
vulnerability to power by ensuring that our moral intuitions and impulses, which come 
forward so readily on behalf of human sentience, do not come forward far enough to be of 
any help: we are most backward on behalf of things we believe in most in part because our 
instincts salute the incommensurability of pain by preventing its entry into worldly 
discourse. 
In the concluding part of this chapter, I will discuss loss of heritage and one’s cultural 
grounding as a form of trauma and propose that Freedom from Trauma should be given 
place alongside Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want if the conception of Human 
Security is to be responsive to our time.  
Present day global conflicts need much more nuanced interpretation than the limited 
categories of inter or intra state war might allow for. The individualisation brought about 
by technologies of globalisation has also made it easier for those same individuals to rally 
around causes, culminating in the ongoing instability that has been the saga of the 
twenty first century thus far176. One less talked about feature of these conflicts is the 
aggregation of intergenerational trauma which almost inexplicably erupts as if a dormant 
volcano come alive. The Black Lives Matter Movement in the United States, the Me Too 
                                                          
175 Scarry E. (1985), The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, OUP, p 60 
176 “…injury must at some point be understood individually, because pain, like all forms of sentience, is 
experienced within, happens within, the body of the individual”, writes Scarry. 
100 
 
and Rhodes must fall movements globally share in common a painful reckoning with a 
loss of agency and narrative control which until recently seemed to have been perfectly 
normalised. Many have expressed bafflement at the polarisation that has ensued in the 
wake of these movements. As Scurry explains, pain makes an “absolute claim for 
acknowledgement” and because society is unused to the expression of pain, such a claim 
tends to remain unacknowledged.  
Scurry describes the trauma inflicted by the fallout of war poignantly: 
“When Berlin is bombed, when Dresden is burned, there is a deconstruction not only of a 
particular ideology but of the primary evidence of the capacity for self-extension itself: 
one does not in bombing Berlin destroy only objects, gestures, and thoughts that are 
culturally stipulates, but objects, gestures, and thoughts that are human”177.  
What these lines powerfully convey is that any attempt to subjugate the alien and stamp 
out the particular through conquest, although seemingly contributing to the 
homogenising onslaught of globalisation, is actually a great disservice to humanity and a 
moral conception of the “universal”. Fortunately, history has examples of societies 
digging deep in their cultural values to deal with loss of the “tangible”. Where trauma 
really runs deep and inflicts the most damage is when “the legitimacy of the outcome 
(whether of war or ideational and epistemic dominance) outlives the end of the contest 
because […] the winning issue or ideology achieves for a time the force and status of 
material “fact” by the sheer material weight of the magnitudes of damaged and opened 
human bodies”178.  
                                                          
177 Scarry p 61 
178 Ibid p 62 
101 
 
Much of the existing literature studies the toll taken by war in the form of trauma caused 
to heritage. Little thought has been invested in considering the trauma inflicted on 
societies who witness their heritage being destroyed or taken away. Beth Stamm et al 
attempt to address this question through a Cultural Clash Theory which “posits that 
original cultures have identifiable and sustainable economic, social, political, and spiritual 
systems in the pre-contact era” and these are vulnerable to dissolution when challenged 
by another culture. In response, claim these authors, the “injured culture lays claim to 
economic and social resources, preferably with the support and encouragement of the 
hegemonic culture”179. This formulation helps us understand why demands for 
repatriation and restitution are such an important piece of the puzzle of reclaiming 
cultural agency. Usefully for international law, it also acknowledges the crucial role that 
powerful actors who benefit from such a system of dispossession need to play in 
rebalancing it. Therefore, for the human security paradigm to form a useful bridge 
between International Relations and International Law, the goal of achieving Freedom 
from Trauma should be recognised an integral part a long term intergenerational 
understanding of “Security”.  
Envisioning long-term security in this broader sense, swings the pendulum back towards 
a thicker conception of human security but, I would argue, without necessarily diluting its 
actionability and operative impact. It also embodies the spirit of the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 66/290 mentioned above. Firstly, it is a conceptualisation 
that not only protects cultural heritage but recognises the potential of and invests in 
empowering host communities to do so in their own way. Secondly, it treats cultural 
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trauma as that “early warning mechanism”, paying heed to which “help to mitigate the 
impact of current threats and, where possible, prevent the occurrence of future threats”, 
as stated in the resolution. But this does not mean that this expanded idea holds no 
promise for the near term, for, as we have noted above, future prospects are an 
important determinant of security in the present.  
However, such redefinition of human security also requires us to contend with the norm 
of military necessity. The balance between risking the lives of combatants and the 
obligation to protect heritage and cultural property is a difficult one to strike. Describing 
attaining military objectives whilst preserving cultural property as goals mutually in 
conflict, Forrest argues that “the key to resolving this conflict may be found in the 
humanitarian legal doctrine of military necessity”180.   He goes on to state that “necessity 
has been viewed as a limitation to unbridled barbarity” and finds expression in the 
principle of proportionality.  It is important to consider the range of threats faced by 
heritage in the course of warfare and military occupation. 
Since antiquity, heritage has been targeted to signify an attack on the most obvious 
symbols of a ruling power or community. Often the intent behind destruction of heritage 
sites has also been to erase local identity. In recent decades, much publicised attacks on 
heritage sites have been seen as an instrument of propaganda and terror.  
The first question relevant to this discussion would be asking why heritage is vulnerable 
to destruction during wars.  
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Gegner and Ziino frame the issue thus181:  
“If heritage can be understood as the selective use of the past as cultural and political 
resources in the present, then there are few fields more productive for understanding 
the process than the heritage of war.” 
This conclusion is based on their perception of heritage as “constituted in the act of 
identifying what is appropriate to remember and preserve in light of experience”. 
Zainab Bahrani claims that “cultural destruction in war is not always a result of accidental 
or “collateral” damage”. Instead, she characterizes the plundering of museums and 
libraries in Iraq as “destruction of history in a country under occupation”182. Bahrani 
underscores the rhetorical strategies that emphasize rescue and reconstruction and 
minimize annihilation, further making heritage “a pawn in this game of war”. She reviews 
a host of well-funded programs aimed at whitewashing the image of what she terms the 
occupation of Iraq, concluding that activities aimed at heritage restoration fall within this 
category and continue to be designed to benefit interested constituencies in the West.  
According to Bahrani: 
The loss or destruction of historical monuments can and does have a devastating effect on 
people. That is why throughout history such destruction has been calculated into the 
strategies of war. This is the reason why iconoclasm and destruction or the relocation of 
monuments have occurred as a deliberate act of war throughout recorded world history, 
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and why ethnic cleansing works through the annihilation of people by means of eradicating 
any trace of their past.  
Echoing this hypothesis, David Roberts explains destruction of ancient Iraqi and Syrian 
sites by ISIS thus: 
Destroying such heritage is thus a part of their duty, as they see it, to reject such a 
"nationalist agenda" that the statues, temples, and indeed, cities represent183. 
Hardy argues that throughout history, “‘punitive expeditions’ to vulnerable States by 
powerful States persisted as standard practices” and that plunder of cultural artefacts 
during these expeditions was motivated sometimes by strategic and at other times by 
material considerations. Practices of preservation, destruction and reservation also 
varied through time and space. “Preservation and destruction were matters of religious 
duty (or its absence) and economic benefit, rather than matters of historical 
understanding and cultural respect. Restitution was still ultimately performed as an act 
of realpolitik and strategy, rather than a recognition of property rights or cultural 
belonging”184, says Hardy. 
A further distinction to be drawn here is that of destruction during combat and 
destruction inflicted after a territory has fallen into the hands of enemy combatants.  
Nabil al-Tikriti alleges wilful neglect on part of US military and government officials when 
it came to protecting cultural heritage in occupied Iraq, something he terms “not a policy 
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failure but a policy of failure”. He deems it “reasonable to suggest that a lack of cultural 
sympathy was at play”.  
William Schabas notes that this distinction is in fact mirrored in some of the relevant 
international legal instruments.  Referring to the Rome Conference (1998) Schabas 
recalls: 
The travaux preparatoires indicate that the drafters were familiar with two models or types 
of provision governing cultural property, one applicable to the conduct of hostilities and the 
other to persons and property that have fallen under the control of one of the parties185. 
In his analysis, it is crucial to draw this distinction when unpacking the terminology of 
“attacks” on cultural property, particularly in the context of international criminal law.  
The above overview of the various threats to heritage in the throes of conflict 
demonstrates that the doctrine of military necessity is complex and can seem 
insurmountable especially when the endangerment of human life is factored in. Military 
necessity is on its own a complex construct due to different capabilities of the parties to 
a conflict, the ever-evolving technologies of warfare and the difficulty of achieving 
normative consensus across the board around such an idea. The proscriptions of military 
necessity in practice must be weighed against considerations of strategic and tactical 
advantage in the battlefield. To determine where the line between preventing human 
suffering in the immediacy of conflict and protecting cultural heritage for the long run 
falls, is beyond the scope of this study. It is at this juncture however, that Chinkin and 
Kaldor’s observation that in the process of alleviating human suffering, international law 
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has legitimised war, is resonant. In the next chapter we deploy the conceptual 
possibilities of Constructivism to investigate this point further and understand how, both 
in conditions of war and peace, when it comes to International Law too, the adage 
“Words make Worlds” holds true.  
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Chapter 5  
Protecting Cultural Heritage: Constructivism 
Chapter Highlights 
 Constructivism is a useful framework for engaging with concepts such as rules, 
norms and institutions and their relationship with each other 
 Constructivist analysis allows us to step back from certain constructs and 
formulations to examine the way in which they are constituted 
 The attention that constructivists pay to the use of language enables us to unpack 
the normative positions embodied by international law on the protection of 
cultural heritage 
 This paradigm is also used to turn a critical gaze on international law from the 
outside in by evaluating it as a product of hegemonic discourse and practices of 











Countering the methodological individualism of rational choice approaches, 
Constructivists argue that individuals cannot be understood stripped from their social 
context. In practice their approach generates the hypothesis that if institutions embody 
the rules of the game, then they can be powerful determinants of identities and 
preferences and influence behaviour. As a framework of searching for meaning, 
constructivism is consistent with the view that theory is “indispensable, at times, to 
make progress, but alone, it is false”186.  
Constructivist theory assumes that learning is a process in which people construct new 
ideas or concepts based upon their knowledge. Each and every person selects and 
processes information, constructs hypotheses and makes decisions, relying on a 
particular structure. This cognitive structure (also called schema or mental model) 
provides meaning and organization to experiences and allows the individual to go 
beyond the information given. Richard Price credits constructivism with “demonstrating 
that moral norms can matter in world politics” before taking on the challenge of 
answering “how and why some norms mattered in some places or sometimes, but not in 
others”187.  For Price, the emerging concern for the constructivist research agenda is to 
provide robust ethical defences of all norms advocated or interventions prescribed. 
Addressing the criticism that constructivists draw from both, the sceptical and utopian, 
ends of the theoretical spectrum, Price says188: 
                                                          
186 Cixous H and Calle-Gruber M (1997), Helene Cixous Rootprints: Memory and Life Writing, Routledge, p 4 
187 Price R. (2008), The Ethics of Constructivism in Reus-Smith and Snidal (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations, p.318  
188 P. 323 
111 
 
Implicitly or explicitly endorsing developments such as the generation of an international 
norm prohibiting the use of antipersonnel landmines or the creation of an ICC need not 
preclude what some might champion as more fundamental progressive changes such as the 
ending of war altogether. Indeed, until such larger international structures are in fact 
favourably altered, constructivists can point the way to forms of action that could claim to 
make a progressive difference, as opposed to falling short of much more ambitious 
comparisons to the ideal that, until their realization, do amount to failure.   
Nicolas Onuf’s point of departure is the idea of agency which he believes to be a product 
of social conditioning189. In his analysis, agents are those individuals or groups who play 
an active part in society based on certain rules. The way rules are either obeyed or 
flouted constitutes social practice and a stable pattern of such practices is what Onuf 
designates as an “institution”. Because agents derive their ability to act under “rules”, 
having rules creates a condition of being “ruled”, in this framework. Those actions of 
agents are considered “rational” which are directed at achieving a set of socially 
determined goals. Thus unlike in the realist conception, constructivist rationality is not 
set in stone but is context dependent and the variables influencing it may be 
exogenously determined rather than simply a function of the internal structure of the 
international system. To sum up, constructivist agency is institutionally constituted but 
has an element of choice built into it. Exercise of this choice is what brings about 
institutional evolution. Charlotte Epstein expands our understanding of Onuf by 
suggesting that agents derive the range of possibilities within which they may act from 
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the inherent structures of language190. Epstein adds that the influence of constructivism 
has polarised International Relations between the causality and rationality of Realism at 
one end and the constitutivity and reflexivity of constructivism on the other. As we have 
seen so far, realists attribute compliance with international law to perception of interests 
and reputational concerns while liberals are more concerned with legitimacy of the 
process by which it comes into being. Constructivists believe “that international law is 
most effective when it ceases to be part of the calculation at all, when the rules of 
international law become so deeply internalized that they are followed simply as a 
matter of course, as little reflected-upon state self-interest.191” 
Persuasion, Issue-framing and Socialization 
According to Payne, “Constructivists commonly explain persuasion by pointing to the 
substantive content, or intrinsic characteristic, of particular ideas or claims”192. It has 
further been argued by constructivists that messages tend to be more persuasive when 
linked with already well-established norms, making this a key strategy for norm 
entrepreneurs when they frame an issue. Payne explains that “frames” perform the dual 
function of offering “a singular interpretation of a particular situation” and prescribing 
“appropriate behavior for that context”193.  Thus the constructivist position on issue 
framing and persuasion may be summed up as follows: Frames draw on building blocks 
from existing normative orders, broadly perceived as legitimate. They then structure 
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messages with specific audiences in mind, outlining the nature of the issue and 
advocating change.  
Finnemore and Sikkink offer the following characterization of Norms194: 
 Norms and rationality are intimately connected (although for the most part the 
one is discussed in scholarship at the exclusion of the other) 
 It is the prescriptive quality of “oughtness” that sets norms apart from other 
kinds of rules  
 There are no bad norms from the perspective of those who promote the norm 
 A norm is an appropriate standard of behavior with reference to a given identity 
and hence norms need not always be global 
 Adherence to norms has been linked to the “logic of appropriateness” but what 
causes standards of appropriateness to evolve, be recognized and change over 
time still needs explaining 
 International norms often begin as domestic norms and the domestic influence is 
particularly strong early in the norm’s life cycle   
 For a certain norm to gain international acceptance, key states (and this will vary 
as per issue area) adopt and implement them 
The last two points of this characterization of norms described what is termed 
“socialization”. Finnemore acknowledges the emphasis of constructivists on soft law in 
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adding, “much of the macrotheoretical equipment of constructivism is better at 
explaining stability than change”195. Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope have observed 
in a similar vein that the “fascination with norm creation, evolution, and destruction” 
drives the conversation between Constructivists in International Relations and 
International Legal theorists, in particular legal pluralists196. The constructivist support for 
international law rests heavily on the legitimacy of the legal rule as well as the legitimacy 
of the process through which it came into being. As Beth Simmons puts it, contrary to 
realists and rational functionalists, constructivists argue that “international institutions 
and organizations legitimate particular rules, enhancing their effectiveness through a 
heightened sense of obligation rather than through their mere instrumental value as a 
convenient point of convergence”197.  
Constructivist Approach to Cultural Heritage Protection 
Laura Demeter explains that identification of certain sites and objects as heritage is itself 
a process of defining criteria and ascribing meaning. Specifically, she notes that “when a 
consensus is achieved around certain ‘relevant’ values, categories and meanings, the 
institutionalisation and classification as heritage takes place”198.  
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An important definitional question relevant to the constructivist paradigm is that over 
the distinction between the nomenclatures “cultural property” and “cultural heritage”. 
Xanthaki sums up the adoption of both terms in international legal instruments thus: 
The (1954) UNESCO Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed 
Conflict defines cultural property as: ‘irrespective of origin or ownership…movable or 
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people’.  The 
restrictiveness of this definition is maintained in the (1999) Second Protocol to the 
Convention, even though the Preamble emphasizes that rules in this area should reflect 
developments in international law. The (1970) UNESCO Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property is more detailed: cultural property is defined as ‘property which, on religious or 
secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance to 
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science’. The Convention also includes a 
very detailed account of objects of cultural property. The (1972) UNESCO Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage is an exception to 
these early instruments, as it refers to cultural heritage, instead of cultural property199. 
As concerns with protecting natural and intangible cultural heritage became more widely 
recognised towards the latter half of the twentieth century, we find international 
conventions (eg. UNESCO 1972 and UNIDROIT 1995) increasingly replace the term 
cultural property with the term cultural heritage, which is broader in scope.  
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According to Elizabeth Crooke, “the ideas of community and heritage share vital 
characteristics: both have multiple definitions; are constructed for contemporary needs; 
and will selectively draw on narratives of place, history and belonging”200. The second 
most important point to consider within a constructivist paradigm on Heritage is 
whether cultural property draws its meaning from and therefore belongs to a particular 
culture or, as is the dominant perception, to humanity as a whole. To set the context for 
this discussion, Benjamin Porter offers a useful explanation about the relationship 
between heritage and identity201: 
Heritage is an intentional phenomenon, a sense of the self in the past where the subjective 
component of ‘self’ is ascribed at increasingly broad scales of the individual, community, 
nation, and globe, and the temporal links between the subject and the past are based on 
perceived genealogical, biological, or community connections. But heritage also possesses 
an extensional component, where these subjective meanings are externalized in language, 
practice, and objects that are concrete and publicly accessible.  
In other words, the intrinsic abstract value of heritage as a link between the past, present 
and future is just as important as the tangible, material worth of its embodied or 
performative manifestation.  
Discussing the evolution of international law on protection of cultural property 
Merryman writes: 
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The Lieber Code and its progeny all dealt comprehensively with the obligations of 
belligerents; the protection of cultural property was merely one among many topics. In the 
1930s, however, international interest turned to the preparation of a convention dealing 
solely with the protection of cultural property in time of war. In 1935 the 21 American 
nations promulgated a Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and 
Monuments, now generally referred to as the Roerich Pact202.  
To this, Merryman further says, the Nuremberg Trials added the innovation of holding 
individual officials responsible for unlawful destruction of cultural property in the name 
of a belligerent nation. The Preamble to The Hague Convention of 1954 justifies the 
protection of cultural property by conferring on it the attribute of belonging to the 
common cultural heritage of mankind. According to Merryman, reference to common 
cultural heritage of mankind, “which has been echoed in later international instruments, 
is a charter for cultural internationalism, with profound implications for law and policy 
concerning the international trade in and repatriation of cultural property”. He labels this 
important and influential approach of thinking about cultural property as cultural 
internationalism.  
The constructivist lens also enables us to think of conservation with reference to multiple 
approaches conditioned by a diversity of values, beliefs and historical experience. The 
practice of heritage tourism has resulted from a normative paradigm which prioritises 
economic resource generation to achieve the aims of conservation. It has proven a highly 
influential approach to the extent of motivating greater engagement with instruments 
                                                          
202 Merryman J.H. (1986), Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 80, No. 4., pp. 831-853 
118 
 
put in place by international conventions such as The World Heritage List discussed 
below. Multiplicity of interests in heritage further complicate the pre-existing culturally 
derived ideas about its significance and proper conservation. Irrespective of the context-
specific model of conservation, by and large, “we find ourselves on the verge of conflict 
when the value groups place on heritage is inversely proportional to their role as 
stewards”203. Constructivism addresses the identity driven norm preferences that shape 
perceptions of interest. In doing so, this theoretical apparatus helps grasp the impact of 
cosmopolitan identity on the global consumption of cultural goods and view the 
application of the rational choice and human security lenses from the outside in.  
As noted above, constructivists believe that agents take their cue about the range of 
possible actions available to them from the structure of language. Based on this premise, 
Constructivism also helps us delve into the role played by communities of experts in 
building a world around words. According to Derek Fincham204: 
 The cultural heritage movement emerged in the twentieth century as groups used law, 
policy, and advocacy to undo these contemporary and historical takings (of art from various 
cultures). But the movement has too often been reactive. 
Fincham describes placing the onus of proving ownership of a cultural object on the 
country of origin, while the collectors, auction houses and museums claim good faith 
acquisitions by maintaining a culture of secrecy around the history of objects. Comparing 
cultural exploitation of less affluent communities with the imposition of environmental 
costs on less affluent parts of the world, Fincham argues that global flows of art and 
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heritage objects mean access and enjoyment at one end and “cultural pollution” at the 
other. He further asserts that the ramifications of these flows throw up questions 
relevant to intergenerational justice. To address these concerns Fincham proposes an 
analysis of “current local, national, and international cultural heritage discourse”205, to 
identify sources of injustice. All said and done, he concludes, “the (cultural heritage) 
movement needs an animating philosophy beyond “this used to be here and looters and 
smugglers skirted the law””. The constructivist framework usefully serves just such a 
cause by focusing its analysis on the role of norms and rhetorical strategies over actor 
behaviour.  
The language of cultural property 
The Hague Convention, 1954, defines cultural property as below: 
Article 1. Definition of cultural property For the purposes of the present Convention, the 
term ‘cultural property’  shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership:(a) movable or 
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as 
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological 
sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are 
of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of 
artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important 
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined 
above;(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the 
movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries 
and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed 
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conflict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-para-graph (a);(c) centers 
containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-para-graphs (a) and (b), 
to be known as ‘centers containing monuments’. 
Jane Anderson and Haidy Geismar write that “the language of cultural property […] 
emerged predominantly in the nineteenth century as a means to position the nation-
state as the owner of particular kinds of artefacts and institutions. Breaking open a space 
between traditional ideas of private property and of public property, this category of 
national property produced a new understanding of the inalienable relationship between 
the state and its possessions.206” 
Their expression of the term cultural property in the following terms is conceptually 
significant207: 
A curious hybrid of culture (the evanescent and immaterial systems and structures of 
knowledge that bind human beings together) and property (the ideologies, political 
regulations, customs and popular consensus that establish entitlement and sovereignty, 
and determine claims and power over a range of tangible and intangible resources), cultural 
property is an evolving category used to describe ways of talking about collective 
entitlement, shared inheritance, the material nature of identity, and in more recent years, 
to debate the ethics of the commoditization of culture. 
Further they add that “to understand that the phrase ‘ cultural property ’ does not simply 
reference an international category and bureaucratic order, but is itself an active site of 
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claim making that is about political recognition, cultural memory, and identity 
formation.208” 
Significantly, Anderson and Geismar note the relationship between cultural property and 
national identity formation, arguing that “Cultural property became one way to articulate 
a political theory of society that was constituted not simply by the recognition of 
individual rights, but by the recognition of collective entitlements triangulated through 
ethnicity, territory, and citizenship in the context of the modern nation-state.209” It is 
thanks to this close relationship between heritage and national identity that cultural 
property became a defining feature of the sovereignty-based international system. 
Anderson and Geismar contend210: 
Cultural property as a distinct category of objects with accompanying sets of obligations, 
emerged as a way to theorize the ethics of relationship between polities, and an important 
discourse of diplomacy and respect between nations. The triangulation of sovereignty, 
national identity, and anthropological notions of culture (...), underpinned by entangled 
articulations of race, ethnicity and territory, framed the emergence of the nation-state in 
the nineteenth century and started to forge the very notion of the modern international 
community. 
Yet, at the same time they acknowledge the disservice done by the universalisation of 
the European template of nation-state to imaginations of cultural heritage that do not 
conform with this dominant paradigm211.  
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In the next two sections, we examine two important expressions signifying international 
cooperation towards heritage conservation – the World Heritage List and the Universal 
Museum – using the constructivist paradigm.  
World Heritage List: Dynamics, Meanings and Impact of Site Inscription 
The idea of common heritage of mankind was originally intended to signify that 
regardless of where important cultural and natural heritage was located, it was the 
responsibility of all states to pool efforts for its conservation. Such collective 
responsibility was vested in states by virtue of a posited unity of human values, at the 
same time, international cooperation was meant to happen alongside the efforts of 
states to protect their own heritage domestically. Accordingly, Article IV of the 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
states212: 
Each State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of ensuring the identification, 
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the 
cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and situated on its territory, 
belongs primarily to that State. It will do all it can to this end, to the utmost of its own 
resources and, where appropriate, with any international assistance and co-operation, in 
particular, financial, artistic, scientific and technical, which it may be able to obtain. 
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Thus, while article IV vests primary responsibility with the State where the site is located, 
Article VII envisages international cooperation in these terms: 
For the purpose of this Convention, international protection of the world cultural and 
natural heritage shall be understood to mean the establishment of a system of international 
co-operation and assistance designed to support States Parties to the Convention in their 
efforts to conserve and identify that heritage. 
This initial message however has been interpreted selectively and reinterpreted over 
time. The first reason behind this is the divergent opinions on what makes a certain 
monument or tradition or natural site inherently valuable. The second important driver 
has been the simultaneous operation of a range of culturally, historically and 
economically conditioned responses to the need of conservation – throwing up 
questions of ownership, location and the tussle between maintaining originality on the 
one hand and continuity and keeping traditions alive inter-generationally on the other.  
Thus, the concept of world heritage fits the characterisation of a “frame” as elaborated 
by Payne. The inscription of a particular site as “World Heritage” bestows upon it a 
singular interpretation and also signifies submission to a particular regime of 
conservation. The efforts of state actors towards applying for inscription, indicate the 
level of persuasiveness of the framing “World Heritage Site”213.  
As on May 2020, the details of UNESCO’s World Heritage List are as follows: 
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Total Properties Listed214: 1121 
Transboundary: 39 




The World Heritage List has been criticised for more sites from of certain world regions 
being listed than others, calling into question how well it represents the common 
heritage of mankind. Applications for nominations of sites to the list have increasingly 
been motivated by enhancing the site’s attractiveness as a tourism destination. Lasse 
Steiner and Bruno S. Frey find that “Gini coefficient as a measure of the inequality in the 
distribution of Sites across the world is increasing over time, depicting an increasing 
concentration of Sites in a few countries”215, even after UNESCO attempted to address 
this concern through the Global Strategy for a Balanced, Representative and Credible 
World Heritage List in 1994 . Steiner and Frey find that the Gini coefficient as a measure 
of inequality in the distribution of sites across countries has “has risen almost 
monotonously over time from 0.34 in 1979 to 0.55 in 2009”216. In their assessment, the 
lack of accountability of the World Heritage Center to the UNESCO General Assembly, 
combined with the assertion of national interest when states get an opportunity to serve 
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on the World Heritage Committee217, results in dominant states (such as the UNSC P5) 
being over-represented in the World Heritage List. The much higher number of cultural 
than natural sites is also suggestive of a definitional bias in heritage that favours the 
European view of the concept. Since the prerogative of nominating sites rests with 
states, the World Heritage List ends up reflecting the unequal capacities of countries 
across the world, stemming from diverse economic and political conditions, to succeed in 
the process. The inscription process itself it “time-consuming, controversial, and 
politically polarizing” due to “the linkage to specific ethnic groups and achievements, 
disputed historical territories, current religious and national tensions, and individual 
biases over cultural values and achievements”218. 
Enrico Bertacchini and Donatella Saccone explain that “having national heritage sites 
with World Heritage recognition does not guarantee greater protection of or additional 
resources to the enlisted properties”219. This often reduces the utility of the list to 
prestige value or snob appeal and the maintenance requirements may trigger an increase 
in reliance on revenues from tourism, enhancing the vulnerability of fragile sites.  
Moses Katerega systematically revisits the implications of recognition as a World 
Heritage Site for the Kasubi Tombs in Uganda220. A combination of creative ingenuity, 
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spiritual significance and technical excellence inspired the nomination of the Kasubi 
Tombs to the World Heritage List in 2001. Katerega, however, sums up the impact of the 
label of a UNESCO World Heritage Site as follows: 
 A diminution in the role of community practices of conservation 
 Confusion around the responsibilities of various stakeholders 
 An increase in the attraction of the site as a tourism destination 
It was not until the catastrophic fire of 2010 which destroyed the main tomb building that 
a coordinated effort ensued among local, national and international stakeholders. The 
noteworthy attribute of the reconstruction process of the site was that international 
technical assistance was extended to strengthen local efforts and amplify the living 
cultural traditions capable of recreation of the structure.  
Based on the above evaluation of the World Heritage List within the constructivist 
theoretical framework, a complex picture of the interplay between interests and norms 
emerges with regard to decision making of states. Persuasion of normative frames may 
be higher for state-actors holding less power in the international system, while powerful 
actors may refer to norms simply as a rhetorical device to bolster their independent 
interests. Here, Onuf’s idea that the existence of rules creates the condition of being 
ruled becomes evident. We see the conjoint operation of the constructivist paradigm 
where norms influence perceived interests with the realist hunch that the distribution of 
power in the system yields varying degrees of such influence.  
As mentioned above, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage vests primary responsibility of protecting their own heritage on 
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state parties. Thus the normative frame of state being the most important actor in 
International Relations and International law, is reinforced by the Convention. Arguing 
that such an orientation has created an “administrative mind”, Michael F Brown 
identifies the following gaps in which emerge when it is translated into practice221: 
 First, most are creations of the nation state, whose interests are likely to diverge from 
those of subcultural communities struggling to maintain a degree of distinctiveness. Even 
when the state is not aggressively trying to redefine local cultures and heritage sites to suit 
a nationalist narrative, a predilection for centralised control is likely to put too much power 
in the hands of credentialed experts far removed from the everyday interactions that keep 
heritage alive. 
The constructivist framework also draws attention to the role that communities of 
experts play as norm entrepreneurs eventually influencing deliberations around framing 
the law. Has greater interest from professional and academic communities changed the 
heritage movement? There is mixed evidence on this question with some evidence 
suggesting an increase in the role of experts and other evidence pointing to the 
overshadowing of expert opinion by political calculus222.  
The United States Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act was discussed in 
the chapter on Game Theory. 
SECTION 306 of the Act states223: 
                                                          
221 Brown MF (2014), The Possibilities and Perils of Heritage Management, in Sandis C (ed) Cultural Heritage 
Ethics: Between Theory and Practice, Open Book Publishers, pp 171-180 
222 In “A Prelude to a Manifesto on Heritage” Shiv Visvanathan argues that under the influence of esoteric 
experience, the field of heritage has “becomes bureaucratic and technocratic”.  
223 CONVENTION ON CULTURAL PROPERTY IMPLEMENTATION ACT Partial text of Public Law 97-446 [H.R. 
4566], 96 Stat. 2329, approved January 12, 1983; as amended by Public Law 100-204 [H.R. 1777], 101 Stat. 
1331, approved December 22, 1987 
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 [17] CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
… 
(2) Appointments made under paragraph (1) shall be made in such a manner so as to 
insure-  
(A) fair representation of the various interests of the public sectors and the private 
sectors in the international exchange of archaeological and ethnological materials, and 
(B) that within such sectors, fair representation is accorded to the interests of regional 
and local institutions and museums. 
Thus we see that professional and special interest groups form the pillars of the decision-
making process. This can have a negative impact if the idea of heritage is narrowly 
construed around the goals and motivations of such groups. At the same time, it can 
have (and some authors argue has had) a positive impact if groups such as 
archaeologists educate society and policy-makers about the significance of conserving 
heritage in its original context. According to Lynn Meskell “mounting challenges to 
expert opinions and decision making, the increasing and overt politicization of the 
(World Heritage) Committee, and UNESCO’s fiscal crisis224” are the key current 
challenges standing in the way of achieving the goals of the 1972 Convention concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Meskell observes that over 
time, the World Heritage Committee has come to be populated by diplomats and 
politicians rather than experts and attributes the difficulties of overcoming these 
                                                          
https://eca.state.gov/files/bureau/97-446.pdf 
Accessed June 11 2020 
224 Meskell L (2013), UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention at 40 Challenging the Economic and Political Order 
of International Heritage Conservation, Current Anthropology Volume 54, Number 4, p484 
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challenges as much to the power and influence wielded by State Parties, particularly 
when they have representation on the Committee. She writes225: 
This statist power structure is inescapable when attempts are made to instigate structural 
changes, whether creating an indigenous expert advisory panel, recognizing nonstate actors 
like nongovernmental organizations, or upholding the heritage rights of minorities within 
nation states. 
As expert bodies, the International Centre for the Study of Preservation and Restoration 
of Cultural Property (ICCROM), the International Council on Monuments and Sites 
(ICOMOS), and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) posses 
“serious decision-making heft”226. However, argues Meskell, in recent years at the level 
of Committee deliberations, political representatives have managed to drown out the 
voices of experts in favour of diplomatic bargaining and national priorities. Thus, we find 
that whether they have been given prominence or not, experts in the various subfields 
under the umbrella of heritage, have played a noteworthy role, exemplifying the 
constructivist take on the power of ideas, concepts and terms.  
Issue Framing and the Universal Museum 
Museums and the rest of the art world in western countries have adopted various 
linguistic devices to describe their attitude towards cultural objects from other parts of 
the world and strengthen their ownership claims over these objects. In the colonial era, 
the works plundered from colonised regions were described as “inferior”, “primitive” 
and symbolising the barbarianism of the other when standing alongside the oeuvres of 
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the civilising race. Describing the role played by museums such as the Louvre in French 
nation-building, Flynn recalls: “Here the bourgeois citizen could partake of a narrative 
vision of civilisation expressed through the carefully arranged collections and locate 
himself and his country at the apex of that historical development”227. In the post-
colonial era, the continued accumulation of cultural objects in metropolitan museums 
was justified in terms of the educational role it supposedly played for the privileged 
audience. In recent years, the terminology of “universal museum” has been crafted to 
convey a sense of transcendence of space springing from a technologically derived 
imagination of globalisation that has no place for the local228.  With specific reference to 
claims of repatriation made by countries in Africa, Tapuwa R. Mubaya and Munyaradzi 
Mawere note that the verbiage Universal Museum has been “deployed chiefly as a 
defence against repatriation claims”229. By way of critique of the construct “Universal 
Museum”, these authors add230: 
If museums were capable of helping to devise and communicate a universal perspective on 
cultural values which achieves credibility and currency outside western cultural elites, they 
would indeed make an invaluable contribution to global society. What makes people of 
critical minds unconvinced by the idea of universal museums is that the idea is perceived as 
evidence of cultural insensitivity or an instrument of injustice. 
                                                          
227 Flynn T (2012), The Universal Museum: A Valid Model for the 21st Century? p 13 
https://www.academia.edu/20053839/The_Universal_Museum_A_Valid_Model_for_the_21st_Century 
Accessed may 29, 2020 
228 Tom Flynn traces back the genesis of the universal museum to the elite practice of private collecting which 
dates back to sixteenth century Europe. 
229 Mubaya TR and Mawere M (2015), ‘Orphans in a strange land’:  Controversies and challenges in the 
repatriation of African cultural property from European museums, in Mawere, Munyaradzi and Chiwaura 
(eds.), African Museums in the Making: Reflections on the Politics of Material and Public Culture in Zimbabwe, 
African Books Collective, p 82 
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Thus, we are made aware that language as rhetoric or instrumental ploy should be 
distinguished from language that represents some form of consensus on underlying 
normative content in the constructivist paradigm.  According to Howlett-Martin the 
concept of universal museum is the product of an orientalist paradigm “which viewed 
indigenous people as incapable of understanding, protecting, and appreciating their past 
and which laid the foundations for the universalist paradigm of a common heritage for 
all”231. 
In 2002 nineteen prominent museums based in North America and Europe issued The 
Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums. The signatories were 
directors of The Art Institute of Chicago; Bavarian State Museum, Munich (Alte 
Pinakothek, Neue Pinakothek); State Museums, Berlin; Cleveland Museum of Art; J. Paul 
Getty Museum, Los Angeles; Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York; Los Angeles 
County Museum of Art, Louvre Museum, Paris; The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New 
York, The Museum of Fine Arts, Boston; The Museum of Modern Art, New York; Opificio 
delle Pietre Dure, Florence; Philadelphia Museum of Art; Prado Museum, Madrid; 
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam; State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg; Thyssen-
Bornemisza Museum, Madrid; Whitney Museum of American Art, New York; The British 
Museum, London. The main message of the Declaration was that repatriation claims 
against their collections were unjustified in light of “different sensitivities and values, 
reflective of that earlier era”, when the contested objects were acquired. Such a claim is 
at first glance incompatible with the 1995 UNIDROIT Conventions which affirms that “the 
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adoption of the provisions of this Convention for the future in no way confers any 
approval or legitimacy upon illegal transactions of whatever kind which may have taken 
place before the entry into force of the Convention”232. By citing “different sensitivities” 
the self-proclaimed universal museums do not engage with provision in UNIDROIT 1995 
under Article 4(1) which assures “fair and reasonable compensation provided that the 
possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known that the object was stolen 
and can prove that it exercised due diligence when acquiring the object”, demonstrating 
a lack of confidence in their own due diligence protocols and practices. 
Tom Flynn writes that the Declaration was based on an “implicit assumption that an idea 
born during the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment can be reconciled with 
more recent scholarship in fields such as postmodernism, post-
colonial theory, and the so-called new museology in order to function as a viable 
philosophical framework for the world’s museums in the future”233. The debate 
surrounding the Declaration on the Importance and Value of the Universal Museum is 
instructive on how a clash of interests plays out as the battle for narrative control. 
Indeed, as the Declaration itself proclaims: Museums are agents in the development of 
culture, whose mission is to foster knowledge by a continuous process of reinterpretation. 
Critics have pointed out that the 2002 Declaration on the Importance and Value of the 
Universal museum is endorsed by signatory institutions based in the United States and 
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Europe. This conflation of “global” or “universal” with western is not uncommon. 
Katherine Burlingame is one of many commentators who have shown that the intended 
purpose of the declaration was to shield the elite museums in the western world from 
repatriation claims of source countries234. Burlingame demonstrates the vacuity of the 
“universal” claim by citing examples of museums in Kenya which house large collections 
documenting and furthering research on human origins and natural history.  
Those who claim status as a universal museum often argue that the nation states who 
claim contested cultural objects are not representative of the ancient cultures in which 
the objects originated. This argument is an extrapolation of European historical 
precedent where “universal survey museum that emerged during the eighteenth century 
made use of traditional religious language and iconography to establish itself as an 
instrument of the bourgeois nation state”235. Besides, even though the nation state 
appropriates heritage discourse to legitimise itself, we must recognise that the nation 
state is itself not a universally organic concept and is not uniformly experienced and 
related to across the world236.  
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The usage “common heritage of mankind” has been criticized for discounting alternative 
associations with heritage and history and approaches to conservation that do not fit the 
hegemonic western mould237. According to Sandra Bowdler, “defining something as 
belonging to that transcendent category is a means of excluding anyone who might have 
a particular interest in it”238. She elaborates by recalling the practices of repainting of 
ancestral sites in certain aboriginal communities of Western Australia, specifically citing 
one such project which became controversial and was eventually abandoned after being 
charged with “desecration” in a complaint filed by a member of the white majority. Thus 
we see that the universalizing paradigms of World Heritage List, common heritage of 
mankind and universal museum lead to disregard and dispossession of the views and 
practices of marginalised communities and regions vis-à-vis cultural life.  
Using the tools of constructivism, we are able to delineate the influence of a dominant 
worldview on the very conception of heritage and approaches to conservation, including 
in law. The widespread usage of linguistic devices like “cultural property”, “world 
heritage” and “universal museum” reflect an authoritative and disciplinary framework, 
grounded in cultural institutions such as museums, in material culture that is 
monumental, sacred, and antique, and in languages of law, policy, and governance” 
(Anderson and Geismar 2017). Thus constructivism alerts us both to the language of law 
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and the legal language as the constitutive framework for international action in a 
particular domain.  
Autre Temps, Autre Moeurs? 
Studying international cooperation from a constructivist lens helps us specify the 
relationship between social norms and existing legal instruments. As Derek Fincham has 
stated, “In some cases, norms conflict with the legal regime; in other cases these norms 
change the law itself”239.  To put this in constructivist terms, the international law on 
protection of cultural heritage does not entirely embody the rules of the game, yet, it has 
shown the ability to reflect gradual change in norms. Constructivism also allows us to 
interpret institutional evolution in terms of choice rather than as derived based on 
structurally-determined givens. The analysis of “World Heritage List” and “Universal 
Museum” in this chapter provides a nuanced take on exercise of choice and its 
implications.  
The constructs of “world heritage” and “universal museum” seek to recontextualise 
cultural objects. These constructs have currency based upon the assumption that to 
localise or nationalise heritage is to politicise it whereas to globalise or universalise it is 
an exercise in depoliticisation. However, the model of globalisation which is espoused by 
proponents of universal museum is acquisitive. It maintains hubs of accumulated wealth 
amidst generalised deprivation. It does not question the structures which perpetuate 
inequality but castigates the ability of those who bear the cost of globalisation for their 
assumed inability to protect their own resources, culture and traditions. But perhaps 
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most subversively, it dresses its historical specificities into an alluring garb of universality 
which transcends both space and time. As a significant body of scholarship has 
established, the universal museum was and continues to be a figment of empire’s 
mission civilisatrice.  
Does constructivism further non-western IR in this case? 
Maybe maybe not. But the study of heritage as a question within the ambit of 
international relations does. Heritage is firstly, not of concern only to hegemonic powers 
or great powers. Studying international cooperation to protect cultural heritage does not 
privilege the study of high politics which has conventionally been the case with both 
international relations and international law, while still allowing us to have discussions 
about the causes and impact of war and conflict and the structures of global 
interdependence and inequality. Depending on how we find a way for different ideas 
about heritage and its conservation to coexist side by side, we may be able to conceive 
an approach to studying the international that is neither universalising nor ethnocentric. 
Shiv Visvanathan offers an alternative perspective on all of the aspects of understanding 
and managing heritage discussed below. Instead of viewing them as the answer, he 
argues that heritage “needs to be rescued: first, from the jingoism of the nation state 
which conscripts it for identity formation; second, from a bureaucracy that forges it into 
a technical entity closer to the sense of property; and third, from a casual populism that 
sees it as part of a tourist fixation”240. Visvanathan’s call for “a language which is less 
economic, less expert oriented, combining the physical and metaphysical so that it 
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retains its civilizational and vernacular quality”, is a nod to the constructivist emphasis on 
the primacy of language. Visvanathan speaks not of caring for heritage but of heritage as 
a form of caring and thereby advocates for trusteeship as the solution. He offers a radical 
critique of universalism – as a figment and aspiration of western political thought – by 
reminding us that “both difference and diversity have acquired an innate secondariness, 
being more part of the problem rather than the problematic of political thought”. Thus, a 
close reading of Visvanathan allows us to see how any claim to “universal”, is not only an 
ironic way of approaching heritage protection, but in fact antithetical to the very idea of 
heritage. Yet, in critiquing universalism, Visvanathan is wary of reactive provincialism. 
Therefore, he calls for an understanding of Diversity where “more sensitive to limits and 
yet provides a different commons of creativity, where the mystery of the whole 
celebrates the magic of the parts, where the whole is never totally knowable, where the 
parts can trigger new cosmologies and worldviews” based on a vision of Democracy 
characterised by “a new dialectic between the universalizing and pluralizing”, where,  
“parts acquire a new legitimacy as they are not provincialized, hegemonized, localized, 
but are embedded in a new cosmopolitan intimacy of part and whole”. 
Visvanathan’s expiration into our relationship with heritage offers a fresh take on the 
foundational building blocks of Western political theory, viewed from a non-western 
lens. As previously discussed, political science and Eurocentric epistemology wield a 
great influence over International Relations. A discussion about heritage makes it 
possible to revisit the fundamental ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity and diversity, 
thereby pointing the way to new possibilities for International Relations and its dialogue 
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Protecting Cultural Heritage: Responses in International Law 
Chapter Highlights 
 Approaches to protection of cultural heritage discernible in existing international 
law are discussed under the rubrics of Legalisation, Criminalisation and Regulation 
 The findings that emerge are superimposed over the analysis presented in the last 
three chapters which focus on dominant paradigms in International Relations 
 United Nations General Assembly resolutions are reviewed chronologically to 
establish the norm emergence and evolution of an opinio juris supporting 
restitution and repatriation of cultural patrimony in cases of illegal acquisition and 
export 
 Just war theory is revisited in the context of an intercivilisational dialogue with 













The uniformity and aspiration to objectivity of law starkly contrasts the diversity and 
subjectivity inherent to the basic concept of heritage. According to Michael F Brown, law 
encodes meanings to influence social practice driven by a quest for uniformity241. The 
pursuit of uniform approaches to protect heritage globally, through international law, 
strikes Brown as ironic.  
In this chapter, the international law on protection of cultural heritage is reviewed under 
three clusters of responses: Legalisation, Criminalisation, and Regulation and Restitution.  
Our thinking about Just War – jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum – has significant 
implications for how we perceive and deal with threats posed to cultural heritage, both 
tangible and intangible, in the context of war. The concern with principles of just war is 
also where international humanitarian law and international criminal law trace their 
foundations back to. Later in this chapter, this study’s emphasis on “other ways of 
knowing” is applied to Just War thinking. Based on the findings of this exercise, certain 
conclusions relevant to protecting heritage in the context of war are arrived at.  
Legalisation 
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Referring to law as both contract and covenant242, Abbott and Snidal write that in the 
international realm, “Legalization has effect through normative standards and processes 
as well as self-interested calculation, and both interests and values are constraints on the 
success of law”243. From the standpoint of International Relations scholars, both hard 
and soft law are, therefore, equally important. In this section however, the international 
lawyer’s understanding of legalisation as creation of binding obligations through treaty 
law is our point of departure. In addition to obligation, precision and delegation are 
important attributes of this view of legalisation.  
Alessandro Chechi describes the emergence of international cultural heritage law as a 
sub-field in international law in these terms244: 
At the national level, most States have enacted legislation that recognises the specificity of 
cultural objects and subjects such assets to a legal regime that is more protective and less 
trade-oriented than the regime normally applied to ordinary goods.  At the international 
level, international organisations progressively adopted rules and principles due to the 
perception that the body of domestic law in force was not sufficient to cope with the 
different challenges posed in this specific field. 
Retracing the chronological evolution of the idea of protecting cultural property in 
international law, Kate Fitz Gibbon finds that the Lieber Code of 1863 was influenced by 
the “notion that it is wrong to impose unnecessary suffering on the losers in a 
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243 Abbott KW and Snidal D (2000), Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, International Organization, 
Vol. 54, No. 3, Legalization and World Politics, pp. 421-456 
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conflict”245. The Roerich Pact of 1935 designated monuments, museums and institutions 
dedicated to art and culture as neutral institutions. The Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954, vested the 
ownership of cultural heritage in all of humanity. The 1954 Hague Convention defines 
cultural property thus: 
Article 1. Definition of cultural property For the purposes of the present Convention, the 
term ‘ cultural property ’ shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership: (a) movable or 
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as 
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological 
sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of 
art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; 
as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of 
reproductions of the property defined above; buildings whose main and effective 
purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph 
(a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to 
shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-
paragraph (a); centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as ‘ centers containing monuments ’ . 
UNESCO’s Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970, addressed the concerns 
with looting and trafficking of cultural goods. The UNESCO Convention Concerning the 
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Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972, expanded the definition of 
heritage which had hitherto been limited to art and antiquities and lays down criteria on 
the basis of which cultural and natural sites may be included in the World Heritage List. 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects signalled 
an intent to strengthen measures designed to ensure restitution of cultural objects to 
countries of origin. The UNIDROIT Convention has the following characteristics: 
 It allows states and individuals (thereby conferring private litigation rights 
without state intervention) to claim restitution and bring a cause of action in the 
country where the disputed object is located, with no retroactive effect 
 Theft is sufficient grounds for claiming restitution but illegal export is not 
 Compensation for bona fide purchasers of stolen objects is provided for, in an 
attempt to balance competing interests 
 UNIDROIT 1995 was an initiative of UNESCO to address the private international 
legal aspects of UNESCO 1970 and hence the two instruments are deemed 
compatible  
 Thus, we see an evolution in the guiding principles behind the international legal 
instruments over time. The UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage, 2003, extended the scope of protections to include living traditions. 
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, 2005, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 2007, also address intangible cultural heritage.  
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The discernible divergence in the nationalist or internationalist bent of international legal 
instruments is captured by Gregory Scott in these words246: 
In comparing the available international agreements, there is no single directive as to 
whom, precisely, errant property is to be repatriated, and the relevant documents can in 
general be grossly divided into two groups that represent varying perspectives. The first, 
including the UNESCO Convention on Illicit Art and International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") present a bias favoring a conclusion that cultural property is 
part of, and necessarily attached to, a particular location or group. To the contrary, the 
second group represented by The Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and certain of Japan's recent 
enactments take a significantly different and more general view that culture and its 
proprietary by-products are to be considered the common heritage of mankind. 
However, from a practical standpoint, Scott acknowledges that “due to the complexity 
of the considerations and the relative dearth of available and effective principles for 
settling these kinds of disputes, it is not unusual in this context for claims of current 
entitlement to be founded upon situational moral or serendipitous contemporary social 
or political biases rather than upon substantive legal principles”247. In preceding 
chapters, we have discovered theoretical frameworks in International Relations help us 
investigate the influence of moral positions and political circumstances on the 
conception, evolution, interpretation and implementation of legal principles. In 
forthcoming sections of this chapter, I centre approaches in international law which 
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constitute models of cooperation for heritage protection. One could imagine 
Criminalisation and Regulation/repatriation as two kinds of responses under the broad 
umbrella of legalisation. Whereas criminalisation pulls international law in a more 
positivist direction of hard law, regulation and restitution allow us to explore the 
normative force of international law. Through this analytical exercise, we find support for 
Abbott and Snidal’s contention that “the choice between hard and soft law is not a 
binary one”248. 
Criminalisation 
David Keane and Valencia Azarova suggest that “The definition and institutionalization of 
the consequence of criminal prosecution for offences against cultural property is rooted 
in the international legal order. While the 1954 Hague Convention provides for individual 
criminal responsibility in case of certain breaches, the effectiveness of the provision was 
undermined by the lack of a list of specific offenses that could give rise to criminal 
sanctions, later enunciated in Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol as part of five 
“serious violations:” the first three corresponding to grave breaches of  the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977, the fourth and fifth considered serious 
violations of the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1999 Second Protocol.249” Accordingly, 
the five offences are as follows: 
(1) Making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of attack250;  
                                                          
248 Ibid p 422 
249 Keane D. And Azarova V. (2013), UNESCO, Palestine and Archaeology in conflict, Denver Journal of 
International Law & Policy, Vol 41, No 3 pp. 309-343 
250 The list of cultural property under enhanced protection is available here: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/1954convention/pdf/Enhanced-Protection-List-2017_EN.pdf 
The Enhanced Protection Regime is established under the second protocol of Hague 1954 and basically further 
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(2) using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in 
support of military action;” (3) “extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural 
property protected under the Convention and [Protocol II] (4) “making cultural property 
protected under the Convention . . . the object of attack;” (5) “theft, pillage or 
misappropriation of, or acts of violence directed against, cultural property protected 
under the Convention.” (1999 Second Protocol) 
Criminalisation, as a response, affords us a glimpse into judicial decision-making on issues 
of heritage protection. Stephen Hall situates judicial decision-making as a source of 
making of rules and their identification in International law. He writes251: 
Although there is no doctrine of stare decisis in international law, decisions of international 
and domestic courts and tribunals are often highly persuasive evidence for determining the 
content and scope of international norms derived from custom, treaties and the general 
principles. 
Punishing art theft and trafficking in cultural property as a criminal offence has the 
advantage of being a deterrent, especially when the penalty imposed is imprisonment. 
This is so because dealers and collectors are generally wealthy individuals who will not be 
deterred by fines252. However, this response also has its share of difficulties. Leila 
Amineddoleh observes that “Scienter  is frequently a stumbling block for prosecutors in 
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252 Karin Orenstein attest to the fact that collectors have conventionally “considered their risk to be financial: 
the loss of the antiquities’ value, the possibility of being sued by a theft victim or of the objects being seized 
and forfeited by law enforcement, and any legal fees expended in defending such litigation”. In Orenstein K 
(2020), Risking Criminal Liability in Cultural Property Transactions, North Carolina Journal of International Law, 
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any theft matter,  but it is exponentially more difficult in cases of art theft”253. The 
provenience and provenance of looted antiquities being either unknown or forged in 
most cases, makes it challenging to establish that the accused knew that they were 
purchasing a stolen object. Museums are further seen to be immune from fear of 
prosecution as “board members themselves are the people responsible for overseeing 
the inner workings of the institutions” and protection of cultural property being in most 
cases a low priority for government agencies, “public intervention is too sporadic”254.  
Simon Mackenzie has observed that responses in international law to illicit deals in 
cultural goods have taken the form of criminalising such acts. He cites the inclusion of 
trafficking in cultural property within the scope of the United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as a further development in the same direction. 
However, Mackenzie is concerned with the inherent tendency in criminology to gaze 
downward or focus on the lower echelons of society. Instead, he finds the role of dealers 
and collectors in the cultural property trade to more closely resemble “white-collar crime 
by individuals and groups, corporate crime, and state and state-corporate crime255” and 
therefore urges an upward gaze or their recognition as crimes of the powerful. 
Mackenzie further argues that since dealers are the relatively powerful actors in the 
system, the trade “may be more usefully controlled by a regulatory approach to the 
trade as opposed to a narrowly legalistic one”.  
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According to William Pearlstein, the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 
passed by the US Congress in 1983 sought to allow enforcement of import restrictions in 
the US to curb illicit trade while still encouraging a thriving cross-border exchange of 
cultural objects. The underlying logic was that “the carrot of US import restrictions 
would be used as a stick to negotiate agreements for partage, museum loans, excavation 
permits for US archaeologists, cooperation and exchange among curators and art 
historians, and even export permits for redundant, non-critical objects”256. At the 
domestic level, particularly in the United States, criminalisation has been viewed by some 
as having favoured “the extraterritorial enforcement of sweeping national-patrimony 
laws”257, in the process supressing the legal art market and hurting the interests of the 
art community and cultural education of the public. Pearlstein, for instance, contrasts the 
regulatory approach inherent to the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation 
Act with the approach of criminalisation favoured by US courts under the national Stolen 
Property Act, describing this as an example of “judicial nullification of congressional 
intent”. He further adds that the stance of US courts in the McClain cases was criticised 
for being influenced by principles of international law rather than strictly upholding US 
common law. Others, operating with the lens of private international law list examples 
where national-patrimony laws have not been upheld in the courts of market countries258 
and focus attention on the illicit trade in antiquities as the more pressing concern.  
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Surveying on-going efforts to address the damage sustained to cultural heritage in Syria, 
Brian Daniels and Salam al Kuntar address the possibility of international criminal 
prosecution of heritage related offences in future. Based on existing case law they find 
that “prosecutors will select to pursue indictments in which a party is unambiguously at 
fault and there is no significant armed opposition”259, so as to comply with the military 
necessity exception. The complex circumstances under which destruction of heritage in 
Syria has taken place heightens the difficulty of satisfying this condition.  
The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) successful prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi 
a.k.a Abou Tourab in 2016 for destruction of UNESCO protected and World Heritage sites 
in Mali during the occupation of Timbuktu by the Ansar Eddine armed group, is an 
instructive case for criminalisation as a response260. The outcome of the case has been 
lauded for exemplifying speedy prosecution by the ICC with cooperation from the African 
states of Mali and Niger. The criticisms levelled against the ICC for this case, however, 
expose the limits of criminalisation as an effective measure for protection of heritage on 
conflict. Under the Rome statute, “gravity” of the crime is one of two core principles of 
the ICC, the other being complementarity. Critics of the ICC’s decision to prosecute Al-
Mahdi have pointed out other instances where the Office of the Prosecutor has failed or 
declined to intervene, arguing that these incidents meet the “gravity” requirement far 
more than the destruction of heritage sites. Reservations have also been expressed on 
whether “Al Mahdi is indeed the most responsible for the crimes”261. As seen in the case 
of Syria, several militia groups, a cross section of the population involved in excavation 
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and the global supply chain of illicit antiquities are all implicated in the destruction of 
cultural property. In such a situation, there are no straightforward answers to the 
question: who is most responsible? Another source of debate is interpretation of the 
word “attack” on cultural property. Two positions are discernible on this point. The first 
construes attack in a limited sense as undertaken during hostilities through use of 
military equipment. The other – which is the position taken by the ICC’s trial chamber in 
the Al Mahdi case – is that “the element of direct[ing] an attack encompasses any acts of 
violence against protected objects and will not make a distinction as to whether it was 
carried out in the conduct of hostilities or after the object had fallen under the control of 
an armed group”262. Based on this distinction, William Schabas has concluded that “Al 
Mahdi has been convicted of a crime he did not commit”263.  
Regulation, Repatriation and Restitution 
The term restitution is used when illegally acquired cultural objects are returned to their 
original makers/owners or their descendants whereas repatriation refers to return of 
objects whose status has changed due to change in political conditions resulting from 
state building or break-up. When demands for restitution are made for objects lost by 
whatever means during colonial rule, the term “return” of cultural property has been 
generally used.  According to Mackenzie, regulation is an intentional goal-oriented 
intervention and includes gathering of information, setting of standards and exerting 
normative influence to produce behaviour modification. He compares a trader in the 
                                                          
262 Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15) Judgement and Sentence, 2016, para 15 
263 Schabas W. (2017), Al Mahdi has been convicted of a crime he did not commit, Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law Vol 49, p 76 
154 
 
financial sector with a dealer in the art market and describes the similarities that emerge 
as follows: 
Looking out for oneself is the primary rule in such market settings, the overall market being 
something that dealers see themselves as exploiting rather than identifying with as their 
responsibility. The market is on this view a context for their actions rather than constituted 
by them, and the temptation to take a profitable risk-shifting approach rather than a costly 
and time-consuming risk-managing one is great. 
Mackenzie concludes that this outlook is the basis not only for risk-taking behaviour but 
also triggers a passing the parcel game of dumping the risk onto other stakeholders 
(reminiscent of the impact of credit default swaps on pension funds). Therefore, the 
intended purpose of regulation in this view is to counter risk-taking and risk-shifting 
attitudes and contain the practices stemming from them. “How might we think about 
‘crystallising’ the risk considerations in any given transaction, or making them more real 
in the minds of the dealers, so as to prompt more of a risk-management approach?”, asks 
Mackenzie. On the flipside, Mackenzie also recognises the limits to drawing parallels with 
the financial sector. Specifically, the ordinary citizen who may be a victim of wrongdoing 
is significantly more likely to report in case of the financial sector compared to the 
cultural goods sector. On the one hand, this poses a serious challenge for the regulatory 
approach to contend with, while on the other, it reinforces the need for international law 
(and legal rhetoric) to inform national and local responses.  
Critics of repatriation and restitution, often portray these claims as stemming from 
extreme nationalist and anti-market parochialism – a characterisation that Tom Flynn 
terms “McCarthyite condemnation”. Instead, explains Flynn, “rather than pursuing 
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narrow political aims, what many are arguing for is a loosening of the Western museum’s 
proprietorial grasp on the world’s material culture and the narratives that circulate 
around it. Instead they argue for the construction of a more internationalist, 
collaborative approach that restores the importance and value of context to an object’s 
meaning and identity”264.  
In response to the illegal flow of antiquities from source country to market country, the 
role of international law is conceptualised as follows: International regulation of 
antiquities aims to make up for the regulatory incapacity of source countries by shifting the 
burden of control to market countries and inducing them to control inflows of 
antiquities265. Securing cooperation of market countries through enactment and 
enforcement of import controls seems to have been a significant strategy under the 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO 1970). Based on the negotiating 
stance of the United States at the UNESCO 1970 Convention, the position of source 
countries may be summed up as follows: 
1. Selective, rather than blank check system of export/import controls 
2. Non-retroactivity with the aim of protecting existing collections of museums and 
other collectors 
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3. Reciprocity by source countries through better domestic protection and 
conservation measures and openness to cultural exchange agreements 
Fitz Gibbon recalls the general rule in private international law with respect to foreign 
transactions between individuals or corporations, whereby the court may choose either 
to make its own characterization or follow the characterization under the source 
country’s laws. Given the nature of the antiquities market whereby “thieves and 
smugglers tend to move cultural property to countries with a weak law enforcement 
capacity and where the tainted title can be laundered through expiration of the limitation 
periods required for adverse possession, prescription or estoppel, or the norms 
protecting bona fide purchasers”, Chechi tries to assess the implications of private 
international law in operation. To begin with, he points out that “restitution claims are 
normally directed to the courts in the place where the objects are found”, however, such 
rules are only rarely designed with cultural goods in mind and in any case vary across 
jurisdictions. Lex rei sitae or the principle whereby title is determined under the laws of 
the country where the last transaction took place is the principle generally used by 
national courts to decide such claims, according to Chechi. However, Chechi argues that 
whether such a transaction has taken place in a civil law jurisdiction (where the possessor 
is assumed to hold title in good faith) or in a common law jurisdiction (where title of 
stolen property cannot be transferred), as well as the statutes of limitation applicable, 
greatly influence outcomes of legal action. Chechi identifies lex originis as the most 
favoured alternative principle in the literature to lex rei sitae, given the significance of 
cultural goods to countries of origin. It is important to note that restitution or 
repatriation is not guaranteed through the operation of lex originis and in cases where 
the cultural artefact predates the coming into being of the state of origin, the principle’s 
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application is contested. Chechi observes that “The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and 
Directive 2014/60,64 which endorse the lex originis principle, have struck a balance 
between the rights of original owners and of good faith possessors by providing for the 
payment of compensation to the possessor that exercised the required due diligence at 
the moment of acquisition”.  
Another constraint which impedes international regulation of trade in cultural goods is 
the non-applicability of foreign laws, writes Chechi. Here, whether the case for 
restitution/repatriation is based on the patrimony law or the export control law is of 
significance. For, while states are obligated to treat illegal removal of another state’s 
heritage as theft, they are not required to enforce the export control laws of another 
state.  
Derek Fincham discussed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) as a way of 
overcoming this last barrier to international cooperation. Since the US is a major market 
country, Fincham believes MLATs to be an effective tool for repatriation efforts, 
particularly through the modality of forfeiture actions. Defining forfeiture as an action 
where “the offence is primarily attached to the thing”, rather than the offender, Fincham 
adds that “forfeiture actions have been used extensively by in the United States in 
actions brought by US prosecutors”. Fincham makes some further important points 
about the implications of deploying MLATs for cooperation in the realm of cultural 
heritage: 
1. Forfeiture actions prioritise repatriation over criminal prosecution of individuals. 
Thus, they privilege the regulatory approach over criminalisation.  
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2. They incentivise museums to step up their due diligence efforts prior to acquiring 
objects. Equally, as financially well-endowed institutions, they hold museums 
accountable for creating demand for smuggled art and antiquities.  
3. Excessive reliance on these treaties by source nations is disincentivised due to the 
possibility of backlash from affected constituencies and the burden imposed on 
agencies directly involved in the cooperative effort in market nations.  
4. Lawyers specialising in cultural heritage may increase their reliance on existing 
tools rather than attempting to develop new laws.  
Fincham discusses law as a subset of regulation in the case of the global heritage market. 
He states that “Social norms regulate behaviour when the law is ineffective—and 
because the antiquities trade works hard at every turn to evade scrutiny, these norms 
serve as de facto regulation of the sale of antiquities in many cases”266. 
Restitution and repatriation constitute a telling example of norm emergence and 
adoption in international society and its eventual reflection in international law. In what 
follows, I trace through history the United Nations General Assembly and United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions which address this issue as a way of documenting the 
evolution of this norm.  
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
In 1961, The international Court of Justice said the following, with reference to a series of 
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly267: 
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General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative 
value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the 
existence of a rule, or the emergence of an opinio juris.  
Accordingly, the emergence and evolution of an opinion juris or norm supportive of 
restitution and repatriation of cultural property to their places of origin is seen through a 
series of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions discussed below, since the 
UNESCO Convention of 1970.  
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3026, 1972268 
 Expressed a fear that “the world may be impoverished by succumbing to 
uniformity and monotony in modes of life”  
 Considered that scientific and technological advancement could both be 
supportive off and at odds with preservation of cultural values 
 Urged states to use their national development plans as an instrument to tackle 
associated risks 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2148, 1973269 
 Clarified that an emphasis on preserving national and local cultures should not 
lead to “withdrawal of various cultures into themselves” 
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 Affirmed the right of states to formulate laws and policies for heritage protection 
as a sovereign right” and recognised cultural exchanges in accordance with these 
laws as conducive to protection 
 Embraced a living conception of culture by encouraging that heritage 
conservation efforts be linked to development policies 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3187, 1973270 
 Taking reference to UNESCO 1970, places a “special obligation” on countries 
which have come to possess art and cultural objects from other territories by 
virtue of imperial occupation to undertake prompt restitution of the objects 
 Emphasizes the role of cultural understanding – one’s own and others – in 
supporting broader international cooperation 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3391, 1975271 
 Invited “Member States to ratify the Convention on the |Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property, adopted by the general conference of the United Nations Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation in 1970”.  
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/39 and 31/40, 1976272 
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 Reiterated the link between cooperation on protecting cultural values with 
positive outcomes for international peace and security and economic 
development 
 Referred to Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights, reintroducing the discourse of human rights in the cultural domain 
 Renewed calls for restitution of plundered art and cultural objects to countries of 
origin 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/18, 1977273 
 Urged member states to take steps towards preventing illicit traffic in cultural 
objects, in particular items from countries formerly under colonial occupation and 
foreign domination 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 33/50, 1978274 
 Mentions establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the 
Return of Cultural Property to its Counties of Origin or its Restitution in case of 
Illegal Appropriation as a promising step 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 38/34, 1983275 
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 Expressed concern over the phenomenon of clandestine excavations on account 
of which countries and the world at large were sustaining heavy losses to cultural 
heritage 
 Highlighted “the importance of inventories as an essential tool for the 
understanding and protection of cultural property and for the identification of 
dispersed heritage and as a contribution to the advancement of scientific and 
artistic knowledge and intercultural communication”.  
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/19, 1985276 
 Drew attention to underwater cultural heritage and called on States with 
historical and cultural links to these treasures to cooperate towards their recovery 
in accordance with international law 
 Pointed out the need for restitution of cultural objects to be accompanied by 
training of personnel for their maintenance  
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 42/7, 1987277 
 Recommended closer monitoring of licenced excavations by archaeologists 
 Recommended that museums should be required to maintain inventories of 
cultural items not only on display but also in storage 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/10, 1991 
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 Highlighted the importance of deploying mass media and educational institutions 
to create greater awareness about progress on return and restitution of cultural 
property278 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/190, 1999279 
 In addition to the on-going illicit traffic in cultural property, drew attention to “the 
loss, destruction, damage, removal, theft, pillage or misappropriation of and any 
acts of vandalism directed against cultural property in areas of armed conflict and 
territories that are occupied. 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/97, 2001280 
 Lauded the creation of International Fund for the Return of Cultural Property to 
its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, to mark the 
thirtieth anniversary of UNESCO 1970 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/17, 2003281 
 Mentions “adoption of the International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural 
Property by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization on 16 November 1999” as a welcome step and urges 
implementation of the code. 
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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/52, 2006282 
 Acknowledged the scope of application of the Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property (adopted by UN in December 2004) to the 
protection of cultural heritage and appeals for member state cooperation to 
ensure the Convention comes into force 
 Recognised UNESCO’s efforts towards “promotion of bilateral negotiations, for 
the return or restitution of cultural property, the preparation of inventories of 
movable cultural property and the implementation of the Object-ID standard 
related thereto, as well as for the reduction of illicit traffic in cultural property and 
the dissemination of information to the public” 
 Mentioned the Cultural heritage laws database launched by UNESCO in 2005 and 
urged linking of all existing databases, including through closer cooperation with 
Interpol 
 Noted the inclusion of mediation and conciliation mechanisms in the revised 
Statutes of the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of 
Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit 
Appropriation 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution A.67/L.34, 2012283 
 Lauded steps taken by UNESCO towards training people in source countries to 
better equip them to protect cultural heritage while simultaneously engaging 
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with representatives of the international art trade “in order to improve practices 
and raise awareness in such areas as provenance investigations, ethics, restitution 
procedures and knowledge of the international legal framework”.  
 Implicitly recognised the connection between the illicit trade in cultural objects 
and other organised crime in calling for cooperation with United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 
African nations have taken the lead in sponsoring these UNGA resolutions. Meanwhile 
many African states have not ratified UNESCO 1970, and fewer still have ratified 
UNIDROIT 1995 (out of 54 nations, 22 have ratified and 6 accepted UNESCO 1970, 
whereas only 11 African nations are thus far contracting states for UNIDROIT 1995). 
However, because conventions carry greater weight than resolutions (as representing 
emerging opinio juris) in international law, we may have a skewed impression of the will 
of the international community.  
Snidal and Abbott term those “states (and other actors) that have worked to obtain 
commitments from others, often in the face of strong resistance”, as demandeurs. They 
estimate that “Demandeurs should seek hard legalization (1) when the likelihood of 
opportunism and its costs are high, and noncompliance is difficult to detect; (2) when 
they wish to limit participation to those strongly committed to an agreement; and (3) 
when executive officials in other states have preferences compatible with those of the 
demandeurs, but other elites within those states have divergent preferences. Finally, 
demandeurs should place greatest reliance on commitments by states that participate 
actively in legal regimes and have strong legal institutions, professions, and traditions.” 
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In the case of source countries desiring repatriation and restitution of their cultural 
goods from market countries, one observes that most of these conditions apply. Interest 
groups in market countries have been seen to repeatedly contrive justifications and 
maintain a culture of secrecy as well as a great degree of opportunism by exploiting the 
conditions which fuel illicit excavation and export from source countries. Source 
countries desire strong commitment on part of market countries as transfer of 
ownership of cultural property can be a fraught and drawn out process and there is room 
for debate about which items are of great cultural and national significance. In this case, 
not the demandeurs but the market countries themselves seek similar levels of 
commitment from other market countries as the game theory framework discussed 
previously suggests. In market countries there is usually a significant and vocal section of 
elite opinion which favours the purported educational needs and cultural enrichment of 
domestic constituents and thereby opposes restitution and repatriation. Lastly, the 
market countries have strong legal professions and traditions themselves. Yet, when 
seeking cooperation on restitution and repatriation of heritage, we find that African 
states as demandeurs have not chosen to Ratify UNESCO 1970 and UNIDROIT 1995. 
Instead, they have repeatedly used the forum of United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions to foster a normative consensus.  
Such a stance by African and other third world states could be attributed to a number of 
reasons. Through legalisation, African states become enmeshed with powerful non-state 
actors in market countries, namely museums and collectors, who are politically 
unaccountable and maintain a culture of secrecy. Legalisation also creates certain 
obligations for source countries which they may not have a capacity to fully meet. Lastly, 
whether through the non-aligned movement during the cold war or the inclusion of 
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second generation rights in the human rights paradigm, or indeed as the above UNGA 
resolutions demonstrate, in case of heritage conservation, third world states have 
demonstrated a preference for normative evolution as a driver of change in the 
international system. My assessment lends credence to Amitav Acharya’s view that “the 
so-called Third World has been a maker of international rules and norms”284. 
Archarya adds that the impact of third world states on the international system 
“include(s) significant modifications to, and adaptations of, European norms of 
sovereignty on the basis of preexisting local beliefs and practices, as well as the 
creation of new rules in the local context and exporting them to the wider 
regional and global levels to influence and shape relations within the Third World 
and between the Third World and the West”. The discourse of repatriation of 
cultural heritage and the demonstrated preference for norm-based cooperation over 
legalisation exemplify such a contribution of third world states.  
Heritage and Just War 
This section explores how the case study of heritage protection allows us to reassess and 
reimagine a fundamental building block of international law – particularly international 
humanitarian law and international criminal law – namely, Just War. Following two major 
motivations behind this study, the principles of Just War are first gleaned from various 
non-western traditions. Thereafter, Daniel Brunstetter’s framework built on the pillars of 
necessity tension, civilizational paradox and magnanimity principle is applied to refocus 
the discussion on destruction of cultural heritage in the context of war.  
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The analysis here is inspired by the two fold understanding that while the relevance of 
religious doctrine to the international normative framework governing just war is well 
established, there is an inadequate foundation of analysis spanning a spectrum of 
religions assessing their respective positions on key individual aspects of cause of war 
and its conduct, to support the desired international normative project. There is a 
multitude of desirable human goals and social aspirations across religions and within the 
same religion across time, and varying degrees of specification as to the proper means to 
achieve these. As a result, there is a genuine lack of a multi/inter-civilizational 
understanding of Just War and the widely held belief that, as it stands, the Just War 
Theory is largely based on relevant ideas in Christianity. To address this limitation, 
interpretations of Just War in other religious traditions – Manu, Sun Tzu and Shia and 
Sunni Islam are discussed. I argue that this, more broad-based approach to 
conceptualizing Just War Theory allows the evolution of International Criminal Law to be 
more sensitive to civilizational diversity, more responsive to changing nature of warfare 
and ultimately, a more effective instrument in promoting just peace.   
Rescuing Just War from Christian-centricity 
Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles states that the Tribunal constituted under the terms 
of the treaty aims to vindicate the “validity of international morality”. The Charter of the 
International Criminal Tribunal at Nuremberg counted murder, ill-treatment, or 
deportation of civilians in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war; 
killing of hostages; plunder of public or private property; wanton destruction of 
municipalities and devastation not militarily necessary as constituting war crimes. The 
Geneva Conventions separately identified breaches corresponding to the wounded on 
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land and sea, prisoners of war and civilians. The Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol 
I added to the list to include medical experimentation; making civilians and non-defended 
localities the object or inevitable victims of attack; the perfidious use of the Red Cross or 
Red Crescent emblem; transfer of an occupying power of parts of its population to 
occupied territory; unjustifiable delays in repatriation of POWs; apartheid; attack on 
historic monuments; and depriving protected persons of a fair trial as well as making it 
incumbent on States to prosecute or assist in prosecuting persons responsible for grave 
breaches. In-keeping with the changing nature of conflict, Additional Protocol II set out 
rules addressing the growing trend towards intrastate conflicts.  
The laws of war as we know them today may have been formalised in response to a 
combination of factors such as socio-political developments in the West across the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the emerging logic of the military industrial 
complex and evolution in the technologies of war making. However thinking about the 
role of war in intercivilizational and interstate relations predates this process of 
formalization by far. In fact, much of this thinking has happened in the context of 
religious pronouncements on broader issues of justice, peace and fairness.  
The fact that much codification of International Criminal Law based itself upon provisions 
in the United Nations Charter, which itself was a response to regional and context-
specific events, led to a progressive overshadowing of other stakeholders and their 
perspectives. To the extent that Custom is one of the sources of International Law then, 
revisiting Just War Theory to incorporate understandings from diverse religious and 
cultural traditions is a project directed at broadening the customary base and extending 
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the customary lineage of International Criminal Law, in time and across civilizational 
boundaries.      
While the relevance of religious doctrine to the international normative framework 
governing Just War is well established, there is an inadequate foundation of analysis 
spanning a spectrum of religions assessing their respective positions on key individual 
aspects of cause of war and its conduct, to support the desired international normative 
project. Academic debate has largely converged on whether religious texts justify 
violence or are mere subterfuge to mask other, more worldly, motives and further, 
whether believers of certain religions are more prone to resort to use of force than 
others285. Existing scholarly treatment has largely cast this as an issue of subjective 
textual interpretation. This obscures the fact that there is a multitude of desirable human 
goals and social aspirations across religions and within the same religion across time, and 
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Characterizing religions as generally precautionary and opposed to violence, Popovski goes on to acknowledge 
that "there are circumstances in which religions would find the use of armed force acceptable. (...) With a few 
exceptions - such as Jainism or Baha'i teachings, known for their extreme pacifism - all traditions admit that war 
can be, in fact should be, a necessary and proportionate tool to stop and aggressor. (...) Religions accept that war 
can be the lesser evil - the last resort to defeat a tyrant and restore peace and harmony." (Popovsky, Reichberg, 
Turner (eds.), World Religions and Norms of War, (United Nations University Press 2009) p. 12) 
Reichberg et al point to the seeming contradiction that “on the one hand, it is often assumed that “true” religion 
requires a renunciation of violence; on the other hand, it seems equally incontrovertible that, when individuals 
enter war with religious motivations, their use of force will know no limits”. (Popovsky, Reichberg, Turner (eds.), 
World Religions and Norms of War (United Nations University Press 2009), p. 303)  
Pearse poses more directly the related question: Is Religion the Primary Cause of violent conflict? "Though many 
wars in human history have been caused mostly by religious differences, many more have been caused by the 
things that religion, for the most part keeps in check: greed, pride, revenge, inhuman godless ideologies and 
disdain for the well-being of others", according to him.  (M. Pearse, The gods of war: is religion the primary cause 





varying degrees of specification as to the proper means to achieve these. As a result, 
there is a genuine lack of a multi/inter-civilizational understanding of Just War and the 
widely held belief that, as it stands, the Just War Theory is largely based on relevant ideas 
in Christianity.   
In the following sections, I start by reviewing thinkers within Christianity around whose 
ideas Just War Theory has developed. Thereafter, interpretations of Just War in other 
religious traditions – Manu, Sun Tzu and Shia and Sunni Islam are discussed. I argue that 
this, more broad-based approach to conceptualizing Just War Theory allows the 
evolution of International Criminal Law to be more sensitive to civilizational diversity, 
more responsive to changing nature of warfare and ultimately, a more effective 
instrument in promoting just peace.  
 
Augustine and Aquinas 
As a bishop in North Africa, Saint Augustine's writing explores various dimensions of faith 
but much of it has been interpreted by later commentators as relevant to the principles 
of Just War. An obvious and oft quoted idea in Augustine is that war is just under certain 
circumstances. But his main stipulation is that war may be waged only by "the good". The 
good in his conception are those who are guided by supreme reason (divine law) rather 
than temporal law (prevailing law at any given time). Augustine clearly believes that the 
good are not motivated by self-defense. Rather, killing an enemy is justified only in 
defense of others and in situations where virtue and other qualities of the soul are at risk 
at the hands of wrongdoers.  
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"Let necessity slay the warring foe, not your will286".  
As long as war is waged by those vested with legitimate authority to do so (and not 
everyone is), means adopted by them in order to win do not matter. Augustine insists 
however that the unarmed and innocent should under no circumstances be subjected to 
cruelty. To him, this was an important quality separating the Christian from the barbarian. 
In letter 189 to Boniface Augustine says:  
"As violence is returned to one who rebels and resists, so should mercy be to one who has 
been conquered or captured, especially when there is no fear of a disturbance of peace." 
 
But closer reading suggests that Augustine's main interest is in the weaknesses of human 
character that supply the basis for war in the first place - pride, malice, hatred. Even as he 
acknowledges the inevitability of war, he remains skeptical of ensuing victories. To 
Augustine, the pursuit of peace through war is justifiable merely in a (lesser) human 
sphere but the human propensity to inordinately value what he terms "goods of the 
earthly city", ultimately leads to a vicious cycle of misery. In City of God Book XIX Chapter 
twelve he states: 
"...pride imitates God in a distorted way. It hates equality with partners under God, but 
wants to impose its own domination upon its partners in place of God. Consequently, it 
hates the just peace of God and loves its own iniquitous peace." 
                                                          
286 All passages quoted in Augustine and Aquinas are from Reichberg, Syse and Begby (eds.) The Ethics of War: 
Classic and Contemporary Readings (Blackwell Publishing 2006) p. 70-90 and 169-198 respectively 
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This prognosis of human nature, together with the fact that scholars have failed to 
identify a coherent body of thought on just war in Augustine (simply basing themselves 
on disparate ideas pieced together), necessitates reconceptualization of Augustine's 
philosophy. It appears that Augustine's point of departure is not Just War but Just 
Peace.  
If the earthy realm followed the laws of God rather than temporal laws which are always 
subject to change, the need for war would never arise. But when barbarians threaten 
virtue in others, the good must not stand idly by but defend those in need. The following 
lines from Letter 229 to Darius suggest that Augustine does acknowledge means of 
rectifying wrongs short of use of force: 
"Preventing war through persuasion and seeking or attaining peace through peaceful 
means rather than through war are more glorious things than slaying men with the sword." 
Moreover, the end goal of victory does not guarantee that peace will permanently 
prevail; indeed man's pride will ensure this does not happen. In addition, he finds the 
origins of political authority itself in sin. Thus the same authority that must be counted on 
to bring wrongdoers to justice, cannot be trusted to establish long-term peace.  
In their editorial comments on select passages from Augustine, Reichberg et al argue 
that his views on the use of force were a response to a contemporary rebellion in the 
Church staged by the Donatists287. This assessment allows us to pinpoint deviations from 
the path of (Christian) virtue as the prime, and perhaps only, justification for the use of 
force to be found in Augustine. In sum, war is caused by human proclivity to stray from 
                                                          
287 Reichberg, Syse and Begby (eds.) The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Blackwell 
Publishing 2006) p 85 
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the path of virtue and the order that results when force is applied being always short of 
the perfect just peace, will ultimately produce conditions fueling war again. The limits on 
use of force in Augustine are the possibility of persuasion, legitimate authority and 
defense of the innocent.  
 Thomas Aquinas explores war in the context of peace and peace with reference to 
justice. In his view, inner peace prevails when there is a “union of the appetite’s 
inclinations” i.e. when the heart is free of desires and wants. And peace between 
individuals prevails when they are in concord as to what is desirable in accordance with 
Charity, the preeminent Christian virtue.  
“Peace is the work of justice indirectly, in so far as justice removes obstacles to peace: but it 
is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature causes peace.” 
When it comes to war, Aquinas appears more favorably disposed to self defense as 
reasonable grounds for use of force when compared with Augustine. As regards the 
manner of conducting war, he argues that ambushing the enemy is acceptable. While 
deception by falsely representing ones intentions is illicit, concealing them from the 
enemy is not. 
In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas justifies war in these words: 
“Even those who seek war and dissention, desire nothing but peace, which they deem 
themselves not to have. For (…) there is no peace when a man concords with another man 
counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this 
concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing 
is contrary to their will.” 
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 More broadly, Aquinas seems to be interested in exploring the human quest for a more 
perfect peace and specifying the conditions that legitimize wielding of political power in 
general, making his ideas applicable in a context of nonconventional conflict and civil 
wars as well.   
Where does Aquinas place the limits on war? The answer can only be gauged from his 
discussion on peace in general as he does not articulate his own views but simply 
synthesizes and sometimes refutes and modifies those of theologians that came before 
him. A plausible reading would be that the basis for war is removed when the virtue of 
Charity is attained so that inner harmony is enjoyed and where there is agreement on 
what the ultimately desirable social goods are so that justice, and thereby 
outer/communal peace, prevails.    
Manu 
The Hindu conception of War and its place in society evolved amid the countervailing 
influences of the idealism in epics such as the Ramayana and Mahabharata, the realism of 
political texts such as the Arthashastra and the proximity to pacifist streaks in Jainism 
and Buddhism. Kaushik Roy identifies the concept of Dharmayuddha as the counterpart 
of Just War in Hinduism288: 
Dharmayuddha depends on the ends (i.e. the objectives) of war. Any war undertaken 
against injustice becomes a dharmayuddha. (…) organized violence applied in accordance 
with certain codes and customs. 
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Contemporary Readings (Blackwell Publishing 2006), p 33 
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Manu is the legendary originator of the Hindu/Sanskrit legal code and his writing has 
been acknowledged by present day scholars and commentators as the place where the 
notion of war crimes first coherently appeared.  
Manu discusses war in the context of a much broader discussion on the nature of 
kingship, the duties associated with it, moral authority of kings and their conduct. In the 
first place, the king is to ensure that justice prevails and the (hierarchical) social order 
maintained. He expounds at length on defensive measures to be put in place by a king to 
preserve territorial integrity. Once this has been done, the more justly the king rules over 
his own domain, the higher will be the reputational gains he makes abroad.  
Careful reading reveals that Manu envisages the role of warfare as a way for the just and 
righteous king to amass more resources and enrich his kingdom. Manu's equivalent of 
the "system" in the Realist school of International Relations is a number of kingdoms, 
some ruled by more just kings than others and varying in wealth and prestige. Thus the 
logic of warfare flows from self-preservation and when the opportunity presents itself, 
self-aggrandizement and enrichment289: 
"Let the king consider as hostile his immediate neighbor (...), as friendly the immediate 
neighbor of his foe, and as neutral (the king) beyond these two." 
Roy notes that “one of the characteristics of dharmayuddha is its defensive nature”. It is 
crucial, however, to distinguish between defensive tactics and defensive intentions. 
Indeed, the King being duty bound to increase his power and prestige through conquest, 
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clearly suggests that there is no recognition of self-defense as the sole just cause for 
waging war in this tradition.   
Certain caveats do indeed apply to this general position on the right of kings to engage in 
warfare. 
Firstly, establishment of a just, prosperous and secure internal order precedes external 
military engagement.  
"When the king knows that at some future time his superiority is certain, and at the present 
time he will suffer little injury, then let him have recourse to peaceful measures. But when 
he thinks all his subjects to be exceedingly contented, and that he himself is most exalted, 
then let him make war."  
Secondly, even when dealing with rival kingdoms, warfare is one of many instruments of 
statecraft, diplomacy being the most important among them. 
"For the ambassador alone makes allies and separates allies; the ambassador transacts that 
business by which kings are disunited or not. Having learnt exactly (from his ambassador) 
the designs of the foreign king, let (the king) take such measures that he does not bring evil 
on himself." 
This is also indicative of there being a notion of last resort in Manu. Elsewhere he says: 
“He should try to conquer his foes by conciliation, by (well-applied) gifts, and by creating 
dissention, used either separately or conjointly, never by fighting (if it can be avoided). For 
when two (princes) fight, victory and defeat in battle are, as experience teaches uncertain; 
let him therefore avoid an engagement.” 




"Thus has been declared the blameless, primeval law for warriors; from this law a Kshatriya 
must not depart, when he strikes his foes in battle." 
His main injunctions in terms of proper war-time conduct are avoiding harm to the 
innocent and unarmed, humane treatment of wounded and captured warriors and bans 
on use of certain kinds of weaponry. Manu does not explicitly discuss "legitimate 
authority", assuming that it is vested in the king; instead he provides specifications as to 
the character of such a king.  
“By him who is pure and faithful to his promise, who acts according to the Institutes 
(injunctions) of sacred law, who has good assistants and is wise, punishment can be justly 
inflicted.” 
Thus punishment being key to orderly human behavior and essential to maintaining 
internal and external order, the same variable, namely the king’s character, legitimizes 
use of force within the domain and outside.  
Manu’s teaching as regards the post bellum order, directs the victors to endeavor to 
restore equilibrium of justice and friendly relations with vanquished former adversaries.  
“When he has gained victory, (…) having fully ascertained the wishes of all the 
(conquered), let him place a relative of the vanquished ruler on the throne, and let him 
impose his conditions,” 
While Manu earlier justifies waging of war to extract bounties from neighboring 
kingdoms, in his post bellum scenario, the victorious king is ever mindful to balance this 
against the need to turn former foes into future allies: 
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“By gaining gold and land a king grows not so much in strength as by obtaining a firm 
friend, who, though weak, may become powerful in the future”. 
Another eminent strategist in this tradition is Kautilya, an influential advisor to King 
Chandragupta of the Maurya dynasty (around 300 BC). Kautilya’s mandala theory 
anticipates the anarchical State system at the heart of structural realism (and commonly 
attributed to Hobbesian state of nature). Explaining this theory, Roy writes: 
Kautilya portrays interstate relations as a circle composed of various kingdoms. This is 
known as the mandala theory. The manadala is full of disorder, chaos and anarchy (…) the 
only security in such a dangerous, fluid situation is power. (…) Hence struggle between the 
various kingdoms is inevitable.  
 
Sun Tzu 
Sun Tzu delves deeper into the art and science of warfare rather than setting out a 
detailed context in which aggression is justified. The wise general is vested with almost 
limitless freedom when it comes to strategy and tactics. He stands firmly in favor of 
deception and deployment of overwhelming force against the opponent, indeed, 
repeatedly advocating them through various metaphors as vital to success in battle. 
Foraging on resources in hostile territory and disrupting civilian life to drain the 
adversary's morale are also deemed permissible.   
Broadly speaking, Sun Tzu's point of departure is moral law which, he says, causes people 
to be in complete accord with the ruler and such a ruler always has the upper hand when 
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it comes to warfare. However the principles of limited objectives and humane treatment 
of enemy combatants and spies may also be gleaned in his writing290: 
"There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. (...) In war, 
then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns."  
"The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. (...) The enemy's spies who have 
come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably 
housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service." 
As noted above however, Sun Tzu is less categorical on the place of war in the general 
conduct of political affairs. Perhaps his most frequently cited adage however is that: 
"...in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas 
he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory." 
This could simply mean that measures should be taken to ascertain that the enemy is in a 
weaker position compared to the aggressor at the time of attack. An alternative 
interpretation, however, raises the more fundamental question as to whether war should 
be engaged in at all once underlying objectives have been attained.  
Shia and Sunni Islam 
Feirahi writes that “in Islamic jurisprudence, war is equal to jihad, which is one of the 10 
secondary rules of Islam. However it should be noted that one must necessarily 
distinguish between the Qur’anic and jurisprudential usages of “jihad”. In most cases in 
the Qur’an, jihad means “striving” in the way of God; in its jurisprudential usage, 
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https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf 
Accessed June 23, 2020 
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however, jihad refers to “war” …291” Sonbol maintains the same distinction referring to 
the first sense as Jihad and the terming the second, narrower, interpretation as 
“Qatilu”292. She also identifies protection of life and human dignity and protecting the 
helpless as two main overriding concerns in Islam. Seeking to clarify the term Jihad, 
Mahmud Mamdani offers another distinction: “Scholars distinguish between two broad 
traditions of jihad: jihad Akbar (the greater jihad) and jihad Asgar (the lesser jihad), The 
greater jihad, it is said, is a struggle against weaknesses of self; it is about how to live and 
attain piety in a contaminated world, The lesser jihad, in contrast, is about self-
preservation and self-defense; more externally directed, it is the source of Islamic notions 
of what Christians call "just war"293.”  
In the specific context of Shiite Islam, Feirahi names “four sources of interpretation: the 
Holy Qur’an, Tradition (Sunna), Intellect (Aql), and Unanimity (consensus)294.” Her 
description of these as sources of interpretation suggests evolutionary growth as per 
historical circumstance and room for application in accordance with context. On this 
point too Sonbol is in agreement with the qualification that there are indeed “consistent 
references and beliefs that represent essential points that appear in the writings of 
important thinkers over the ages”. Within (and perhaps stemming from) this interpretive 
flexibility, there appears a cleavage between thinkers who believe the qualifying 
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secondary verses are central to reading the main injunctions on War and those that 
maintain that the primary verses overrule secondary qualifications.  
The general principle guiding all followers is that use of force is justified when there is 
persecution of Muslims, in particular displacement and attacks on holy sites. But beyond 
this first point of departure, a spectrum of opinion exists on defensive versus offensive 
jihad. On this point Feirahi writes: “The classic Islamic jurisprudence, whether Shiite or 
Sunnite, classifies jihad on two levels: offensive and defensive. In this classical approach, 
the main meaning of jihad is offensive jihad, which is an obligatory act for any Muslim. 
Particularly among Sunnites, it is believed that the Qur’anic verses on jihad nullified 
(nasikh) the Qur’anic verses on peace…” 
The quotes below from two prominent jurisprudents starkly convey this difference of 
opinion: 
“It is our obligation to commence war on them (non-believers), though they may not intend 
to commence a war on us. Because Allah has made it an obligation on us to kill the 
unbelievers, so nobody (Lawful or Unlawful Governors) would be in a position to suspend 
this rule, so that all the people would say that there is no god but Allah.295” 
“But if Muslims are attacked by the enemy and the religion or lives of Muslims are in danger, 
in such a case Jihad and defence is a religious duty even under an unjust ruler, of course not 
as an offensive Jihad, but as one defending the lives of Islam and Muslims.296” 
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The above quotes also allude to the question of legitimate authority and herein lies the 
main difference between Shiite and Sunni Islam. In Shiite Islam, only the infallible Imam is 
vested with the authority to declare war. The fact that the twelfth infallible Imam is in 
occultation, coupled with the responsibility of believers in Islam to engage in jihad 
discussed above, may lead us to conclude that defensive jihad has the upper hand in 
Shiite Islam. This reading also finds resonance in the words297 of the First infallible Imam, 
Ali, who lived in the seventh century: 
Peace is closer to salvation and is more beneficial up to the moment that Islam is not in peril. 
Analysis 
Based on review of principles embedded in the traditions discussed above, one can 
plausibly conclude that Just War Theory embraces their understanding of conduct during 
war more broadly than it does the competing conceptions of just cause for war. Both are 
separately discussed below and implications for relevant aspects of International 
Criminal Law assessed in each case. 
The two pillars of Jus in Bello – Discrimination and Proportionality – find mention in all of 
the traditions studied but an exact overlap of scope and rationale is not in evidence. All 
religious tenets forbid attacks on the unarmed. There is general agreement that humane 
treatment must be extended to captured enemy combatants. However, in Sun Tzu, this 
is inspired not by a humanitarian logic but as an extension of strategy to the extent that 
it is justified for purposes of gathering information about the enemy. As regards 
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proportionality, it has been noted above that disruption of civilian life is acceptable in 
Sun Tzu as a means to gain the psychological edge over the adversary. Hindu philosophy 
legitimizes attack on all assets in enemy territory, although it equally holds the victor 
responsible for restoring order to defeated regions and populations post bellum.  
The table below summarises the broad orientation to offensive and defensive war in the 
traditions considered and juxtaposes them against the locus of legitimacy.  
 Offensive War  Defensive War 







Legitimacy derived from 
text 
 Sunni Islam 
 
In Sunni Islam, there is consensus around the idea that enemies of Islam and its 
homelands should be opposed and by violent means if necessary. Less widely shared but 
certainly prevalent is the belief that offensive jihad may be waged against nonbelievers. 
In the table above it is therefore classified under traditions which legitimise Defensive 
War. In Shia Islam too we find this justification for defensive war when Islam and its 
believers are in jeopardy but with the additional requirement that resort to violence must 
be certified by the Imam (in occultation). This is unlike in Sunni Islam where only the 
message contained in religious texts matters.    
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Manu and Sun Tzu are classified under offensive war in the table simply because both 
speak of waging war necessarily from a position of strength. The fact that the Hindu king 
is permitted to wage war to augment the resources of his kingdom suggests that 
unprovoked aggression is not ruled out. It is noteworthy however, that this decision 
rests with the just king and involves the exercise of the wisdom, discretion and sense of 
fairness that he embodies. Sun Tzu also accords significant weight to the wise general’s 
assessment of when and for what reasons resorting to force is acceptable. The fact that 
both these traditions make room for offensive war in no way means, however, that war 
is inevitable. They lay great emphasis on the role of diplomacy and other instruments of 
statecraft in ensuring harmonious interstate relations.   
To conclude, it is instructive to recall what the judgement of the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal reads298: 
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of States 
which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles of justice 
applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. This law is not static, but by continual 
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world.  
The analysis above shows that there are indeed divergent perceptions of offensive and 
defensive war not fully captured in the Just War Theory as it has been understood and 
which thereby remain unrepresented in International Criminal Law despite their 
significance in real world conflict scenarios. We also find that proportionality is not 
uniformly defined across all traditions. As battlefields of the future evolve to include, for 
instance, cyber warfare, this finding can help us take more effective measures to ensure 
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emerging risks to civilian life are insured against. One of the traditions reviewed above 
upholds the right to defend one’s home and territory based on interpretation of textual 
sources. Seen from this perspective, it does not matter that the “invading force” terms 
the intervention as humanitarian. Thus, a broader reconceptualization of Just War Theory 
calls into question a one-size-fits-all approach to Humanitarian Intervention. Lastly, since 
so much of the theological literature reviewed discusses justice and peace in relation to 
each other, it provides valuable insights towards addressing a concern at the heart of 
International Criminal Law: How to balance considerations of peace and reconciliation 
with the aspiration of bringing wrongdoers to justice? 
Just war, protecting heritage and intercivilisational dialogue 
Brunstetter counts “scholasticism, neoscholasticism, canon law, chivalric code, holy war, 
secular natural law, positive law, various types of reformism, and realism” among the 
influences that have shaped the recurring themes constituting a body of thought that is 
Just War299. He identifies three themes that are most pertinent to any discussion on the 
threat of heritage destruction in war: 
1. Necessity Tension which refers to “the dilemmas that military planners and 
soldiers face when deciding whether to destroy or preserve cultural heritage sites 
to advance toward victory300” 
2. Civilisational paradox or the question as to “who defines which sites are 
intrinsically valuable?301” 
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3. Magnanimity Principle which refers to “the positive effects that could ensue in 
choosing not to pursue the full range of acts the laws of war permit in times of 
necessity302” 
It is true that all cultures through history have partaken in plundering and spoliation of 
each other’s heritage. However, a multi-civilisational perspective on Just War helps us 
address some of the nuances of the problematic of protecting heritage amid conflict. 
Firstly, the justifications for attacking the enemy’s heritage might be found to vary. 
Brunstetter gives the example of the ancient Romans whose “worldview that clearly 
distinguished between the civilized and the barbarians would impact how it fought its 
wars, and what respect was ultimately paid to the cultural heritage of its enemies303”. 
From the foregoing discussion about various traditions, one could extrapolate a 
motivation of obtaining precious materials by plundering well-endowed heritage sites 
from Manu’s justification of waging war to augment the resources of the kingdom/state.  
Secondly, this analytical exercise helps us transcend the necessity tension – already 
reflected in existing law in the form of “military necessity” and discussed in previous 
chapters – and tap the Magnanimity Principle for it is promise. Sun Tzu’s emphasis on 
limited objectives and non-disruption of civilian life serve as a boost to the magnanimity 
principle. Manu’s insistence on a just ruler as a precondition for just war points towards a 
magnanimous attitude towards the enemy’s culture and way of life.  
Thirdly, it would be possible to glean a range of prescriptions on action to be taken 
concerning destroyed or looted heritage after the end of hostilities – Manu, for instance, 
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would advocate restitution if it enhances the prospects of converting a former adversary 
into an ally.  
Fourthly, it gives us grounds to argue against the destruction of heritage in the name of 
religious prescription – in fact, use of force is justified in Shiite Islam if holy sites are 
attacked. This aspect is particularly important considering the deliberate destruction of 
heritage in recent years as part of the strategy of non-conventional warfare. Lastly, it 
evades the risk of a hegemonic interpretation of the value of heritage by preventing the 
views of a particular tradition from becoming generalized and predominant. In other 
words, an intercivilisational dialogue of this kind enables us to arrive at a more balanced 
and multi-faceted response to Brunstetter’s question “who decides which sites are 
intrinsically valuable?”.  
An intercivilisational dialogue is greatly instructive in determining what puts heritage at 
risk during war and how heritage protection might be reimagined both during hostilities 
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In the last three chapters we applied the paradigms of Game Theory, Human Security and 
Constructivism to international cooperation on protecting cultural patrimony. In this 
chapter we evaluated major international legal responses as falling under the three 
clusters of legalisation, criminalisation, and regulation, restitution and repatriation. To 
conclude this chapter the above table brings the entire discussion together and shows 
how approaches from International Relations and International Law working together 
present international cooperation in a particular domain in different light, as a step 
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“Did an aggregate of entities boasting their sovereignty and insisting upon the 
absoluteness of their particular interests constitute a societas where jus could reign? 
Could the norms alleged to govern their conduct without benefit of authoritative 
agencies of interpretation and enforcement, and subject therefore to literally 
interminable debate between parties, be classified as law? Were they not rather a purely 
tentative code, observed in fair weather, discarded in storm? Most lawyers seemed 
content to leave the matter there.304” 
This series of queries raised by P.E. Corbett over half a century ago fairly sum up the 
inspiration behind conducting this study at the intersection of International Relations and 
International Law.  
The most significant contribution of this study lies in the innovative engagement it 
orchestrates between the disciplines of International Relations and International Law as 
its basic methodological orientation. This methodological enterprise is not directed at 
finding common ground between the disciplines, as most existing literature has aimed 
for, but at isolating those incompatibilities which illuminate and energise both disciplines.  
The approach taken in analysing our case study from the lenses of rational choice/game 
theory, human security and constructivism departs sharply from the inductive and 
hierarchical approach to legal research but is instead selective and non-hierarchical. This 
study has attempted to show that the clash between International Relations and 
                                                          




International Law research methods offers a new way forward for research by uniquely 
accessing the potential of international law.  
In a practical and practice sense, the trend of foreign ministries being increasingly staffed 
by lawyers throws up questions about the distinctiveness of legal norms and the 
emphasis laid on them over social, cultural, professional, religious and other types of 
norms305, as well as of the influence of epistemic and practice communities more 
generally. This phenomenon and its ramifications for conducting the business of the 
international society enhances the urgency of a meaningful collaboration between 
International Relations and International Law. On the opposite end, International 
Relations scholars operating on their own have been able to show how norms with 
domestic origins come to be internationalised. In conversation with International Legal 
scholars however, they have been able to examine how norm entrepreneurs operating at 
the international level can effect social and legal change in the domestic realm. Such an 
understanding is crucial as we navigate a paradoxical contemporary milieu of strident 
global social movements on the one hand and the inward pull of nationalism and 
populism building on the disenchantment and discontents of globalisation on the other.  
The choice of heritage protection as my case study sidesteps the tendency in 
International Relations to arrive at generalisations and middle-range theorisation based 
almost exclusively on studying issues of high politics. As succinctly stated by Finnemore 
“the ‘null hypothesis’ in international law debates is that soft law does not matter or 
does not matter as much as hard law”306. This study proves that soft law matters but 
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transcends the very debate by investigating how the language of international law is 
used and received by policy makers and those social groups whose interests are at stake. 
By examining international legal responses in a particular domain (heritage protection 
and cultural property) through the categories of legalisation, criminalisation and 
regulation, the study also uncovers the picture that emerges when the very binary 
between hard and soft law has been purposefully dismantled. In the case of restitution 
and repatriation, for instance, we observed that both hard and soft law coexist. Further 
we discovered that legalisation does not necessarily mean that there is no space left for 
norm evolution in that particular domain. In fact, we found that states will often 
appropriate the products of legalisation (conventions and treaties) for their normative 
content rather than their binding force.  
Another achievement of this study is that its methodological framework allows us to 
transcend investigating international law purely for its form and function. The human 
security approach to heritage protection enabled detection of trauma as a source of 
conflict and contributed to an enhanced and extended conception of the security we aim 
for. The constructivist paradigm cast aside the presumed neutrality of language when it 
comes to articulating our moral positions and forming our world views. Going beyond 
form and function to look into the normative ambitions and ramifications of international 
law can make all the difference – either it will shore up structures of oppression or 
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